Is it Ethiopia or Egypt that flaunts hegemonic ambitions?

It has been over two years since Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s claim of Ethiopian “natural rights” to the Red Sea. Has Ethiopia eschewed what Tafi Mhaka, in a 14 November 2023 piece, dubbed as Ethiopian imperial ambitions? Ethiopia’s ruling Prosperity Party would counter it never had such ambitions in the first place. They, instead, accuse Egypt, as done recently by Ethiopia’s ambassador to Somalia, Suleiman Dedefo, in an article that was published on 3rd December by the AfricaReport media under the title of “Horn of Africa: Egypt’s ‘strategic balance’ disguises regional ambitions’. 

The ambassador accused Egypt of disguising its “malicious hegemonic ambitions”. The ambassador was responding to the Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty’s reference of the Horn of Africa region being “continuously challenged by the inherent inclination of certain parties within the region to export their chronic internal instability by fabricating external threats, inventing enemies and fueling hostilities resulting from hegemonic tendencies”. Like many observers of the region, Ambassador Suleiman nodded Abdelatty was referring to Ethiopia here. 

But who really has hegemonic ambitions? Well, Ethiopian officials and surrogates have openly spoken of their “hegemonic ambitions”, articulated both in writing and in speeches, in official and affiliated platforms. I have not, however, found such public pronouncements from Egyptian officials.

Ethiopia wants ownership of a coastline

In Ethiopian ruling party parlance, “sea access” is interchangeable with their demand for “sovereign sea access”. Whereas the former is legitimate, the latter is not since no coastal state would willingly forfeit its territory. It’s to be recalled that Ethiopia rejected Djibouti’s generous offer to jointly manage the port of Tadjourah for commercial activities. According to President Ismail Guelleh of Djibouti, Ethiopia’s PM Abiy wanted much more: “to establish a corridor with extraterritoriality between the Ethiopian border and Tadjourah and to set up a naval base for their navy”. This was rejected by Djibouti, with President Guelleh noting “Djibouti is not Crimea”. Ethiopia’s call for “dialogue” with Eritrea and the other coastal states is, therefore, an audacious request to bargain sovereign control of their maritime territory with Ethiopia. No coastal state, however, has refused Ethiopia access to the sea.

Prime Minister Abiy, in his 28 October 2025 speech addressing the country’s parliament, and where he questioned the legitimacy of Eritrean independence, said “Ethiopia’s loss of access to the Red Sea came after a struggle that lasted more than 30 years — as you all know. However, I do not believe that it would take another 30 years to restore what was lost.” Crucially, the Ethiopian prime minister omitted the fact that this “historical Red Sea access” represents the violent, forceful occupation of Eritrea from 1961 to 1991. His desire to “restore what was lost” is, therefore, an obvious indication of Ethiopia’s irredentist, expansionist adventures because Ethiopia does not have a legitimate claim on Eritrean coastline.  

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Ethiopian rivalry with Kenya for regional hegemonic power

So why does Ethiopia want to be a coastal state at the risk of engulfing the region in yet another devastating war? A July 2024 “policy brief” by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Institute of Foreign Affairs discussed Ethiopia’s competition for regional hegemony with Kenya and listed out four possible scenarios: “(1) competing hegemonic power between Kenya and Ethiopia; (2) Kenya will assert its ascendancy in the region; (3) Ethiopia will reassert its hegemony/dominance and (4) a region without a clear hegemon.” Ethiopia’s large population size and economy ensures that the country will have a significant role in the region. But only if it harnesses its internal resources and learns to live in peace within itself and with the region. Unfortunately, peace has long eluded Ethiopia, with catastrophic impact to the entire region. 

Navy as instrument of power projection and changing maritime boundaries

Where does naval capability fall within the Ethiopian equation for dominance? Last month, articles by Ambassador Nebiyu Tedla (currently Director General of the Public Diplomacy Directorate General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia) and another by Surafel Tesfaye and Rebecca Mulugeta of the Horn Review put naval power as an imperative part of the country’s pursuit of “sovereign sea access”. To Surafel and Rebecca, a navy would play a significant role in projecting power with the ability to affect “the strategic balance within the Horn of Africa”. As background, the Horn Review is affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Institute of Foreign Affairs and claims to partner with the War College of the Ethiopian National Defence Force. Moreover, the Executive Director of the Horn Review, Blen Mamo Diriba, works for the Institute of Foreign Affairs. In April, she authored an article that posited “Ethiopia, long denied access to the sea, could move to reclaim the strategic port of Assab. In such a scenario, Eritrea’s control over Assab could be permanently altered, akin to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.”

Surafel and Rebecca explain that “naval capabilities serve as powerful bargaining chips in international negotiations over port access, maritime boundaries, and security partnerships.” The use of naval power to influence negotiation on “maritime boundaries” clearly has annexation and hegemonic implications. Given the real risk of Ethiopia using their naval capabilities for an expansionist agenda, neighbouring coastal states would be forgiven for refusing to host such a force in the first place. It would be akin to inviting a known serial killer to your home and expecting them to behave kindly and show mercy! Possibly, the primary target of this open musing could be for domestic consumption, to garner nationalist fervor and distract from internal crises. But the threat to coastal states and regional stability is deadly serious. 

Where do Ethiopian maritime territorial claims stop?

Ambassador Nebiyu (19 November) and the Horn Review’s Samiya Mohammed (13 November), almost in identical phrases (coincidental or not), explain that Ethiopia’s ambition goes beyond the port of Assab and entails controlling the Eritrean Dahlak archipelago. Both ambassador Nebiyu and Samiya suggested that “any vision for a secure Ethiopian maritime future must, by necessity encompass this dual reality, the door to the sea is Assab, but the key to holding it open lies in the control and fortification of Dahlak.” It’s noteworthy to mention that the Dahlak islands are about 600 kilometers north of Assab and only about 45 kilometers from Massawa, the other major port of Eritrea. So, one has to ask where does Ethiopia’s ambitions stop? At Eritrea? What stops them from attacking or pressuring Djibouti, Somalia or others down the road when they feel they have the capacity? 

Conclusion

Ethiopia’s ruling party’s expansionist and hegemonic aspirations should be called out for the danger they represent for the entire region. While Ethiopia’s Suleiman Dedefo tries to flip the script and assign the blame on Egypt, it is in fact the current Ethiopian regime’s hegemonic ambitions that risk engulfing the Horn of Africa region in yet another devastating and intractable conflict. A conflict the region can ill-afford! Against this backdrop, the lack of public condemnation by countries and international institutions may be encouraging PM Abiy’s regime to escalate the tension, both to distract from internal conflicts and to serve his hegemonic agenda. 

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.