The fault lines that were never fixed: Sudan’s endless war

Just a few days before the end of the second millennium, Sudan was set to undergo a major political shift amid undercurrents of internal turbulence. The president of Sudan at that time, who had led a military coup 11 years earlier, in 1989, had decided to end his alliance with his ideological mentor and steer Sudan on a different path. President Omar Hassan al-Bashir had decided to dissolve the parliament, outlaw the Salvation coalition, and arrest Professor Hassan al-Turabi, his partner in the 1989 coup and the influential Islamist leader who had shared power with the army for 11 years.

The end of the Salvation coalition in Khartoum had sparked the beginning of the long years of the Darfur war. Khalil Ibrahim, a close aide and minister loyal to Hassan al-Turbai, established the Justice and Equality Movement also known as JEM. Soon after, the brutal fighting and killings started. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), closer to the ideology of al-Turabi, was a main Darfur faction clashing with the Sudanese army, but not the only one. These calls for change were motivated by demands for fairer distribution of wealth and power, and an end to the region’s neglect and marginalisation. Yet, Khartoum’s political complications were always present, even in the heart of Darfur’s wide desert.

Soon after the eruption of the conflict, the Omar al-Bashir regime decided to employ the traditional “balance of horror” in Darfur to gain the edge. The Arab nomadic tribes active in Darfur and across the borders were indirectly invited to participate in the war, supporting the central government’s side. The most influential name among the leadership of the Arab tribes at this stage was Mousa Hilal, who was considered the chief commander of the tribal fighters known as the Janjaweed. Horrific atrocities and massive brutality were perpetrated during this bitter conflict, especially with the involvement of the Janjaweed during the years from 2002 to 2008, which marked the peak of the brutal conflict.

When the war began in Darfur in 2003, it was mainly between the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Mini Arko and Abdelwahid Nour, and Khalil Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement on one side, against the Sudanese Armed Forces on the other. The situation quickly shifted when Al-Bashir’s government called on the Arab Bedouin tribes to join and support the army in its war against the native people of the region. It was already clear that the long history of rivalry between Darfur’s people and the Arab tribes would deepen the conflict and ultimately serve the government rather than the rebels. The war in Darfur may have started in 2003, but its traditional, regional, and ethnic roots run far deeper in the history of Darfur and the wider Sahel–Sahara region.

Darfur’s ethnic structure is originally made up of two main components: the African tribes that form the majority of the native people of the region, and the Arab tribes. The largest tribe is the Fur, which gave the region its name as the land or homeland of the Fur. There are also the Zaghawa, another major tribe in the region with a significant presence extending into neighbouring Chad. The Masalit people are also one of the main groups in Darfur; they mostly inhabit the state of West Darfur with its main city, Geneina, and are also found in Chad around the border area with Sudan.

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The Arab Bedouin tribes, on the other hand, are part of a wider scene known as the Baggara Belt, which extends from western Sudan to the south, around Lake Chad; they have played a significant role in the Sahel and Sahara region. Such a vast region is home to several tribes, including large ones that have been roaming it for hundreds of years. The Rizaigat are the most influential Arab tribe in Darfur, and the Mahamid branch of the Rizaigat holds most of the Arab tribes’ power in the region.  The founder of the Janjaweed militias at the beginning of the Darfur war, Mousa Hilal, was the leader of the Mahamid from the Rizaigat. The current commander and leader of the Rapid Support Forces, which inherited the leadership of the Janjaweed, Mohammad Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti,” is also a Rizaigat member from the Mahamid branch.

Several reports from regional and international observers on the situation in Sudan suggest that, since the start of the war in April 2023, the RSF has expanded its ranks by recruiting fighters from Arab tribes in neighbouring African states such as Chad and Niger. These observers have also drawn attention back to Chad’s own civil conflict, where for years the African Zaghawa tribe — through its members, the late president Idriss Déby and his son, current leader Mahamat Déby — has held power while fighting opposition groups. In that conflict too, the same Arab–African tribal complexities of the Sahel and Sahara have played out.

The RSF today is largely in control of most of Darfur. They are in a relatively strong position, geographically linked to a wider source of support from Arab tribes across the Sahel and Sahara, and empowered by their control of the Jabal Amer gold mines which provide the financial strength they need. They also receive political and logistical support from their international allies.

The bigger picture, however, shows that the Sudanese Armed Forces still control much of the Sudanese map. They are, in one way or another, an extension of the traditional establishment formed under the rule of Omar al-Bashir — the man who shaped the leadership and structure of the army as it stands today. Ending the war is now a national priority, as is reuniting Sudan under one leadership capable of leading it toward peace and stability. 

Yet, one ongoing conflict can easily ignite others, like in eastern Sudan, where the Beja once fought the central government for years. The current Sudan, after the separation of South Sudan, also has a new “south” inheriting the old conflicts of the former one — and is affected by the ongoing struggle for power in South Sudan itself, reflecting the deep tribal and ethnic divisions between the Dinka and the Nuer. This adds yet another layer to the mosaic of tensions and conflicts in one of Africa’s largest and richest countries in terms of natural resources. 

More than two decades on from the eruption of the war in Darfur, Sudan’s fault lines have not been rectified; they have simply redrawn the map of its endless conflict. With more than 12 million people displaced since 2003, the country has grown tired and yearns for a new era of peace and stability. 

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