“One nation, one army:” Lebanon’s debate over resistance and sovereignty

Lebanon once again stands at a defining crossroads. As the country prepares for parliamentary elections in May 2026, the political landscape is dominated by one issue: the state’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Interior Minister Ahmad Hajjar has pledged that the polls will be conducted “with complete neutrality and transparency.” President Joseph Aoun, in a meeting with the Interior Minister, insisted on holding the legislative elections “without postponement under any circumstances.” US Special Envoy Tom Barrack warned that “postponing the 2026 elections under the pretext of war would ignite major chaos within Lebanon, fracturing an already fragile political system and reigniting sectarian distrust.”

These assurances stand in sharp contrast to a political and security environment defined by uncertainty, external pressure, and ongoing Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty.

In August 2025, the government approved a plan to bring all weapons under state control by the end of the year. Strongly backed by the United States and its allies, the proposal forms part of a wider Western framework linking disarmament to reconstruction aid and economic relief. Hezbollah rejected the plan outright. Its Deputy Leader, Naim Qassem, declared publicly: “We will never abandon our weapons, nor will we relinquish them.” In another statement, he added: “We cannot be asked to soften our stance or lay down arms while [Israeli] aggression continues,” asserting that the movement is “ready for martyrdom.”

The truce of November 2024, brokered by the United States, reduced large-scale fighting but failed to halt Israel’s near-daily airstrikes and cross-border incursions. On 24 October 2025, an Israeli air raid on the southern village of Ej Jarmaq killed two civilians. Israel claimed it had targeted Hezbollah sites—another violation of the ceasefire.

Earlier, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam urged the international community “to exert maximum pressure on Israel to immediately stop its aggressions” and to compel a full withdrawal from Lebanese territory. He also reaffirmed his government’s commitment to preventing any armed operation against Israel from Lebanese soil. His statements highlight Beirut’s dual challenge: protecting sovereignty while restraining escalation.

Following the ceasefire, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were tasked with implementing a “Homeland Shield” plan, beginning south of the Litani River and expanding nationwide. The government welcomed the plan but acknowledged that its success depends on international support and, crucially, on reciprocal Israeli compliance with the truce.

US envoy Tom Barrack stated: “Elections in such a moment would expose [Hezbollah’s] weakened standing [and] risk electoral setbacks for its allies.” He has already proposed a phased “One More Try” framework, promising economic incentives in exchange for Hezbollah’s gradual disarmament. He also warned that “Israel may act unilaterally” if the Lebanese government continues to hesitate in its decision to impose a state monopoly over arms. For Hezbollah, this language merely confirms what it has long argued: that Western calls for disarmament serve Israel’s strategic interests rather than Lebanon’s national ones.

Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, whose words “never abandon our weapon… while aggression and occupation persist” encapsulate the movement’s rationale—that its arms are a deterrent against Israeli attacks, not a threat to Lebanese sovereignty. Qassem linked the question of weapons directly to Israel’s continued occupation of five strategic hilltops inside Lebanon and its ongoing violations.

Prime Minister Salam has insisted that the state remains committed to the principle of one army under one authority, describing exclusive control of arms as a prerequisite for stability and recovery. Yet even as the government pursues disarmament, it recognises the LAF’s limited capacity to defend the country alone.

UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) calls for “no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the state.” But the same resolution also requires Israel to withdraw fully from Lebanese territory—an obligation it has not fulfilled. The United Nations continues to record Israeli violations and the occupation of disputed areas. Hezbollah argues that any unilateral disarmament would amount to surrendering Lebanon’s right to self-defence.

Hezbollah’s historical role in the country’s defence remains central to Lebanese memory. The country endured eighteen years of Israeli occupation between 1982 and 2000, and it was Hezbollah’s resistance that forced Israel’s withdrawal. During the 2006 war, the movement again defended Lebanon. The 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the civil war, called for the disarmament of militias but explicitly exempted Hezbollah because it fought Israel rather than other Lebanese factions. With no capable army, Hezbollah’s military wing became an accepted necessity for defending the south.

For many Lebanese—particularly in the south and the Bekaa—this history explains why Hezbollah’s arms are still regarded as a deterrent. Western and Gulf governments, by contrast, view them as the main obstacle to stability and reconstruction. The tension between these perspectives defines Lebanon’s ongoing political deadlock.

For years, Syria provided Hezbollah with strategic depth and supply routes. But the Syrian conflict, regional sanctions, and the erosion of Iranian supply lines have weakened those channels. Israel now views this as a rare opportunity to dismantle the movement’s military capacity. For Washington and its allies, restoring “one nation, one army” has become both a political objective and a condition for aid. For Hezbollah and its supporters, this policy represents an attempt to neutralise Lebanon’s only credible deterrent.

Prime Minister Salam’s position reflects Lebanon’s constrained diplomacy. On one hand, he reassures international partners of the government’s neutrality and its intention to extend state authority over all arms. On the other, he calls on the world to halt Israeli aggression and enforce a ceasefire that Israel has repeatedly breached. The LAF’s limited capacity to defend Lebanon alone, and the reality that Hezbollah’s presence still deters further incursions, remain undeniable.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reiterated his attachment to the idea of a “Greater Israel,” which critics interpret as a doctrine of permanent regional dominance. Recent Israeli strikes—including one on Doha, Qatar, that killed six people, including a Qatari security official—have demonstrated that no Arab state is beyond reach. Meanwhile, Gaza remains under siege, Syria is weakened, and most Arab governments are either silent or aligned with Western priorities.

To Western capitals, Beirut appears as a fragile partner in stabilisation. To supporters of resistance, it risks becoming a vehicle for foreign dictates. The core question is not merely the fate of Hezbollah’s arsenal but whether Lebanon retains any real capacity to deter Israel.

The ceasefire of November 2024 remains central to any future arrangement, yet both sides accuse each other of violating it. Without reciprocal guarantees and international enforcement, disarmament could leave Lebanon vulnerable to further aggression.

Qassem’s assertion that “the arms of the resistance are pointed at the Israeli enemy” thus encapsulates Lebanon’s dilemma. Sovereignty, for the government’s Western partners, means the state’s monopoly on force. For Hezbollah and many Lebanese citizens, it means the ability to deter attacks when the state cannot. In a region shaped by asymmetry of power and selective diplomacy, deterrence remains, for now, the country’s last line of defence.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.