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Why does Syria need a fast transition plan?

January 23, 2025 at 9:37 pm

Syrians gather in the Umayyad Square, waving the Syrian revolution flags as they continue their celebrations after the overthrow of the 61-year Baathist regime and the end of the Assad family era in Damascus, Syria on December 27, 2024. [Emin Sansar – Anadolu Agency]

Although more than six weeks have passed since the fall of the Assad regime, and the general relief with which the world has met the change in Syria (despite acknowledging the existence of concerns and reservations among many regional and international parties), the new authority in Damascus still does not have a clear vision of how to manage the transitional phase or, if it does, it has not shared it with the Syrians and the world. The importance of presenting a clear vision now for the transitional phase stems from the fact that much depends on it.

On the one hand, the existence of a realistic, comprehensive and implementable transition plan is a source of reassurance for the world, which will decide, based this plan, whether it will help or hinder the transition, specifically, whether it will recognise the new regime, lift sanctions, provide aid and curb potential foreign interventions during the transitional phases. On the other hand, and this is perhaps most important, possessing such a vision means that a clear path will emerge, and the Syrians can engage in building their country with all their energy, so that it can reach the level of their ambitions. The existence of this vision is the difference between moving towards a strong, prosperous state or turning into a black hole in the region, and an arena of overwhelming chaos that encourages foreign interventions, ultimately leading to the fragmentation of the country. This is the greatest threat facing Syria in the foreseeable future, according to what we have seen from the experiences of others.

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During revolutions or internal conflicts, the defensive capabilities of states decline, temporarily, due to the purges carried out by the forces of the new regime to establish their authority, and the forces of the old regime and its remnants’ intrusions. This obvious weakness in the state’s power, after witnessing a revolution, usually affects the balance of power in the regional or international system (if the state is central to it). Foreign intervention occurs at this point because it is seen as a “good opportunity” for two reasons:

First, other states often interpret the weakness of a revolutionary state as an opportunity to improve their positions towards these states, either by seizing disputed lands, or by seeking diplomatic concessions from it in a moment of weakness. This is precisely what Israel is trying to do in southern Syria by occupying new Syrian lands, which it may keep, or may later use as a negotiating tool to obtain recognition from the new regime in Damascus of the legitimacy of its Occupation of the lands it controlled in an earlier stage (1967). Turkiye is also seeking to obtain concessions from Damascus at a moment of weakness, by insisting on demarcating the maritime borders with it at this particular stage, in the hope of obtaining areas where underground wealth is expected to exist, which may otherwise not be possible to obtain under different circumstances.

Second, social revolutions can lead to increased competition between other countries to improve their positions in the regional system vis-à-vis each other. This may occur through taking advantage of the instability in a third country to change the balance of power in favour of a particular country (such as establishing a friendly regime in a revolutionary state or opposing the overthrow of a friendly regime), and/or preventing competing countries from doing the same. In this case, with the intensification of competition between Turkiye and Israel considering the vacuum created by the weakness of the Syrian state, Israel may intervene to prevent the establishment of a strong central regime friendly to Turkiye in Damascus, if it imagines it will have negative repercussions on its interests.

In different circumstances, some neighbouring countries may act, out of fear of the potential capabilities of the revolutionary state, if it succeeds in achieving internal stability after the revolution, and attack it, as the revolutionary state usually possesses greater capabilities and can mobilise more resources than it could under the old regime. The mobilisation of energies, the cohesion of the new ruling class, the activation of the state bureaucracy, and the revival of the nation’s common spirit allow post-revolutionary regimes to exercise a greater degree of control and domination over society. This situation raises concerns among neighbouring countries and sometimes leads them to move pre-emptively to attack the revolutionary state, before the situation stabilises there. This is what Israel did immediately after the fall of the Assad regime, with the aim of weakening Syria and leading to its fragmentation. These risks can be avoided completely or partially through a clear and declared vision for the political transition that quickly mobilises the state’s power, prevents a vacuum and closes the door to destructive foreign interventions.

READ: 6 EU nations call for temporary Syria sanctions relief

This article appeared in Arabic in Al Araby on 22 January, 2025.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.