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Why Turkey insists on taking part in the battle for Mosul

November 5, 2016 at 12:20 pm

Turkey has declared its intention to take part in the battle for Mosul against Daesh and has started to increase its military presence along the border with Iraq. Its insistence on taking part is down to three main reasons. For a start, Turkey is hosting more than 3 million Syrian refugees and has to cope with border-related problems due to the five-year war in Syria; it does not want a demographic change in northern Iraq as Iran-backed Shia militias may try to force Sunni Arabs and Turkmens to leave their homes. Nor does it want Mosul to become a centre for anti-Turkey groups, including the Iranian-supported Shia militant group Hashdi Shaabi (“Popular Mobilisation Forces” — PMF), which has been known for its brutality against Sunni civilians and the Kurdish PKK since — to Ankara’s chagrin — the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (the PKK), took power in northern Syria. Finally, Turkey has always been the defender of the Iraqi Turkmens’ rights, regardless of their sects. The government in Ankara is afraid that the Turkmens will be slaughtered, as reports indicate that the PMF has already entered the Turkmens town of Tel Afar.

Baghdad’s response to Turkey’s proposed major role in Mosul was negative; America’s was ambiguous. However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insists that the Mosul issue is related directly to Turkey’s situation in the region. Erdoğan’s recent remarks about the 1923 Lausanne Treaty as a result of which Turkey had to abandon Mosul and Kirkuk prompted accusations that he is following a sectarian policy and imperial ambitions. Turkey has long been training some Kurdish and Sunni Arab forces in its military base in Bashiqa, near Mosul, for the purpose of clearing Daesh and also has troops in four other bases. However, the Iraqi government claims that Turkish troops are occupiers even though they are there at the request of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with Baghdad’s approval.

Turkey has spent more than $12 billion on the Syrian refugees; this figure excludes the humanitarian aid provided by civil society and charities. Moreover, it has to deal with several social aspects of the refugee issue, including the integration of the refugees into Turkey’s health and education systems, and creating job opportunities. Although Turkey is the most successful country in terms of providing the refugees with facilities, compared to Jordan, Lebanon and the EU countries, it is wary of taking more people. It does not want to face a new wave of refugees, although this is a possibility; it is a fact that the Sunnis are not welcome in Shia-dominated areas and that the KRG has stated that it does not have the capability of looking after more people. Moreover, a new wave of refugees will destabilise the border with Iraq where the PKK is already located and carries out deadly attacks within Turkey. There are disturbing reports that some PKK militants, who have been using Sinjar as a base after being freed from Daesh, have joined the operation alongside Iran-backed Kurdish groups. Hence, Turkey wants Mosul to be governed by Sunni Arabs under the authority of the government in Baghdad.

“Very important incidents are happening just near our border and we have to protect ourselves,” said Turkey’s Defence Minister Fikri Işık earlier this week. His words explain Turkey’s intention. It does not want other terror groups like the PKK to take the place of Daesh after Mosul is retaken, as it has experience in Rojava and Kobane where Daesh was repelled and then the two Syrian towns became bases for the PKK/PYD; it was discovered later that PKK militants who have carried out terrorist attacks in big cities entered Turkey from Syria.

The participation of Iran-backed Shia radical groups also disturbs Turkey. Ankara and Tehran are at odds with each other over Syria as the latter has been sending thousands of militants there to fight against Turkish-backed opposition groups. Although the countries do not want to tackle each other directly due to trade and energy deals, it is apparent that Iran-backed groups will be fighting against Turkish-backed groups in Iraq too. Mosul has become an issue about influence for both governments. While Iran has been backing the Baghdad administration and some Kurdish political parties — especially Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Movement of Change, known as Gorran — Turkey has pledged its support for the incumbent KRG President Massoud Barzani. Ankara enjoys close cooperation with the Gulf, so it is also concerned about Iran’s efforts to create a Shia corridor that will prevent Turkey from maintaining its influence in the region.

Since the foundation of modern Turkey, Ankara has always dealt with the Turkmens’ problems in Iraq and believes that it has to defend the Turkish-speaking community’s rights. Due to the Turkmens’ close ties, Ankara has taken on the role that the government in Baghdad has failed to do, to keep Daesh away from Turkmens towns while the PKK and some KRG officials have a negative stance towards the community.

It is clear why Turkey wants to take a role in the battle for Mosul. Although the Iraqi and Iranian media claim that Turkey is sectarian, throughout its modern history the government in Ankara has always regarded itself to be above sectarian issues. It has maintained very good and promising economic relations with Iran even while positioning itself closer to Riyadh in Syria and disputing with the Saudis over Egypt. Even though the Western media claims that Turkey wants to annex Mosul — suggesting that Operation Euphrates Shield in Syria will help Turkey to declare its sovereignty in Northern Syria and Northern Iraq — it is probable that Erdoğan’s reminder that Mosul was under Turkish rule for centuries was rhetoric for domestic consumption more than anything else. Ankara does not want its troops to be on the front line but is concerned that post-Daesh Mosul may fall into the hands of groups with which Turkey has no ties.

In conclusion, Turkey wants to take part in the Mosul operation to prevent the destabilisation of its border; stop another influx of refugees; take pre-emptive measures against groups like the PKK and PMF; and so as not to challenge Iran militarily directly whilst also preventing Tehran’s expansionism. The nationalist rhetoric seems to be used to create a sense of historical legitimacy in the minds of Turkish citizens, while the emphasis on Mosul being administrated by Sunnis is related directly to the dynamics of the region.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.