Mubarak endorsed American and British plan to humiliate Saddam in Kuwait, predicting his regime’s fall, British documents reveal

Newly declassified British documents reveal that the late Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak supported US and British efforts to defeat and humiliate Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, predicting that a military defeat would lead to the Iraqi leader’s downfall.

The documents, released by the British National Archives, show that Mubarak advised British Prime Minister John Major to disregard Arab public opinion and press forward with the military campaign. He argued that once Iraq was militarily defeated, Saddam would be removed by his own generals.

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, triggering international condemnation. On 17 January 1991, a US-led coalition launched Operation Desert Storm to liberate the country.

Mubarak’s advice came about three weeks into the military campaign.

During a phone call, Major explored the possibility of a sudden Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and voiced concern that Saddam might claim symbolic victory simply by having “stood up” to the US. Major stressed that both the US and UK “very much” wanted to avoid such an outcome, insisting Saddam had to be not just defeated but humiliated. He added that destroying Iraq’s military capabilities was “important”.

Mubarak agreed, predicting that once defeated, Saddam would “soon be seen off” by his generals. He stressed the importance of applying maximum pressure on the Iraqi Republican Guard. Even if Saddam withdrew, Mubarak told Major, the destruction of his military capabilities would ensure he “would not survive”. He reiterated that military defeat would bring down Saddam’s regime.

Following the start of the coalition’s air campaign, Iraq launched missile strikes on Israel, which, along with the US-led war operation, sparked pro-Iraq demonstrations in several Arab countries. These protests caused concern in both Washington and London.

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Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (r) and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (l) 28 January 1990 in Cairo reviewing the honor guard following Saddam’s arrival in an unannounced visit to Egypt. Iraqi troops stormed into Kuwait early 02 August 1990 occupying the capital. [MONA SHARAF/AFP via Getty Images]

During the call, Major praised Mubarak for his strong stance, saying British officials were “tremendously impressed” with his “clear-cut and outspoken lead on Gulf issues,” which had earned him “great admiration” in the UK. Mubarak, in turn, described the conflict with Iraq as a “matter of principle” for Egypt, insisting that Egypt’s commitment “would not weaken”.

According to other documents unearthed by MEMO, Mubarak informed the UK that Saddam had tried to “bribe” him into supporting Iraq’s stance against Kuwait.

Prior to Mubarak’s call, US Vice President Dan Quayle met Major in London and expressed concern that Muslim public opinion was becoming  “steadily more vocal” in support of Saddam—not just in the Middle East but also in the Far East. He called it a “worrying development.”

Asked whether the British public supported Saddam’s removal as a war aim, Major said such an objective “couldn’t be an overt aim.” Quayle, however, noted growing feeling in the U.S. that Saddam must be removed, but acknowledged that the US and UK had to  consider the possibility that Saddam could survive the war and remain politically powerful, with much of his military power intact.

American officials had begun to discuss Saddam’s overthrow as a possible war aim. But Brent Scowcroft, then US National Security Advisor, told Charles Powell, Major’s Chief of Staff, that this was not a feasible strategy. The US hoped for a “lucky hit” to kill Saddam or for an internal coup -supported by Iraqis- to remove him.

The British government feared a scenario where Saddam withdrew from Kuwait while retaining part of his military, declared victory, and prepared for renewed conflict—possibly with Israel.

In conversations between US President George H. W. Bush and Major, both leaders agreed that Saddam must be seen to “lose and be humiliated”. They stressed that Saddam emerging from the war with any prestige would be “unfortunate.” Bush insisted on denying Saddam the chance to become “another Nasser,” referencing the late Egyptian nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. He hoped instead that the Iraqi people would remove Saddam themselves.

The US State Department was also concerned about growing anti-coalition sentiment in the Arab world, though it was less intense than anticipated.

In another phone call, Secretary of State James Baker warned British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd of the risks of expanding the war’s aims to include Saddam’s removal. Baker feared that public pressure, especially if Iraq paraded coalition prisoners of war or used chemical weapons, could push Western leaders into that “wrong direction.” Many Americans, Baker noted, supported either killing Saddam or trying him for war crimes, but he cautioned that doing so might “snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.”

Baker and Hurd agreed that expanding the coalition’s mission could also bring new responsibilities, such as protecting Iraq from “possible Syrian or Turkish attempts to poach Iraqi territory”.

French President François Mitterrand shared similar concerns. In a call with Major, he warned that Saddam might become a hero in the Arab world if not decisively defeated. He urged that the coalition ensure Saddam’s clear defeat and that any postwar settlement be “very demanding,” particularly in limiting Iraq’s future access to weapons.

A few hours before the coalition’s ultimatum to Saddam—demanding that he accept its conditions by noon on 23 February 2001, or face a ground offensive—expired, Iraq offered a ceasefire.

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President Mubarak telephoned Prime Minister Major to warn him not to trust the Iraqi leader, advising him not to believe a word Saddam said. “All Iraqis were liars. They told you one thing and did another,” Mubarak asserted.

According to the conversation records, when the Prime Minister expressed concern that the Soviet Union might try to take the issue to the Security Council, Mubarak “seemed rather startled” by this and remarked that “time was short.”

The Egyptian president also told Major that he had spoken to President Bush about the matter.

On 26 February 1991, Kuwait was liberated after Iraqi forces retreated in the wake of a coalition 4-days ground offensive. Iraq was subsequently subjected to comprehensive UN sanctions, including a ban on oil exports. These sanctions lasted over 10 years, crippling the Iraqi economy and contributing to a humanitarian crisis.

In 2003, the US led a new invasion of Iraq, citing Saddam’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism—claims that were ultimately never proven. Saddam’s regime was overthrown during that war.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.