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Normalisation efforts with Israel before peace

April 4, 2017 at 9:15 pm

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shakes hands with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (L) during the funeral of former Israeli President Shimon Peres in Jerusalem on 30 September, 2016 [Amos Ben Gershom/Reuters]

There have been American-Israeli actions which carry a warning of normalisation before final status issues in the supposed Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are resolved. This is accompanied by pressure on Muslim Arab countries in order to enhance the hopes of confidence in the region and propose concrete initiatives towards ending the isolation of Israel and establishing normal relations with it, as a “backwards” prelude to peace.

The Separation Wall built by Israel in the occupied West Bank

The Separation Wall built by Israel in the occupied West Bank

The foundations of this “settlement” effort are extended by sending good intention gestures promising the region’s countries would treat the Israeli occupation normally and end its isolation, without ruling out coming up with a formula of some sort that would be headed by normalisation to resolve the final status issues (refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, borders, security and water). This constitutes a dangerous warning that would achieve Israel’s goals in the region and disregard the legitimate Arab Palestinian rights, reversing the content of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The initiative stipulates the withdrawal of Israel to the 4 June 1967 borders and reaching a fair solution regarding the Palestinian refugees in accordance with Resolution 194 in exchange for normalised relations, meaning ending the Israeli occupation of Arab and Palestinian territories, first, and then the final step would lead to normalisation.

The alarming nature of this action, along with the efforts to achieve a two-state solution before resolving the final status issues, aligns with the meaning of a state before a solution. This includes the liquidation of the Palestinian national rights, as well as structurally contradicting the right of the refugees to return to their homes and the land that they were expelled from by Israeli violence in 1948. This is especially true in light of Israel’s condition of the Palestinian recognition of “the Jewishness of the state”, which aims to erase the right of return and deprive Arab citizens of Israel their right to their country.

There is nothing to suggest that a fair and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue will be found soon at least, and perhaps not even in the long-term.

This is because the concept of peace contradicts the ideological foundations of the Israeli entity which is based on racism and expansionism, amid a constant search for security and protection that are absent in light of the presence and resistance of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The launch of the peace process in Madrid in 1991 has forced the occupation to search once again for the identity of the Israeli entity among developments that have occurred in the last decade of the 20th century, which Israel was not immune from.

This includes the emergence of the “post-Zionism” theories regarding the Israeli dilemma, the role of Zionist thought in the state leadership, the means of dealing with the presence of the Palestinian and Israeli nations living on the same land given the Zionist ideology’s inability to find a solution to the problem of relations with the Palestinians residing in the occupied territories, and resolving the issue of the state identity.

Since signing the Egyptian-Israeli treaty in 1979, we have found early indications in the Israeli debate circles of a contradiction between the ideological constants and the mechanisms of political work, reaching its climax when Begin’s government called for the abandonment of “all of Israel” which is part of the Zionist ideology and a vital extension of Israel’s national security. In addition to this, Israel’s participation in the Madrid peace conference caused a similar debate, but more intense and involved various trends in Israeli society.

There are those who believe that the peace process established the features of a new Israeli phase that involves many questions regarding the function of the state, its role, identity, future and relationship with Zionism. They also raised doubts regarding the feasibility of Zionist concepts, such as “Greater Israel” or the “Promised Land”, which form the foundations of the Zionist historical, religious and ideological claims that view the West Bank as part of the “Land of Israel”. This does not mean these concepts will be disregarded altogether, especially in light of the presence of political religious movements that are fuelled by such concepts and which derive their active role by sticking to these concepts. These concepts are also used when talking about Israel’s security needs, as they are considered justifications that allow for the negotiations on Israel’s presence either permanently or temporarily in the area.

However, the Israeli entity is not ready to change its nature and ideological discourse, despite its attempts to adapt to international and regional changes. It is looking for any formula that will enable it to achieve control and security without causing instability in the Israeli home and without losing the credibility of the Zionist project, both in the eyes of the settlers or the imperialist approach it adopts. This is one of the most important contradictions in the process of the peaceful settlement.

Furthermore, it does not need to reach a settlement today that includes a compromise regarding the occupied territories and the weakening of its deterrent capabilities because the balance of power is in its favour given the current troubled Arab region.

The forces opposing peace within Israeli society recognise the contradiction between Zionism and its traditional ideas with peace and coexistence. They are also aware of the correlation between the process of peace, the interaction of cultures and the deconstruction of traditional Zionist thought, which explains why extremist Israeli forces are opposed to peace, since peace is considered the death of traditional Zionist thought and its end as an out-dated culture.

Image of Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem [Muammar Awad/Apaimages]

Image of Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem [Muammar Awad/Apaimages]

Hence the Israeli rejection of the division of Jerusalem, the cessation of settlements and the right of return, accompanied by the policy of hostility and force against the Palestinians. The Zionist movement in its early days adopted this policy in order to achieve its colonial project in Palestine. The Israeli position on the future Palestinian entity has not deviated from the context of autonomy whose privileges are confined to the residents’ life affairs, while security and sovereignty are assigned to the occupation. Although some Israeli left-wing parties claim publicly to be reconciled with the idea of a Palestinian state, they refuse to make any concessions regarding occupied territories needed to establish a state, amid changes within it that cannot lead to statehood.

The Arab regional and international situation allowed the occupation to proceed with its plan to prevent the establishment of a contiguous Palestinian state, by flooding the area allocated to this state with settlements, bypass roads and military checkpoints, thus taking over 80 per cent of the West Bank. This is compared to less than 20 per cent left to the Palestinians, which constitutes only 12 per cent of historic Palestine within geographically disconnected cantons and includes about half a million settlers in 180 settlements.

Any settlement that may be reached will not end the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the fundamental issues such as the right of return of Palestinian refugees and Jerusalem will remain given the doubts about Israel’s commitment to any settlement agreement reached, based on previous experiences.

Translated from Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 4 April 2017

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.