Straight talk on Somalia’s insecurity

There is a broad-based consensus that security in Somalia has been deteriorating at an alarming rate. In the past few weeks, hundreds of people have been killed by truck bombs at two prominent locations in Mogadishu. The lethal potency of the explosions and the scale of death and devastation resulting from the 14 October bomb was far beyond what the capital has witnessed in over a quarter of a century of violence.

Such deadly terrorist operations, combined with allegations that the attackers have used intelligence service ID cards, have turned the spotlight on Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). Serious questions regarding the agency’s leadership, competence and scope of authority are being raised.

However, how does one reveal unpleasant realities and tell a traumatised nation that what appeared like a light at the end of the tunnel is in fact a runaway train coming at them? How does one do that without shoving them into a state of self-defeating despair? These indeed are the dicey challenges we face, but the truth must be told.

Somalia is in an existential race against time. Much like all other critical issues facing the nation, the Somali government does not actually control its own intelligence or security. Worse, the government does not have the political will to address the real causes and effects.

The ownership dilemma

Somalia is at the centre of predatory international capitalism, not only because of its untapped natural resources — many other countries would also qualify on that count — but also because it is the gold standard of three systematically destructive elements: corruption, ineptitude and disloyalty to the nation. How many nations do you know that host dozens of security and intelligence forces with various (domestic and foreign) commanders and control channels?

Read: Aftermath of Somalia’s 9/11 counter-terrorism quandary

For example, there is the revolving door syndrome of failed security leadership that recycles the same has-beens. Every year or so, a new commander is appointed and another is sacked. The former brings in his own clan cronies while the latter takes with him the personnel that he brought in. There are former Al-Shabab leaders with long, ugly records who, despite never seeking the forgiveness of their victims, have been co-opted by the government and, yes, been given highly-sensitive positions at NISA and other official institutions.

There is also a cottage industry in intelligence service ID cards. These are readily available for anyone willing to pay the going rate. Apparently, it is the agency’s failure when individuals in charge of issuing these IDs have a salary of just over $200 a month and the going price for a false ID is twice that amount. While civilians try to obtain these IDs for various reasons, the most common is the need to get through roadblocks and checkpoints since there is no logging system to verify their authenticity.

What’s more, multiple security and intelligence agencies have emerged within the five clan-based federal states; they may share a name with NISA but, functionally, have nothing to do with that “national agency”. Most of them take their substantive orders from one neighbouring state or another.

Then there are the corrupt leaders in the political upper echelon who readily put Somalia’s national interest behind anyone with a bag full of money, or the capacity to aid them in attaining or keeping a position. There are many within the circles of influence, including ministers and parliament members, who own their own private security companies and benefit directly from increased insecurity. An underground business cartel considers the status quo to be a blessing from heaven.

Read: Al-Shabaab retakes key town from African Union troops

Moreover, there is a Blackwater project to advance what might be called “world peace according to Erik Prince” while the UAE and Dubai Ports World (DPW) provide the diplomatic and commercial cover.

Britain, meanwhile — in the guise of UNSOM (the UN Assistance Mission to Somalia) — guards the Soma Oil and Gas interest by any means necessary. It is the mandated face that governs the Halane compound in Mogadishu, where a mishmash of the good, the bad and the ugly, and their mercenaries, are separated from the rest of the city. In their possession is the carrot and stick that boosts or undermines security at will.

Furthermore, in addition to AFRICOM drone operations, the US runs routine covert operations in cooperation with a Somali counterterrorism unit that is trained, paid and commanded by Washington. Though this was a thinly-veiled secret, it entered the public discourse on America’s controversial activities in Somalia following the recent killing of a US Special Forces soldier, and its role in Africa when four more Green Berets were killed in Niger even more recently.

Needless to say, this raised both media and congressional interests in clandestine US operations across the continent. For years, AFRICOM has been effectively managing perceptions by offering an ocean-cruise version of embedded journalism.

Against this backdrop it is extremely difficult to pinpoint who, or which combination, has triggered the latest wave of terroristic atrocities.

Knee-jerking into oblivion

As usual, after the latest bombing the government immediately issued its counterterrorism refrain: “Al-Shabab and Daesh have committed this atrocity.” According to President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” Mohamed, “They are out to eradicate the Somali people, therefore, we should all join hands to fight them in their bloody swamps. We should wage an all-out war in many fronts and many regions.” He added that he will be the first in the front line.

Never mind the fact that the terrorists — be they Al-Shabab or one of the other clandestine candidates — are executing their deadly operations behind the roadblocks and barricades across Mogadishu. And never mind that the mightiest nation on the face of the earth could not defeat terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan in a conventional war involving hundreds of thousands of its best soldiers. President Mohamed declared a war and went off to solicit more military support from Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti to “defeat Al-Shabab, once and for all.”

So how does one get out of this mess?

In order to stabilise Somalia, all of the pieces of the insecurity puzzle must be accounted for. In addition to Al-Shabab’s suicidal vision, the ever-worsening security condition is driven by the interplay of the aforementioned domestic and foreign elements.

Somalia continues to be a lucrative project with international appeal; a regional cash cow and geopolitical pretext for exploitation and military expansion. Apart from the government which, in theory, is the guardian of Somali national interests, all of the others are entrenched in advancing their zero-sum strategies and interests. Out of that condition has emerged a deadly system of “a favour for a favour” that keeps insecurity ever-present, but manageable.

The Somali people need and deserve more than a cosmetic accountability fix that is intended to cover the wrinkles of incompetence and corruption. They need competent leadership that puts their country’s national interest in its appropriate place; leadership that is mindful of the fact that security does not exist in vacuum; leadership with strategic vision which is mindful that genuine national reconciliation is essential to harmonising hearts and minds; leadership with the political will to demand the immediate overhaul of the current dysfunctional security system; leadership willing to demand the streamlining of the command and control of the intelligence sector; and leadership that demands a front-door entry into Somalia and thoroughly vets the right strategic partnerships.

Unless and until these fundamental issues are addressed, neither Somalia nor its (official and unofficial) guests will be safe. Security will be nothing more than an extended respite between one terrorist attack and another.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.