After reading the statement issued after the meeting of the Palestinian factions in Beijing on 22 July, we can say that it includes two types of decisions. The first are general principles, such as the right to resist and condemn aggression, and the second are practical or operational steps. The question, though, is whether or not there is a serious intention to implement them. There are also some important things missing, not least of which is how to negotiate a ceasefire in Gaza in a united manner.
The formation of an interim national government with the consensus of the Palestinian factions and by presidential decree based on the Palestinian Basic Law is the first practical step mentioned. This is followed by preparation for holding elections under the supervision of the Palestinian Central Elections Commission as soon as possible, in accordance with the approved election law. Then the need was stressed to form a new National Council in order to deepen the political partnership in assuming national responsibility and to develop the institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), after first activating and organising the unified temporary leadership framework for political decision-making, in accordance with what was agreed upon in the Palestinian National Accord document signed on 4 May, 2011.
Practically-speaking, a unified leadership framework can lead to discussions on the formation of the government. The presidential decree would follow, and then elections. The easiest and yet most difficult thing about this agreement concerns the interim leadership framework, bringing together the leaders of the Palestinian factions, specifically the active factions, led by Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This simply requires fixing a date and going to a meeting in Cairo, Algiers or any other place, with Chinese and Arab observers. Such a meeting, if repeated monthly, would be a qualitative shift in Palestinian life.
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However, this is also the most difficult decision, because it contradicts the Palestinian decision-making mechanism. The current Palestinian bodies, which do not include parties with real differences between them, do not meet. For example, the PLO Executive Committee rarely meets on a regular basis chaired by the head of the organisation, Mahmoud Abbas. This is nothing new. Years ago, consultative meetings were held, chaired by the late Saeb Erekat in his capacity as secretary of the Executive Committee, but not in the presence of the president. Erekat’s successor, Hussein Al-Sheikh, tried to resume them.
It is said that some factions do not agree to this formula, which turns the meetings into mere photo opportunities to issue press releases without any real power.
Moreover, the basis of any interim phase is that changes must be made within the context, or taking account of, regional arrangements, including more Arab-Israeli normalisation, in exchange for settling the Palestinian issue. It also has to consider the fact that the current official Palestinian leadership has no apparent desire to assume a leadership role in the ceasefire negotiations in Gaza. Coordination and unity between Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad has to become a real and daily process. If a unified leadership framework is developed, it could negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people, boosting the influence of both the people and their leaders, whose legitimacy will be strengthened by the fact that they speak on behalf of all Palestinians. Put simply, there needs to be collective leadership.
The US administration, the international community and the regional powers have had nine months since the beginning of the Israeli war to influence events, and the results have been limited. The Palestinian leadership can take the initiative now for genuine Palestinian unity. If this framework comes together and is developed seriously, it will be possible to work on the other issues mentioned in the Beijing statement. These include the national unity government and elections — for the Legislative Council, the National Council and the presidency — all within the vision of national reconciliation and through a collective decision.
The main hindrance to national unity is the absence of an inclusive Palestinian decision-making mechanism.
It is true that external players can and do influence what happens, and the likes of the US and Israel, for example, will seek to block unity. Nevertheless, thinking and moving away from a monopoly over decision-making is the key to change.
Without a unified, inclusive decision-making mechanism, no new government will have a consensus. It will simply be a clone of the governments that have existed since the political split in 2006. We have seen two types of Palestinian government: a presidential government that does not reflect the differences between the Palestinian political parties, but is rather an executive tool with limited authority within a political system governed by an individual authority; and a government with democratic legitimacy but lacking in cooperation from rival factions’ supporters employed by the previous administration. An example was the Hamas government in 2006, with which the employees and staff did not cooperate, as they were previously part of the Fatah-controlled administration. This was also the case after the formation of Rami Hamdallah’s government in 2014, when Hamas staff and officials in Gaza did not cooperate with the Ramallah-based administration. What’s more, we have to consider that the obstacles cited to justify the cancellation of the 2021 elections, such as the issue of residents of occupied Jerusalem being allowed to vote, still exist, as does the impossibility of holding elections in wartime and occupation conditions.
It is imperative, therefore, for Palestinian political parties and civil society to apply pressure for moves to be made towards unity and the interim national framework as a conduit to resolving all of the other issues and developing a real consensus to activate the PLO and develop Palestinian frameworks for action. The first item on the agenda of this framework must be to impose united negotiations to end the war in Gaza, and work to stop the deterioration of conditions in Gaza and the West Bank.
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This article first appeared in Arabic in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed on 24 July 2024
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.