India’s changing Middle East policy

For decades, India’s West Asia policy rested on three simple principles: equi-distance, non-prescriptive, and non-interference. These reflected New Delhi’s belief that its stakes in the region were too high to risk taking sides. The stakes speak for themselves—over nine million Indian workers live and work in the Gulf, sending home billions of dollars in remittances every year. New Delhi is also deeply engaged with the Gulf through energy, trade, investment flows, particularly from the petrodollar-rich monarchies. Therefore, a stable Gulf has always been central to India’s overall interest, including security and prosperity.

This balance, however, began to shift after the Modi government came to power in 2014. New Delhi no longer held as tightly to its old principles. Instead, it started looking at the region through a different lens, mostly shaped by material gains and geostrategic hedging. Another important element the Modi government added was to stop treating the Gulf in isolation. It connected the region with India’s larger foreign policy canvass. Third, it divided the region into three circles, each marked with different policy objectives and treatment. The first circle deals with Saudi-led groupings, tied to the Gulf monarchies;  second, Israel-led with strong US backing, and the third Iran-led, built around Tehran and its proxies. 

As of now, India feels that Israel and Saudi circles are in close cooperation on many issues such Palestine, economic diversification, IMEC (Indian Middle East Europe Economic Corridor), common US security umbrella, it does not have any problem in converging the two circles, whereas Iran-led circle appears faltering. Thus, it does not count much weight in India’s transformed Middle East policy. It is true that the Iranian circle has been weakened after Israel decimated Hezbollah and Hamas.

Several factors pushed India to transform its Middle East policy, including its growing ties with the US and Israel, changing dynamics within the Gulf region itself, and more recently, the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023.

Since India does not view West Asia in isolation, the presence of major powers such as the US, Israel, Russia and more importantly, China, also significantly shaped its Middle East policies. First, India has stopped being viewed as a free-rider in the region as accused by the US. Second. It has adopted a supra-engagement policy in the Middle East. Apart from the six GCC countries, New Delhi has also started deepening its engagements with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and other North African Muslims countries, including Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, etc.   

In the past two years, India’s stance has become more ‘interest-driven’ and less neutral. Two clear shifts stand out. One, New Delhi appeared more openly aligned with Israel, a departure from its ideological and long-practiced balancing act. Second, it occasionally stepped back toward its traditional policy—most notably when it joined the Tianjin Declaration at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, a move that hinted at a subtle correction. This ‘to and fro’ movement is guided by impromptu changes in regional and global dynamics.

India’s Tilt toward Israel is visible in three episodes:

1. The Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 was the first. PM Modi was among the earliest world leaders to react, tweeting his solidarity with the Israeli people and condemning the “terrorist attacks.” His quick response fit neatly with India’s counterterrorism narrative but struck many observers as overlooking the Palestinian cause. Traditionally, India would have balanced sympathy for Israel with a reaffirmation of its support for a two-state solution. This time, the balance seemed absent—reflecting both the Modi government’s closer strategic embrace of Israel and India’s growing reliance on Israeli defence supplies.
2. The Israel–Iran conflict in June 2025 provided another illustration. When Israel struck Iranian targets, New Delhi avoided directly criticising Tel Aviv. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) simply called on both sides to engage in ‘dialogue’ and ‘restore’ peace. Modi even acknowledged a call from PM Netanyahu, signalling concern but carefully avoiding condemnation. This was a departure from India’s earlier habit of offering itself as a mediator in regional crises—showing instead a posture of caution tilted toward Israel.
3. The SCO’s reaction to Israel’s strike on Iran was the third moment. Despite Iran being a fellow SCO member, India chose not to join the bloc’s collective condemnation of Israel. Instead, it stuck to its independent position, speaking vaguely of “dialogue” and “de-escalation.” This signalled New Delhi’s unwillingness to jeopardise its ties with Israel, even at the cost of appearing out of step with its regional partners.

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A Subtle Rebalancing at Tianjin and Attack on Qatar

Yet, at the SCO summit in Tianjin, India’s stance softened. This time, New Delhi signed the Tianjin Declaration, which carried strong language against Israel and the United States. It condemned Israel’s role in the humanitarian disaster in Gaza and criticised the Israeli–US strikes on Iran as violations of international law and sovereignty. Importantly, India did not raise objections, suggesting a willingness—at least in this multilateral forum—to return to its older tradition of balancing Israel with Palestine and Iran.

However, before Tianjin, India also showed its concerns to the killing of an Al Jazeera’s journalists in Khan Younis. The MEA spokesperson said, “The killing of journalists is ‘shocking’ and ‘deeply regrettable’…We understand that the Israeli authorities have already initiated an enquiry.” 

Since the Modi government views the Middle East within a broader global framework, its cautious stance toward Israel may also have been shaped by President Trump’s tariff policies. 

This episode hinted that while India has tilted toward Israel, it is not abandoning its broader Gulf relationships. Rather, it is experimenting with a more flexible, situational approach.

 India’s response to Recent Developments: Pragmatism First

Two more recent developments reinforce this picture of a policy still in transition:

Then first was the recent visit of Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to New Delhi. Although presented as an economic engagement, the timing was striking. Israel, under strain from the Gaza conflict and global criticism, seemed eager to shore up ties with India. The signing of a bilateral investment treaty underscored how both sides see their relationship as strategically and economically important.

The second was India’s reaction to Israeli strikes in Doha targeting Hamas leaders. India has also shown its concern to Qatar’s attack by Israel. The MEA expressed “deep concern” about the situation but stopped short of directly criticising Israel. A day later, PM Modi also tweeted, condemning the ‘violation of the sovereignty’ of the State of Qatar. Again, the message was carefully worded—enough to signal unease, but not enough to alienate Israel.

Conclusion

India’s Middle East policy is clearly evolving. The old framework of equi-distance and non-interference has given way to a more pragmatic, interest-driven stance. 

As of now, the Israeli attack on Qatar has complicated Gulf politics, India’s choices will depend on several moving factors: how Saudi Arabia and the UAE position themselves toward Israel, the trajectory of US–India relations, Iran’s role in the Gulf, and the overall stability of a region on which India relies for both energy and expatriate livelihoods.

As India seeks a greater global role, the real test of its foreign policy in West Asia will lie in whether it can successfully balance pragmatism with principle—managing its new partnerships without losing sight of its long-standing ties and interests across the region. 

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.