The reasons for Syria’s neutrality on the Israel war

The Syrian regime’s distancing itself from the Israeli war in Gaza is understandable, due to the cold relations between it and Hamas, and the unfeasibility of military support for the Resistance due to the geographical distance.

However, the Syrian regime’s distancing itself from the Israeli massacre against Hezbollah and its supporters raises many question marks for those who have not closely examined the regime’s policy over the past five decades.

Since the era of Hafez Al-Assad, the Syrian regime has adopted a policy of the art of the possible, and playing on the margins available, regionally and internationally, with a high-level political sense of risks. This makes it retreat and resort to its usual strategy based on going through the stages in the hope of changes occurring in its favour.

The Syrian regime did not need an Israeli warning through an Arab mediator after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, nor a direct Russian warning to refrain from participating in this war and not provide assistance to the Palestinian and Lebanese Resistance, as it realised that Israel and the world would be different than it was before 7 October, 2023, and that Israel would launch a fierce military attack against every geographical spot participating in the war.

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This approach was quite clear to Damascus, which presented a lacklustre media discourse regarding the war. Then it removed its forces from the locations where pro-Iran forces were positioned. Moreover, Al-Assad did not attend the funeral of former Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi, in a clear political message directed not only to Tehran, but also to other concerned capitals, signifying that there is a difference between Damascus and Tehran regarding what is happening in the region.

This does not mean what media reports and what the Iranian Revolutionary Leader, Ali Khamenei, have said about attempts to remove Syria from regional equations through various methods, is true, referring to attempts to tempt the Syrian regime with lifting sanctions imposed on it and ending its international isolation.

The Syrian position is not at all related to Arab temptations, as these temptations have existed since 2011, and continue to exist, and the regime cannot distance itself from Iran due to the existential link between the two regimes that goes beyond the limits of normal interests between countries.

The Syrian-Iranian relationship is a supra-strategic relationship based on strong overlap and interconnection at all levels, and the Syrian regime cannot risk abandoning Iran for the sake of Arab countries whose interests may change in the medium term and turn against it.

On the other hand, the regime realises that the Arab demands will not be satisfied with merely distancing itself from Tehran, but will be followed by other demands related to the internal political situation. This is something that the regime will not compromise on at all, after the military successes it has achieved over the past years with Iranian and Russian support.

Accordingly, Syrian neutrality cannot be explained based on Arab temptations, but rather based on its internal situation, as the regime today is no longer what it was before 2011. It only possesses a weak military force, a primitive arsenal of weapons compared to Israel’s capabilities, a faltering economy and a human population that does not meet the requirements of war, not to mention its loss of its chemical weapons.

Moreover, its territory is divided into three areas, and it has two hostile powers (Turkiye and the US), and a social situation that is likely to explode, a factor of which is the Sweida protests.

Within this complex equation, the Syrian regime only has purely domestic goals, in the form of, firstly, maintaining authority and its continuity in light of the geopolitical earthquake, and not weakening the remaining military force it is saving for its major battle, i.e., regaining control over the territories controlled by the opposition and the Syrian Democratic Forces.

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For the sake of achieving these goals, the regime distanced itself from the war, but the escalation of tension between Iran and Israel and Tehran’s attempt to exploit Syrian territory, prompted the regime, with Russian support, to take practical steps, firstly by closing the human gathering centres that Iran had established to bring fighters to Lebanon; secondly by refraining from transferring weapons to Hezbollah, leaving this matter to the Iranian forces only and, thirdly, by restricting Hezbollah’s movement and pro-Iran militias to the Golan Heights, the Damascus countryside governorates and the Homs desert.

This policy prevents the regime being exposed to any Israeli attacks that might lead to the collapse of its power, which the opposition forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces might exploit.

This policy also allows it to get closer to the so-called “moderate Arab countries” that have an interest in eliminating the Resistance in Gaza and Lebanon. These are the countries that the Syrian regime relies on, not only to re-strengthen its Arab presence but, more importantly, to be a strong factor in convincing the US to change its approach towards Syria. Perhaps the regime’s neutral position on the Israeli war will be one of the main points used by these countries to pressure Washington.

It will not be surprising that, after the war ends, the Syrian regime will turn into an obstacle and an impenetrable barrier to Iran in sending weapons to Hezbollah.

The “axis of Resistance” has practically ended, and the Syrian regime has begun to accept the Arab moderation that it fought for decades, as long as it ensures it remains in power. The mask has fallen, and the national constants have fallen in favour of pragmatism steeped in opportunism.

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This article first appeared in Arabi21 on 9 November, 2024.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.