Moscow is Bashar's ally, but …

Many questions have been (and continue to be) raised regarding the position of Bashar Al-Assad’s allies, and the extent of their betrayal of him, especially in the days preceding his escape. Since Iran, the first and most reliable regional ally, is going through a very difficult period, given the successive blows it has been dealt over the past months, its position is more understandable and explicable, especially in light of the leaks relating to Tehran’s doubts about Damascus’ true position or, more precisely, its role in passing dangerous information to Israel, which contributed to the success of the successive wave of assassinations of Hezbollah leaders.

The behaviour of Russia, Damascus’ main global ally, and the global power that has benefited most from the continued survival of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime over the past decade, is worth contemplation and examination. Russia has a vital interest in maintaining the military presence that the Al-Assad regime has granted it. Therefore, abandoning support for that regime, and not backing it in its confrontation against the opposition factions, is a matter surrounded by great mystery.

Moscow was following the development of the armed Syrian factions’ preparations, most notably Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), and their provisions for the comprehensive attack they launched on the sites controlled by the Syrian regular army. These preparations took about six months, between accumulating weapons and ammunition, redeploying forces and armed groups in large areas of Syrian territory, followed by making logistical arrangements, and political coordination with internal societal forces. If Moscow did not obtain direct intelligence information on the ground, then all of these arrangements must have been monitored by satellites.

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If this is the case, then why did Moscow “sell out” Bashar Al-Assad?

The answer is that Al-Assad was the one who sold everyone out first. He dealt with his allies, despite their small number, piecemeal, and thought that by satisfying each of them partially, or in a certain issue, or during a specific time, he would maintain his alliances with all of them and continue to obtain their non-stop support. He did not deal with his allies, including Iran and Russia, with confidence. He would hear, but not listen, receive advice and suggestions, but do something else, or he would take measures that were inconsistent with the advice, and sometimes even contrary to the advice he received.

After ten years of direct Russian military presence in Syrian territory, and obtaining two military bases there, Moscow no longer receives much from Damascus. Actually, it is the opposite, as Bashar Al-Assad’s regime (over time) became a heavy burden on Moscow, especially at the operational level. When Russia intervened militarily in Syria, it expected that it would later only need to supply the Syrian army with weapons and technical expertise, without having to repeat the Russian forces’ direct intervention. However, Moscow was surprised by the Syrian army’s inability to fulfil its tasks as a regular army, even in areas controlled by the regime. What is more tragic is the spread of corruption among the ranks of the army and its members being preoccupied with smuggling and extortion. Of course, the Syrian army did not have the willingness or drive to be trained to use the weapons that Moscow provided to the Al-Assad regime for ten years. Hence, Russia found itself required to defend Damascus against any real danger and, at the same time, it had to endure Bashar Al-Assad’s stubbornness and inflexible mentality, as was the case when Moscow mediated to bring Damascus and Ankara closer together, and the process stopped due to Bashar’s rejection of the understanding sponsored by Russia.

Moscow abandoned Bashar Al-Assad because he wanted military support, political cover and security protection from Russia, without taking its interests into account, but rather, on his own terms. Assad was misinformed, did not realise the meaning of the alliance and that everything has a price, and tried to satisfy his allies outwardly, but not practically, and ended up not satisfying anyone.

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This article appeared in Arabic in Al Araby on 16 December, 2024.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.