The excruciating wait: Tripoli on the brink of a war that may never happen

In Tripoli, the tense calm feels almost unbearable—residents live under the constant threat of sudden, brutal clashes that have become part of their daily routine for years now. The sprawling capital stands precariously on the edge of renewed violence. As the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) prepares to implement its latest political roadmap, the city’s entrenched rival factions are already manoeuvring to block progress, gain territory, or simply hold onto their turf. With the Government of National Unity (GNU) struggling to assert authority and armed groups signalling their readiness to exploit any vacuum, ordinary residents face the unnerving prospect that another round of urban warfare may be imminent.

One of the first requirements of the new roadmap is the formation of a unified government, which would mean the GNU and its Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, stepping aside. However, since coming to power in 2021, Dbeibeh has repeatedly vowed not to hand over authority except to an elected government—a top condition and priority for his administration to gain the confidence vote in March 2021, though the GNU did everything to make it difficult to achieve. Now, he appears ready to fight to extend his tenure. Should conflict erupt, the GNU will pursue two closely linked objectives. The first, and most visible, is to dismantle the influence of the Special Deterrent Force (Rada), which controls several western neighbourhoods of Tripoli, particularly around Mitiga Airport and the eastern Souq al-Juma district, where it maintains deep-rooted support. Over the past two years, Rada has posed a significant obstacle to the government’s efforts to assert authority over additional parts of the capital that remain outside its control.

If the government succeeds in dismantling Rada—or at least in significantly curbing its presence and zones of control, which appears more likely than full elimination—it would secure a major boost in its authority over the capital. At the same time, it would achieve another, less openly stated objective: disrupting UNSMIL’s roadmap, presented by Hannah Teetteh to the UN Security Council on August 21, which envisions the creation of a unified government for Libya. Since 2014, the country has remained divided between rival administrations, and any delay or obstruction by the GNU directly complicates UN efforts to bridge this divide.

To strengthen his hand against Rada, Dbeibeh has mobilised armed groups drawn largely from his Misrata stronghold. He has, in fact, consolidated his forces around the capital over the past two months amassing heavily armed militias around Tripoli, mainly from his hometown of Misrata—arguably the only “city-state” that has never been disarmed since the NATO-backed rebellion of 2011 that toppled Muammar Gaddafi and plunged Libya into its ongoing turmoil.

The GNU is also increasingly concerned about shifting alliances within Tripoli itself. The prospect of militias—both powerful ones such as Rada and weaker groups—reaching out to General Khalifa Haftar in the east, where his Libyan National Army (LNA) maintains full control, is not far-fetched. Armed groups in cities like Zawiya and Zintan, already aligned with the LNA, have expressed tacit support for Haftar. Should fighting erupt in the capital, these militias are unlikely to remain passive; more likely, they would descend on Tripoli with the aim of dislodging the GNU and sending Mr Dbeibeh scrambling for cover.

READ: ‘Every delay costs lives’ UN warns as Israel continues to impede aid access to Gaza

Seeking to avert escalation, Dbeibeh sent his nephew and national security adviser, Ibrahim Dbeibeh, to Rome to meet Saddam Haftar, the LNA leader’s son and newly appointed deputy. The purpose was to explore arrangements to avert war in Tripoli while also ensuring both the Dbeibehs and the Haftars secure a place in any UNSMIL-brokered negotiations. The Rome meeting also included Donald Trump’s top Africa adviser, Massad Boulos, suggesting a degree of American endorsement for a potential collaboration between the two families. Although little has been publicly disclosed about the talks, it is almost certain that the escalating tensions in Tripoli, as well as the new UN plan for Libya, were central to the discussions.

Foreign backers continue to play a decisive role in Tripoli’s dynamics and in Libya’s overall political scene. Ankara, a staunch supporter of the GNU, is reported to have warned the prime minister against any actions that could trigger fighting in the capital, home to over two million people. In June 2025, Turkey’s top intelligence chief, İbrahim Kalın, visited Tripoli and met with Dbeibeh to discuss regional developments and implicitly caution against escalation.

In August 2025, a high-profile summit in Istanbul brought together President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Dbeibeh, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to discuss illegal migration. During the meeting, Ankara reportedly signalled its readiness to guarantee the safety of the prime minister, his allies, and his family should his position come under threat.

Meanwhile, the Haftars have been warming up to Ankara, which until recently had been perceived as their sworn adversary. The Turkish consulate has reopened in Benghazi, and numerous Turkish companies have been awarded substantial contracts for development and construction projects across five eastern and southern regions, including Benghazi, Tobruk, Sebha, and Ubari—areas partially under LNA control.

In August 2025, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) chief, İbrahim Kalın, visited Benghazi and held a rare meeting with General Khalifa Haftar. This marked the first high-level contact between Ankara and Haftar in years. The discussions focused on enhancing bilateral ties, including military cooperation and addressing regional security concerns. Kalın reportedly invited Haftar to visit Ankara, and Haftar expressed willingness to travel there later in the year. The meeting coincided with the docking of the Turkish Navy corvette TCG Kınalıada in Benghazi, where it was received by Saddam Haftar, Haftar’s deputy—another rarity in itself. 

With improved relations with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—two of Haftar’s main backers—Ankara is now openly engaging with the Haftar faction. In this shifting landscape, Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh appears increasingly vulnerable; should a confrontation occur, he risks losing Tripoli and, with it, his leverage in Libya’s political equation.

Meanwhile, Russia, another key backer of the Haftar family, continues to support their leadership. In late August 2025, Khaled Haftar, the newly appointed Chief of Staff of the LNA, was received in Moscow in his new role, signalling that Russia approves of the Haftar faction’s actions. The visit underscores Moscow’s ongoing support for the Haftar family and its strategic interests in Libya.

Yet all these behind-the-scenes manoeuvres —foreign warnings, high-level visits, and shifting alliances—may not be enough to prevent another round of bloodshed in Tripoli. Nor do they mean that removing Dbeibeh, as the UNSMIL roadmap suggests, would be a straightforward process. Ankara once again appears as a potential saviour of the capital, reminiscent of 2019–2020, when Turkish military intervention decisively halted an LNA advance just a few kilometres from the city center.

Still, despite high-level diplomacy, foreign guarantees, and careful manoeuvring, Tripoli remains caught in an agonizing suspense, awaiting a war that may or may not ever arrive.

OPINION: A losing battle: Israel’s struggle against genocide scholars

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.