Iran: Nuclear deterrence or negotiation

After the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, Tehran faces a critical choice: should it pursue nuclear militarization to restore deterrence, or seek a settlement with the West to prevent further conflict. This article examines the strategic scenarios now before Iran.

Following the October attacks on Israel, the country launched widespread strikes against the Islamic Republic’s proxy groups in the region—what Iran refers to as the “Axis of Resistance.” Hamas and Hezbollah were considered the main pillars of this axis. After nearly two years of war, these groups have found themselves in their weakest state, significantly undermining the Islamic Republic’s deterrence capability. 

Meanwhile, several rounds of nuclear negotiations between Steve Witkoff, the US special envoy to the Middle East and Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s minister of foreign affairs of Iran had reached a deadlock. Seizing the moment, Israel, after convincing the US, launched a military attack on Iran.

Now, after a 12-day war, both sides are observing a fragile ceasefire, with the possibility that Israeli attacks on Iran could resume, potentially with even greater intensity. The million-dollar question now facing Iran is: what should the country do to restore its deterrence and prevent another war? There are three plausible scenarios.

Nuclear deterrence

Some in Iran believe that the only way to achieve deterrence under the current circumstances is to militarise the country’s nuclear program. Even prominent global figures such as John Mearsheimer have voiced support for this theory. However, there are several critical points to consider regarding this proposal.

First, merely building a single nuclear warhead does not automatically establish deterrence. If the Islamic Republic decides to pursue a nuclear bomb, it must be capable of building a sufficient number of warheads to balance not only against Israel—which, according to SIPRI, possesses around 90 nuclear warheads (with unofficial sources estimating between 80 and 400)—but also against the United States, which is estimated to have 5,800 nuclear warheads (or up to 7,000 according to some sources). Given Iran’s current circumstances, achieving such a nuclear arsenal appears virtually impossible.

Second, if the Islamic Republic opts to build a bomb, it would have to do so in secret facilities. Accomplishing this in a context where Iranian airspace is essentially open to Israeli operations, and since Israel has demonstrated deep intelligence penetration within Iran, such a plan seems extremely difficult to implement.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, if Iran were to unveil a nuclear warhead, it would remove any ambiguity and make it plausible that the United States might consider a nuclear strike in response.

In light of these points, pursuing this scenario would be the most dangerous and high-risk option for the Islamic Republic.

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Nuclear ambiguity

Others in Iran suggest that the Islamic Republic should adopt a strategy of nuclear ambiguity; that is, to refrain from any transparency or information sharing with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community. Under this approach, Iran would provide no details about the damage inflicted on its nuclear facilities in Fordow and Natanz following US strikes. There would be no clarification on whether the centrifuges have survived or been destroyed, nor any information on the status of the 400 kilograms of enriched uranium that existed in Iran before the war. Has this material been buried under the rubble of the Fordow facility or does it still exist? If it still exists, where is it now?

Under this scenario, Iran would also deny IAEA inspectors access to Fordow, while neither confirming nor denying whether its nuclear program is continuing. The strategy would involve silence, ambiguity and calculated uncertainty.

But what would be the consequences of such a policy?

Pursuing nuclear ambiguity would likely lead to repeated rounds of warfare, conflicts similar to the 12-day war but potentially even more intense. Israel would likely escalate its actions, including the assassination of top Iranian political and security decision-makers, and could even target the Supreme Leader. Attacks on national infrastructure such as power plants, water facilities, and petrochemical complexes may also expand.

Although the Islamic Republic could retaliate and inflict some damage on Israel, the 12-day war demonstrated that Israel maintains air superiority over Iranian territory. In future confrontations, this capability could allow Israel to severely damage Iran’s critical infrastructure and paralyse daily life for its population.

The continuation of periodic wars and the disruption of daily life through infrastructure destruction could also increase the likelihood of domestic unrest and protests. Therefore, the nuclear ambiguity strategy would not only fail to restore deterrence for the Islamic Republic; it would also leave behind a shattered Iran.

Agreement

Another option before the Islamic Republic is to accept the US conditions in ongoing negotiations and reach a new agreement. The American side is likely to present Iran with three main demands: halting uranium enrichment, ceasing or strictly controlling its missile program, and ending support for its network of proxy groups.

The biggest challenge for the Islamic Republic in pursuing such an agreement will not be halting its nuclear program, but rather curbing or abandoning its missile program. To reach a deal, Iran would likely have to concede on nuclear enrichment and proxy activity. But what should it do regarding its missile capabilities?

The development of Iran’s missile program is one of the few state policies that can be legitimately described as aligned with Iran’s national interests. Therefore, if the Islamic Republic seeks to preserve this program, it must shift its negotiation red line: instead of insisting on the continuation of enrichment, it should define the missile program as its new red line. In this context, the Islamic Republic would need to devote all its diplomatic resources to protecting the missile program and preserving as much of its missile range capability as possible during negotiations.

Under such conditions:

One: Because the missile program can be seen as a conventional military initiative aimed at enhancing Iran’s national defence capacity, defining it as a red line would serve national interests and constitute the most reasonable strategic limit the Islamic Republic could adopt.

Two: Since Iran’s missile program enjoys broad support among the Iranian public, declaring it a red line would garner greater domestic backing, unlike nuclear enrichment, which has evoked mixed public opinion. Even if negotiations fail due to disagreements over the missile issue, the Islamic Republic would face a far less public backlash.

If Iran chooses the agreement scenario with the US, it would likely bring an end to military confrontations between Iran and both the US and Israel. The Islamic Republic could retain a viable missile program, and with the lifting of sanctions, gradually purchase conventional weapons and enhance its overall deterrence capability.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.