Three notes on the margins of the Syrian transition

I still believe that it is unfair to pass judgment, evaluate the performance, or criticise the new Syrian administration in power, while it has not yet completed two months in power. This can happen in a stable country, with solid institutions, a strong economy, abundant resources, a modern administrative system, a cohesive society, a comprehensive national identity, an ancient constitution and an agreed-upon political system, protected by a large middle class, possessing modern political culture and reasonable living conditions, where the country lives in peace with its neighbours, without blatant interference from them. None of this is available in Syria.

The new administration has inherited a shattered country, a state that is territorially divided and institutionally shattered, an impoverished society that is deeply divided within itself, whose sub-identities are superior to the unifying national identity, and armed factions whose leaders are accustomed to ruling with the logic of warlords in a plundered country with scarce resources, with four foreign armies stationed on its lands. There is also no agreement among its elites on the form of the state, the constitution and the system of government. While the elites are preoccupied with major political issues (the constitution, democracy, public freedoms, the relationship between religion and the state, etc.), and are racing to fill public positions, the rest of the population is literally struggling to survive in light of the difficulty of obtaining the most basic requirements, such as security, bread, water, electricity and heating fuel, let alone the rights to education, health and other things that people are accustomed to having available, as a natural given in life.

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Despite this, and to be fairer, we must also acknowledge that the new administration has achieved two important accomplishments on the eve of the regime’s fall: preserving civil peace, meaning preventing widespread incidents of revenge between societal groups, which was one of the major cautions that perhaps delayed the regime’s fall for years. The second is preserving state institutions, as we did not witness widespread looting and sabotage the moment of the regime’s fall. Above all, we must note something extremely important: since the new administration came on the scene, it has been facing pressures from three conflicting parties that are trying to strike a balance between them, which sometimes puts it in a state of confusion and disarray, making ill-considered decisions that it then quickly backtracks on. These parties are, first, the general Syrian society that expects the new administration to politically, economically and security-wise perform in a manner that matches its aspirations and ambitions for the next stage. Second, the new administration’s supporters who believe that having brought down the regime, it has the right to rule in its own way and according to its vision. Third, the international community, which is demanding more evidence that the new administration has completely abandoned its past, and that it does not want to monopolise power and impose a strict version of government.

After all this, we can make observations that, if we continue to ignore them, we fear that we will later fall into the forbidden. The most important and most valid of these observations is the mistake of continuing to move forward in the current state of constitutional vacuum, especially after the suspension of the 2012 constitution. We do not know, for example, the constitutional basis on which the current government is governing, nor the limits of the powers of the transitional President, nor the duration of the transition. We also do not know the reason why the issuance of a constitutional declaration has been linked to holding the National Dialogue Conference “which may take months to prepare”. The second observation is that, considering the slow pace of movement on the political track, there is an unjustified rush in determining the status of economic institutions, especially production ones.

As a transitional administration, the current authority does not have the authority to make major decisions that affect the future and fate of the country. It also realises that it does not have a mandate to reach a peace agreement with Israel, and also does not have a mandate to determine the fate of the public sector, whether to sell it, privatise it in whole or in part, or even lay off its workers, nor to dispose of the state’s strategic assets, such as the transportation and energy sectors, etc. This is the exclusive right of an elected government chosen based on the platform it presents to the people, and it can even be included in the constitution. The third and final note: The current authority will not be able to rule based solely on a network of international and regional alliances that it is seeking to establish, despite their importance, as this will not do much in the absence of a broad national alliance at home, based on a consensual social contract. This is because the legitimacy of the government stems from the satisfaction of the nation, and its strength is derived from the will of the people. We point this out of concern for the success of the experiment, in which we must all help, because failure, God forbid, means chaos.

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This article appeared in Arabic in Alaraby on 5 February, 2025.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.