Othmani’s government in Morocco: A form of revenge?

When the royal palace in Morocco appointed the government of Abbas al-Fassi in 2007, on a fateful night in a mosque in the city of Fez, I described the government’s composition as a form of “official collective punishment” for all Moroccans who had boycotted that year’s elections. The elections had witnessed the lowest turnout of any national election in Morocco’s history, despite the King’s appeal to the people to vote in large numbers, and despite an official campaign on which the state spent vast amounts of taxpayers’ money, whose slogan was “2007 Daba” (2007 now). However, when Election Day came, Moroccans betrayed the state and politicians, with most failing to perform their “national duty.” The punishment was a government that had nothing to do with the votes cast by the minority of the population who had participated in the elections.

This journey into the past serves as a comparison between the appointment of Abbas al-Fassi’s government (2007-2011) and the announcement of the next government majority, led by Saadeddine Othmani, the prime minister who was appointed over two weeks ago. The comparison reveals many similarities between the two contexts. When the government of Abbas al-Fassi, the weakest prime minister during the reign of King Mohammed VI, was formed, a government majority was imposed on him, including even the names for each ministerial post. Most of them were not affiliated with any party and their new party affiliations were announced when they were appointed to ministerial positions.

Read: Morocco king names new cabinet, Islamists lose key post

Moroccans then discovered the names of “party activists” belonging to one of the administration’s parties, the National Rally of Independents, including Aziz Akhannouch, Moncef Belkhayat, Nawal al-Mutawakkil, Amina Benkhadra and Yasser al-Zanaki. One of the parties, al-Haraka al-Sha’biyya (the Popular Movement), which is classified in Morocco among the “regime parties”, was punished when its secretary-general refused to accept the appointment of independent figures in the government on behalf of his party. The party was excluded after having been present in every government in Morocco since the 1950s. It thus became part of the “official opposition” under duress rather than as a heroic choice of its own.

What is happening now is a kind of official collective revenge against all who dreamed of a democratic Morocco.

Among the paradoxes in both contexts – al-Fassi’s government and al-Othmani’s – is that among the names of independent figures who were going to hold a ministerial position in the al-Fassi government was Aziz Akhannouch of the Popular Movement. Akhannouch was going to enter the government on behalf of another party, the National Rally of Independents. Due to the refusal to include him on behalf of the Popular Movement, this party was consigned to the “official opposition” for the next four years. Today, Akhannouch’s name has been put forward once again but this time as the head of the National Rally of Independents, a position he took over the day the results of the October elections were announced! Due to the impossible conditions Akhannouch presented to the former prime minister, Abdelilah Benkirane, in order to form his government, the latter was dismissed from the task of forming the next government and from his post, simply because he had rejected the conditions of the head of this party, which is close to the royal palace.

The al-Fassi government did not last long. The winds of the Arab Spring broke out to the east, sparking a surge of public anger in Morocco on a fateful rainy day on 20 February, 2011. Those protests swept aside the government that had been imposed as “official collective punishment”, and delivered the government of Benkirane, whose head would eventually, after five years of frictions and clashes, meet an unhappy end.

When we look at what is happening today in Morocco, all the signs accompanying the formation of Othmani’s majority, which will form the basis of the next government, suggest that it will be a government of “official revenge” against the leader of the Justice and Development Party, Abdelilah Benkirane, because of his “critical” statements regarding the regime and his refusal to bow to the humiliating conditions imposed on him to form a new government majority, in which his role would be merely to implement orders. Meanwhile, his successor, Saadeddine Othmani, accepted all these conditions without discussion and without justifying his position to the public until now. It is also an “official revenge” against the Justice and Development Party, whose popularity frightens influential figures in power in Morocco. So far, this “revenge” has provoked uproar within the party, which drew its strength from its unity and cohesion among its activists.

It is also a retaliation against the Istiqlal Party and its leader, Hamid Chabat, who revealed the existence of a “coup” plot, which he refused to participate in when he was called for an urgent meeting on 8 October, 2016 (on the day of the announcement of the election results) between several party leaders to form an “artificial majority” irrespective of the results brought by the ballot boxes in order to block the Islamists from heading the government once again.

Last but not least, it will be the largest “collective official revenge” against all Moroccans who gave their votes to the Islamic Justice and Development Party, and all those who supported its popular leader, Benkirane, who was ousted from office in a degrading manner intended to humiliate all those who had voted for his party in the last elections.

The regime’s response to all those dreamers is that their dreams are a long way away from being fulfilled.

A Moroccan proverb says, “Beware of sea storms, camels and the makhzen” (the makhzen is the central authority in Morocco, which corresponds to the concept of the “deep state” in the east). What is common among these three is the penchant for revenge, which is difficult to control once it explodes, with destructive consequences. What is happening now is a form of collective official retaliation with retroactive effect, against all who dream of a democratic Morocco, whether they expressed this by demonstrating on the street or trying to reform from within. The regime’s response to all those dreamers is that their dreams are a long way away from being fulfilled.

Translated from Al Araby Al Jadid, 5 April, 2017

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