The Quad’s paper tiger problem: Why the Indo-Pacific strategy is faltering

In February 1946, George Kennan sent his “Long Telegram” from Moscow, providing the intellectual blueprint for the “containment” of the Soviet Union. Kennan argued that the West needed a strategy of “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment” based on a clear-eyed understanding of the adversary’s psychology. Today, Washington is attempting to replicate this feat in the Indo-Pacific through the “Quad”—the strategic grouping of the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia.

However, like the Cold War strategy, the current approach is struggling with its internal contradictions. Although Washington views the Quad as its best defense against China’s expansionist foreign policy, on-the-ground developments in the Indo-Pacific are beginning to paint a much more complex picture. If the Quad is ever to mean more than just a “talk shop,” it must correct three crucial errors that currently confer an advantage on Beijing.

The myth of strategic unity

The most obvious vulnerability in this bloc lies in the divergent national interests of its members. Although Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra increasingly resemble one another in their “containment” stance, Delhi remains the outlier within this bloc. India maintains a strong commitment to its strategic independence and has extensive, highly complex trade arrangements with the nations this bloc seeks to contain.

As pointed out by Foreign Affairs: “The problem is that the Quad finds it difficult to counter the ‘region’s ambivalence about aligning with one side against the other,’ which ‘closes several options for effective action’ against China as a solid bloc”.

For India, it’s a security instrument for maritime and border security, whereas for the United States, it’s a geostrategic encirclement of China. These two goals can’t match with what Washington sees as a “unified front.”

The “public goods” deficit

The biggest Quad failure is that it lacks the same “checkbook” as “Belt and Road” China. Diplomatic ambitions in Southeast Asia do not construct any bridges, high-speed trains, or electric power lines. At present, financing for Quad-backed infrastructure in the region trails strongly behind the Quad’s diplomatic rhetoric. The Quad offers “cooperation,” but China turns the dial to deliver.

As a recent RAND Corporation report asserts, this is because the Quad does not make direct investments; hence, it is viewed more as a military containment strategy than an actual development partnership. It supports the Chinese narrative that the West is merely interested in Southeast Asia insofar as it can use the region as a battleground for supremacy, rather than for economic partnership.

ASEAN “neutrality wall

Even more difficult may be a lack of support from the broader region. The ten nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have made their stance on the matter clear: they refuse to be left with just two options. Many of these countries see the idea of the Quad as a form of “outside-in” construct which disrupts “ASEAN centrality.”

Since the Quad holds that conflict exists through the paradigm of “unilateral actions” in the South China Sea, yet cannot offer a comprehensive economic security umbrella, it actually distances the very nations it aims to protect. This is apparent in a discussion in the text China’s Diplomacy in the New Era, which suggests that, at times, perceptions of the Quad may be considered duplicitous towards regional leaders.

The bottom line: No containment without capital

Kennan’s containment policy was successful, as it later benefited from the Marshall Plan—a massive dose of economic reality that made membership in the West a recipe for financial success rather than simply a security partnership. Now, the Quad Group has become a voice shouting into the void of its own creation. Moreover, the Quad Group is not a military alliance and is unlikely to become one in its current configuration, insofar as it seeks the same “strategic autonomy.”

To effectively challenge China’s “New Era of Influence,” the Quad must go beyond sea exercises and begin providing the “public goods”—infrastructure development, technology transfer, and trade—to the extent desired by the people of the region. As the late Shinzo Abe once conceptualized, the “Quad must be a Security Diamond. But today, without economic substance, it looks and feels like a glass object, easily broken.”

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.