Iran signals a shift: Is Beijing ready?

Iran’s post-conflict celebration of victory may be over, but the worries of the Islamist regime are not. As the events of the past month have exposed shortcomings of Iranian grand strategy, which left the home front vulnerable, the regime representatives now appear to be cosying up to China. Popular media have also started reporting on Iran’s plans to shift towards China for defence procurements and assuage its security vulnerabilities, especially in the air domain. Such a shift, however, remains difficult for several reasons, ranging from domestic weaknesses to regional geopolitical alignments.

If the past is a prologue, the post-1979 Iran has a record of self-destructive policy choices. Three choices stand out: degradation of the Air Force, creation of parallel military structures, and dependence on Russia for procurements. The case of the Iranian Air Force is particularly illuminating. It was once among the best in Asia and displayed significant feats in the Iran-Iraq war. In Operation Kaman 99 and Attack on H-3 (1980 and 1983, respectively), it degraded the Iraqi bomber fleet and reduced the enemy’s capability to respond. But none of the achievements saved it from the ultimate decay. Years of neglect left it with “easy targets” like F-4 Phantoms, F-5s, F-14 Tomcats, Chinese F-7, and SU-24 Fencer bombers to face one of the most advanced [Israeli] air forces in the world operating a fleet of F-35, F-15, and F-16 complemented by AEWACS, electronic warfare, and aerial refuelling aircraft.

A similar level of under-preparedness was evident in air defence systems. Iranian sources propagated that the country employed not only Russian systems like the S-300 or TOR-M missile batteries but also achieved a level of ingenuity by deploying indigenous systems like Bavar and Khordad. Yet none of them denied Israel access to the Iranian space, nor did they protect the sensitive installations. This vulnerability seriously affected Tehran’s ability to inflict costs on Israel. For instance, Israel claimed that it destroyed nearly one-third of Iran’s launch vehicles. The attack imagery published by the Israeli military showed the ease with which its Air Force could take out launch vehicles about to deliver payloads.

The origins of the above issues lie in the second choice: parallel military structures. The revolutionary setup established a parallel military structure to cement control. In so doing, it empowered the newly-created Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at the expense of Artesh. IRGC, as the regime’s force, quickly established dominance over resources, strategy, and equipment. Its strategic arm oversaw the country’s strategic missiles program, and the air arm managed air defences. How the existence of two parallel air forces aggravated the problem became evident in June 2025 when Israel quickly outflanked Iran’s airspace.

IRGC’s air defence network, comprising radars and SAM batteries, did not fare well against Israeli SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) operations. Nor did the Air Force assets secure the IRGC’s primary deterrent of drones and ballistic missile salvos to strike mainland Israel. The lack of airpower thus stagnated the only leg of deterrence that the Iranians thought they had (after the decimation of proxy networks in Syria and Lebanon). Had Iran enjoyed the operationality of its launchers, its ballistic missile volley, designed to overcome Israeli interceptors, would have exerted serious human and material costs on Israel and might have shaped the choices of its leadership. The same problem, lack of credible air power, must have loomed large in Tehran’s decision not to blockade the Strait of Hormuz.

The 12-day war exposed the harm the Western sanctions had done to Iran over the years. Similarly, it showed the impact of geopolitical choices made by decision-makers in Tehran. One such choice was over-dependence on Russia for procurements. Russian systems have proved to be subpar in recent conflicts: Gulf Wars, Armenia, Ukraine, and India-Pakistan engagements. Iran also suffered from Russia’s failure to deliver on time. For years, analysts claimed that Iran would be armed with SU-35 fighters. Iran acquired Yak-130 fighter trainers, but the Su-35 never came. Russian beyond visual range (BVR) missiles like R-77 and the lethal R-27 were also not operational in any of Iran’s Russian systems during wartime. A single squadron might not have made any significant difference, but it would have been a morale booster.

As the India-Pakistan case (which strategists in Iran reportedly observed) showed, a steady supply of parts and access to real-time satellite data could be crucial in air battles. China’s reliability as a partner would also have become evident, especially when Russia struggled in delivering advanced platforms on time. The China option thus appears to be a rational choice for the incumbent Iranian political and military leadership. They seek a strategic partner that is dependable, delivers on time, offers advanced systems, and provides access to crucial resources. Iran is reportedly considering acquiring advanced Chinese SAMs, AEWACS aircraft, and fighter jets.

Can China help Iran? It can. But there are formidable challenges that both Beijing and Tehran face. China has a modern research and development ecosystem. It has a massive industrial base to deliver mass orders in a shorter duration, unlike Russia, France, and even the US. It also offers vast multi-layered systems (to partners like Pakistan) that complement modern aircraft, providing the complete “kill-chain” required for air warfare. To do so for Iran, however, Beijing will have to cover many fronts. First, the delivery and technology transfer of advanced systems to Iran will irk the Gulf states, Israel, and the US. Second, such a transfer may trigger economic sanctions against Chinese companies by the US and the EU.

Third, more importantly, transferring advanced platforms to Iran, when Chinese technology is attracting global attention, can be risky. Even if China takes the risk, Iran might not be able to protect the assets during the acquisition phase (which itself can span many years). Second, Iran faces a challenger equipped with 5th-generation aircraft and backed by the US. It will need to jump to 4.5 or 5th generation from 3rd generation, which is virtually impossible in a short span. For any air force, advancement is evolutionary. Iran cannot jump to the 5th generation by skipping decades of technological experience with intermediate technologies. Even if it somehow manages to procure SU-35s or J-10s, countering the Israeli stealth aircraft would be challenging. An advanced air-defence system will also not do much because Iran’s rugged topography aggravates problems for an air defence controller.

Tehran’s only option is “putting the house in order,” which includes counter-intelligence capabilities, denying Israel access, reformulation of military arms (especially air and strategic forces), and diversification of procurement sources before embarking on the track to modernization. Its success in modernisation will largely hinge on efficacy, consistency, and, more importantly, stability. It will need a few years of peace on both internal and external fronts. Will Israel ever let that happen remains to be seen.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.