Gaza and the poisoned bread

We, who monitored the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas’ visits to Cairo, saw the most recent of which, Deputy Head of the Hamas Political Bureau Ismail Haniyeh’s visit and his meeting with Egyptian officials and the Director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate (EGID) Khaled Fawzy. He is the highest ranking figure that has met with Hamas so far during the rule of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi.

The level of optimism shown by the Hamas officials towards relations with Egypt and the “qualitative improvement” of the bilateral relations between the two parties was noteworthy. This will reflect positively on the mechanism of opening the Rafah crossing to allow those stranded on either side and those travelling to and from Gaza to cross. It will also alleviate the severity of the siege by increasing the amount of Egyptian goods that will enter and be consumed by the besieged Palestinians in Gaza.

After monitoring the merits and circumstances of the bilateral relations, I believe that the level of optimism shown by Hamas or the magnitude of what Hamas expects from its relationship in the short-term is an issue that requires consideration. It is no secret that the essence of the bilateral meetings from the Egyptian perspective is focused mainly on the security issues and includes pressuring Hamas to hand over a number of individuals, wanted on security charges, located in Gaza. On the other hand, Cairo is hoping that Hamas will assist Egypt in dealing with the security issue that erupted a few years ago in Sinai, and would, in cooperation with the Egyptian security institution, prosecute wanted individuals and armed groups that succeeded in becoming a worrying security/military phenomenon for the Egyptian government and its ability to control the area.

Hamas, who oversees the Gaza Strip, finds itself torn, as it is realistically and nationally responsible for managing the affairs in Gaza and is working hard to lift the siege imposed on Gaza 10 years ago, and the key to doing so is its sole Arab neighbour, Egypt, after the PA refused to bear its national and political responsibilities in Gaza. At the same time, Hamas refuses to interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state in order to protect the path of its resistance and to keep its compass pointing towards the Israeli occupation. This is because it is aware that any interference in any country or taking any sides would involve it in regional crises, create many enemies, exhaust the movement in the long run, and will distract it from resisting the occupation, who is the only one benefitting from the Palestinians’ and Arabs’ distraction or seizure of resistance. This is especially true as it allows the occupation to continue its Judaisation and occupation of the West Bank and Jerusalem, thus killing the Palestinians’ dream of a state.

There is no doubt that Hamas’ hesitation and caution is justified, especially since it has witnessed similar situations with its own eyes. The Lebanese organisation, Hezbollah’s experience in Syria, which I will not assess, is an example of this, especially if we take into consideration the complications in the Egyptian economic, political and security scene. Whether we like it or not, Cairo is confronting the Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood, who are an ideological extension of Hamas, and it has normalised relations with the Israeli occupation, even cooperating with it in a number of issues. Egypt is also the sponsor of the PA in Ramallah and of the political movement’s rivals, such as President Mahmoud Abbas and his rival Mohammed Dahlan. In addition to this, the relations between Cairo and Hamas are dominated by suspicion and caution due to the difference in opinions regarding politics and ideological references, although the latter is always careful to avoid any public clashes or differences with Cairo, who is in control of Gaza’s political geography.

Therefore, it is Gaza and Hamas’ fate to choose to either maintain its original approach and methodology while retaining a margin of manoeuvring in order to ward off the ghost of clashes with Cairo, and to try to alleviate the siege’s severity until the equation changes once there is a change in subjective and objective factors, or to eat poisoned bread out of necessity in order to save itself from a slow death.

Translated from Arabi21, 1 February 2017

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.