Will Sudan’s civilians benefit from the renewed international focus on their country?

Sudan is once again getting a lot of attention – fueled by reports of serious atrocities and the Trump administration’s desire to help stabilize the war-torn country at the urging of Saudi Arabia. While any efforts to halt hostilities would be welcomed by the Sudanese people, this newfound focus on Sudan should be more than simply imposing a ceasefire without any political outlook. It should trigger a serious process that centers the civilians’ vision for peace and systemic reform. So, the real question is whether any international actor is ready to advocate for that civilian voice?

Sudan’s instability did not appear in 2023. It is the product of two decades of missed opportunities, international hesitation and inconsistencies. Three main events in particular reveal how international actors repeatedly failed to support the Sudanese people’s quest for change.

The first is the War in Darfur, a region that has endured violence since 2003 despite several attempts to stop atrocities. In 2005, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1593 set a precedent by referring the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) as reports of genocide were emerging. Though seven arrest warrants were issued, only one suspect is in ICC custody – following his voluntary surrender in 2020 – highlighting limited international cooperation required to demonstrate a strong commitment for justice.

During these years, the 2005 World Summit boasted the global endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a doctrine intended to prevent serious offences such as war crimes and genocide. Yet its non-binding nature limited its applicability. The conflict in Darfur was the first one to be linked to R2P through resolution 1706 which sought to expand the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to Darfur. However, inadequate pressure by the Security Council meant the Sudanese government effectively resisted deployment which nullified the resolution.

Not until 2007 did Khartoum agree to the deployment of United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) under the less restrictive resolution 1769, raising hopes that violence could be reduced. But the new hybrid model faced serious issues: neither the AU nor the UN had experience running such a mission and UNAMID’s mandate was unclear. It was expected to support a political process without being empowered to lead one. Meanwhile, a lack of consensus among UNSC members – who disagreed on how to address the conflict – further limited the mission’s efficacy on the ground.

As a result, UNAMID largely remained an operation aimed at marking a physical presence. Though it improved humanitarian access for the displaced communities, its ability to protect civilians was constrained by the absence of unified political vision from major international actors. Violence continued for several years well until the mission was dissolved in 2020 during Sudan’s fragile political transition.

The second turning point came in April 2019 when President Omar Al-Bashir’s regime fell after months of civilian unrests driven by economic hardships and growing demand for political openness. Yet once again, the international community missed an opportunity to rally behind a civilian-led vision for Sudan’s future. Even the formation of the Transitional Sovereignty Council meant to begin an equitable political process between civilians and the military, proved a risky experiment that could not counter decades of military grip on power.

In October 2021, the military coup swiftly ended hopes for civilian participation after months of uneasy dual governance. Lacking genuine international support, and with the AU sidelined, Sudan’s transition struggled to survive. Moreover, Gulf powers wary of a democratic Sudan, offered little support for civilian political aspirations. Internal dissensions within the military elite ultimately escalated into a full fledge war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces that has wrecked Sudan since April 2023.

This pattern of inconsistent interventions has reinforced the notion that Sudan cannot seem to find a direction towards stabilisation. Today, middle powers with divergent interests – especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia – exert disproportionate influence over the warring parties at the expense of civilian ambitions. Yet President Trump’s renewed interest could present another prospect for change given the United States’ leverage over Gulf Nations, granted that future decisions do not impose a ceasefire that sidelines civilians.

For progress to be sustainable, African leadership must emerge from the backseat. The regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), working in coordination with the AU, is best positioned to stand united behind the civilians. Its member states have far more to gain from a stable Sudan than any external actors. A united IGAD-AU front could press people-centered priorities in negotiations with the US, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as the three countries seek to reinforce their economic and diplomatic ambitions on the continent. Meanwhile, recent backlash towards the UAE’s role in Sudan offers additional leverage for African leaders to promote a process that limits bilateral actions detrimental to Sudanese civilians.

The modest results of past interventions underline the disparate positions of an international community unable, or unwilling, to build a credible conflict-resolution framework that addresses the root causes of the Sudan tragedy. Any outcomes delivered from increased US involvement should set forth a fresh course for coordinated international action, one that ensures the civilian voice remains a priority to the next transition. Only then will the Sudanese people have a chance to emerge as the true winners of the reinvigorated global focus on their nation.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.