On the UAE mercenary operations in Africa

In recent years, the UAE has capitalised on the vacuum left by Western powers to emerge as a key regional player in Africa. Rather than deploying traditional military forces, it has crafted its own playbook — one centered on funding and arming proxy militias. This intervention is increasingly causing huge instability and is accompanied by countless violations of international laws.  

In Libya, the UAE has been backing the warlord Khalifa Haftar with arms for a long time. This military support resulted in Haftar controlling the East of the country. Several reports have shown that the UAE’s arms supply was essential for Haftar to seize control of this power.

The UAE has also been the main backer of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in Sudan, and credible reports exposed that the  UAE supplied the militia with money,  arms, guided bombs, and hosting its social media team and business companies. This relentless support has been vital for the militia to sustain more than a couple of years of fighting with the Sudanese national army. 

The UAE started to utilise the Wagner Russian group; an independent report by New America suggested that the UAE financed Wagner’s operations. In return, the UAE turned a blind eye to UAE-based and Wagner-related companies that were later sanctioned by the U.S. 

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Recently, the UAE has been recruiting Colombian fighters and sending them to fight in Sudan alongside the RSF militia. These experienced soldiers, some of whom are teenagers, are moved from the UAE to Darfur through a complex network, and they are also involved in training children to join troops on the front lines. 

These mercenaries are not isolated actors; they operate as part of a vast, interconnected network serving the UAE’s broader agenda across the region, not just within the borders of a single country. For instance, in April 2023, at the outset of the war in Sudan, a news report exposed that Wagner transferred weapons to the RSF militia from Libya. The UAE also used Wagner to funnel arms from the Central African Republic to the RSF militia. Colombian mercenaries are usually sent to Sudan via Libya. In February 2021, the UN accused the UAE of sending mercenaries from Sudan to fight along with Haftar in Libya. 

Bosaso airport has become the central hub in a covert supply chain to this network, where weapons and mercenaries shipped from the UAE are rerouted to war fronts across the region. What appears as routine cargo traffic hides a deliberate military pipeline fueling conflict. Without accountability, Bosaso will remain the quiet engine driving regional wars.

The UAE has increasingly turned to mercenaries as a way to dodge legal accountability for the crimes and illicit activities committed on its behalf. By outsourcing violence, Abu Dhabi keeps its hands ostensibly clean while preserving the image it tirelessly promotes to the world — that of a modern, peaceful nation.

READ: Sudan urges UN to designate RSF as terrorist organisation

Behind the UAE’s growing military footprint in Africa lies a mix of motives: a determination to sideline Islamist movements, its longtime political rivals, as seen in Libya and Sudan; and an appetite for economic gains through control of natural resources and strategic sea ports.

Yet these interventions rarely come without controversy. Repeatedly, they have been accompanied by stark violations of international law, including the breaches of UN arms embargoes in Darfur and Libya — measures meant to bring peace and stability to these regions. In addition to the international humanitarian law that prohibits using human rights activities to send arms. 

The impact of the UAE’s mercenary operations has been devastating for the countries where they operate. In Libya, the nation remains effectively split, with UAE-backed warlord Khalifa Haftar ruling the east. In Sudan, the RSF militia—armed and financed by Abu Dhabi—has gone so far as to declare its own government in the territories it occupies, pushing the country perilously close to partition. These interventions are also increasing the gap between African nations, for example, Sudan and Chad cut ties after the UAE utilised an airport in East of Chad to supply the RSF militia with drones and weapons. 

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.