Iraq awaits a government without politics and a judge above the state

What kind of government can emerge when a judge steps onto the political stage? What happens when Iraq’s Chief Justice, Faiq Zidan, transforms from a guardian of the law into a power broker serving clear Iranian interests? What is the meaning of government when it is forged through collusion, political blackmail and submission, far from the rules of ordinary political engagement?

What is happening in Iraq today is not taking place behind closed doors. On the contrary, it is happening in full view of the cameras. For weeks, Faiq Zidan has been acting like a politician, not a judge. He appears. He negotiates. He smiles for the cameras. He acts as if he holds an unwritten mandate to manage the state.

From the selection of parliamentary speaker Haibat al-Halbousi, to orchestrating a parliament in which representation has lost its meaning, to negotiating with Kurdish parties in Erbil and presenting himself as the sole authority over armed militias, it is clear that Zidan is not impartial.

He is the central player. Perhaps the most powerful actor in the room. The question is no longer whether he will intervene. Rather, it is: who gave him this role, if not Iran? What political authority does a judge have when acting as a party leader or the ultimate arbiter of power balances?

Recently, an investigative team of Iraqi journalists produced an extensive report on Zidan, dubbing him ‘Iraq’s Escobar’. The report highlighted his ‘silver or lead’ doctrine: two options for any opponent and no third — accept the bribe or face severe consequences.

Zidan used this approach to build a complex network of judges, officials, political leaders and influential figures, leveraging the law to enforce loyalty, silence dissent and protect the corrupt.

He shielded those behind the ‘theft of the century’ and crushed businesspeople, leaving them with no option but submission or a slow death through the courts, asset freezes, bankruptcy, imprisonment or exile.

Today, ahead of forming a new government in Baghdad, all signs point to one conclusion: Zidan does not seek a government of balances. He wants a government that is completely subservient to his authority.

Since the reconstitution of Parliament and the selection of Hebt al-Halbousi under terms that can be summed up in one word — compliance — it has become clear that legitimacy is no longer derived from popular representation. Rather, it is derived from the judicial stamp.

This stamp legitimises a parliament that includes dozens of leaders tied to militias classified as terrorist organisations, treating the issue as procedural rather than structural. This kind of political farce is unique to militia-dominated Iraq.

For Zidan to stand on the anniversary of the killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis — primary sources of unchecked weapons and killings based on identity — and speak earnestly about ‘monopolising weapons under the state’ is contradictory and absurd. It is a kidnapped state demanding exclusive force while its symbols mourn those who shattered its authority and handed it over to militias.

In this context, Zidan has presented himself as the ‘saviour’ from chaos, paralysis and politics itself. He is presenting himself as Iraq’s de facto leader, not because he was elected, but because he is backed by external powers, namely Iran, and because of his position within the so-called ‘deep state’, where judicial power intersects with security, money and weaponry.

In recent weeks, Zidan has not only managed the situation in Baghdad. He travelled to Erbil to negotiate directly with Kurdish parties, acting as though he were a prime minister or an extra-constitutional envoy. Then he returned to bring together the leaders of Iraqi parties and Iranian-backed militias — a scene reminiscent of Soleimani, not as a memory, but as a role now filled.

In this sense, Zidan is not just an Iranian ally, but the new de facto agent of Iranian political influence in Iraq. Soleimani operated as a military commander. Zidan operates as a jurist. The result is the same: controlling the tempo, preventing chaos and establishing authority that does not threaten Iranian interests. Michael Knights, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, has noted that Zidan has issued order after order to block any genuine opposition to Iranian militias.

Following the 2003 invasion, Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis elevated Zidan to the highest echelons of the judicial system, where he oversaw terrorism courts — not to combat terrorism, but to ensure that Iran’s affiliates could never be held accountable under Iraqi law. In this context, the judiciary is no longer an independent authority. It is a concentrated power. Zidan appoints. He dismisses. He commands judges as a prime minister commands ministers. Without election and without a time limit.

It is a permanent installation driven by external political will rather than national consensus. U.S. Congressman Joe Wilson summarised the situation succinctly: Zidan is no longer simply an Iranian proxy. In reality, he acts as a political leader, a central mediator in Iraq’s power balances who intervenes directly in government formation negotiations in a manner that is more brazen than any previous conduct.

What kind of government could emerge from this situation? A political government? A judicial government? Or a hybrid authority, cloaked in the guise of the state and functioning according to militia logic while employing the language of law? The judiciary in this equation is no longer an independent authority. It is a concentrated power.

The conclusion is almost certain: Iraq is not moving towards a strong government, but rather a weak and subservient one. This government lacks politics, accountability, vision and the courage to defy imposed boundaries.

The heavier question is: Are we witnessing a transitional phase? Or is this a new model of governance, written in judicial ink rather than politics? In this model, the prime minister is merely a façade, absorbing popular anger while real authority is exercised elsewhere, beyond politics and closer to a system that neither questions nor holds itself accountable.

The greatest danger is not the weakness of the upcoming government. Rather, it is the precedent that it establishes by transforming the judiciary into the supreme political authority and placing the judge above parliament, the government and the will of the people. If this model becomes established, it will not be temporary. It will become the norm. Then, the question will no longer be about the shape of government. It will be about the very meaning of the state. That is the true warning. This is a cost that Iraq may realise too late.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.