The Abraham Accords gambit: Washington’s high-stakes balancing act in the Middle East

As Israeli forces continue operations in Syrian territory, a public rebuke from President Donald Trump-the incursions are “counterproductive”-exposes the fault lines in America’s Middle East strategy. Yet in Netanyahu’s defiant response, maintaining that Israel will not retreat one step from territories it occupies, a deeper reality lies: even as the administration pursues an audacious diplomatic endgame, which might reshape the region, the limits of Washington’s influence extend to its closest regional ally.

Behind closed doors, three strategic imperatives reportedly drive US policy in the Middle East. All of them are fraught with contradictions that may forge a historic peace or ignite new conflict between America’s own allies.

The Abraham Accords: From achievement to ambition

The crown jewel of Trump’s Middle East policy remains the Abraham Accords-the 2020 normalization agreements that established diplomatic relations between the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco and Israel. Now, administration officials are eyeing an even more ambitious expansion: bringing Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria into the fold.

“The Abraham Accords represented a paradigm shift in how we think about Middle East peace,” says Dr. Martin Indyk, former US Ambassador to Israel. “But expanding them to include Syria and Saudi Arabia would be transformative on an entirely different scale.”

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According to diplomats, Syria’s inclusion is considered indispensable political cover for the real prize: Saudi Arabia. “You cannot ask Saudi Arabia to normalize with Israel while Damascus remains outside the framework,” says Dr. Cinzia Bianco, a Gulf analyst at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Syria provides the Arab legitimacy that makes Saudi participation politically palatable.”

But there is a fundamental problem with that approach. How can Washington persuade Syria to sign a peace treaty with Israel when Israeli forces are occupying Syrian territory? The contradiction has not gone unnoticed by regional observers. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently observed that “you cannot build peace on continued occupation,” a view shared in most Arab capitals.

The Turkey-Israel tinderbox

Perhaps more urgent than the Accords’ expansion is Washington’s race to prevent open conflict between two of its most important regional allies, namely Turkey and Israel. The deterioration in the relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv has accelerated dramatically, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warning that Turkey might intervene militarily if Israeli actions in Gaza continue.

“The nightmare scenario for Washington is a shooting war between Turkey and Israel before January 2029,” says Dr. Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. “Such a conflict would shatter NATO’s southern flank and fundamentally alter the regional security architecture.”

The tension is palpable. Recent Israeli operations in Syria, partly to counter Iranian weapons transfers but also to secure buffer zones, have brought Israeli forces closer to areas where Turkish troops maintain a presence. The potential for miscalculation is enormous.

Khaled Elgindy, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, comments: “Washington is trying to preserve ties with two countries whose visions of the region are increasingly irreconcilable. Turkey views itself as a defender of Palestinian rights and Syrian sovereignty. Israel views existential threats that must be preempted. These positions are on a collision course.”

The Saudi-Turkish promise

Complicating the issue further is a reported commitment from Trump in May to both Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Erdoğan that he will “render Syria great again” by lifting sanctions and supporting reconstruction.This pledge reflects the understanding in Washington that both Riyadh and Ankara—despite their own fraught history—see Syrian stability as crucial to regional security.

“The Americans understand that they need Saudi Arabia and Turkey on board for any sustainable regional order,” says Yasmine Farouk, a Saudi analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “But it’s easy to make promises and hard to keep them when the other best friend is actively bombing the country you promised to rebuild.” 

The issue of sanctions relief also speaks to a broader challenge: how can Washington support Syrian reconstruction when its partner Israel views a stable, reconstructed Syria as a potential security threat?

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The F-35 dilemma and the limits of leverage

More fundamental to all these, however, is the question of America’s influence. While it remains Israel’s most crucial benefactor, accounting for some $3.8 billion in yearly military assistance, Washington has traditionally been loath to use that aid as a lever over Israeli military activities.

The new pressure point now is the proposed sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia and Turkey; Netanyahu reportedly is pushing Trump to block or delay these sales on the grounds of the longstanding US commitment to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” in the region.

“This is where American policy contradictions become most acute,” argues Aaron David Miller, a veteran Middle East negotiator. “Trump wants to sell advanced weapons to allies he’s courting for the Abraham Accords, but doing so risks alienating the ally whose participation makes the Accords credible in the first place.”

A strategy at war with itself

The fundamental contradiction at the root of US policy becomes increasingly evident: Washington seeks to expand a peace framework, while its closest partner in that framework continues military operations that undermine the participation of essential parties. It promises reconstruction while enabling bombardment. It cultivates multiple allies whose strategic visions are mutually exclusive.

Whether the Trump administration can square these circles remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the window to do so is rapidly closing. In the words of one senior Arab diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity: “The Americans are trying to build three different Middle Easts simultaneously. Eventually, they will have to choose which one they want most.” 

For now, Washington’s strategy remains a high-wire act—balancing between allies, between promises, between vision and reality. What is at issue is not whether there will be compromises but whether they are made through thoughtful diplomacy or through catastrophic failure.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.