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‘Israel, What Went Wrong’: Omer Bartov on genocide in Palestine

May 5, 2026 at 11:22 am

Omer Bartov. Israel: what went wrong

Omer Bartov is an Israeli-American historian. He is professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Brown University in the United States. Dr Mohammad Farhan who is Assistant Professor (English) at the Center for Distance and Online Education, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, recently interviewed him about his latest book Israel: What Went Wrong.

What is happening in Palestine is not a conflict or war, it is a genocide as Bartov Omer, a leading authority on genocide writes in his book. In this interview he succinctly discusses how Israel commits war crimes and genocide on Palestinians:

Mohammad Farhan:  I would like to ask what inspired you to use such a title What Went Wrong and what actually went wrong in the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict that the book addresses.

Omer Bartov: Thank you. The title is a bit of a pun on Bernard Lewis’s book published 20 or 30 years ago about what went wrong with Islam. That was not a very good book, but it carried an assumption that the problem was a lack of development in the Islamic world. For me, it is also a question of what went wrong in the country where I was born and raised. It is a personal, political, and now an existential question with many layers.

The book talks about a process rather than a single point, but if I were to indicate a crucial moment, it is the very establishment of the State. At that moment, the state made a choice that carried a long-term price. It decided not to have a constitution and never decided what its borders were. As a result, Zionism became the state ideology and the guideline for how the state would behave toward its own population—citizens and non-citizens—and those who later became occupied populations.

Mohammad Farhan: While reading, I noticed the book refers frequently to the events of October 2023. Was that the triggering point for you to write this book, or was there another point of inspiration?

Omer Bartov: Yes, it was. I was in Israel for three months in late 2022 researching another book I am currently writing. Once October 7th happened, I was stuck into those events and tried to understand both what was happening on the ground and the deeper roots of it. Most of the book was written after October 7th in an attempt to understand the events and their origins.

Mohammad Farhan:  I would like to ask you what Zionism was originally and what has it become now.

Omer Bartov:  I was just reading commentary in Hebrew where people have very different ideas of what Zionism is. My view is that Zionism is a political ideology formed in the late 19th century in response to the rise of ethnic nationalisms in East Central Europe that became increasingly exclusive, militant, and anti-Semitic.

Jews living in those parts of the world found themselves facing the “Jewish Question.” One solution they developed was their own ethno-nationalism, which they called Zionism. Since they were told they did not belong in the lands where they lived, they chose the ancestral homeland of the Jews—the Land of Israel—to exercise self-determination.

Once Jews started settling in Palestine, they discovered the land was already settled by Arab Palestinians. This created a conflictual situation perceived by the local population as settler colonialism. Zionism wanted to create a Jewish majority state so Jews would no longer be a minority, but they remained a minority in Palestine for a long time. Ultimately, considering most European Jews were murdered by the Nazis, the movement established a majority by ethnically cleansing the Palestinian population from what became the State of Israel.

Israel chose not to become a “normal” country; it adopted Zionism as its State ideology. The State could exist as a normal democratic state that respects the rights of all citizens, but it hasn’t done so. Zionism has become increasingly militant, expansionist, and racist—to the point of now justifying ethnic cleansing and, for some, even genocide.

Mohammad Farhan: You mentioned in the book that your father’s Zionism was different from the Zionism of today. What kind of Zionism did your father follow, and did it influence you?

Omer Bartov: I dedicate the book to my father and call him “the last Zionist.” It is a bit tongue-in-cheek, of course. My father was born in Palestine in the 1920s, before the state was created, whereas my generation was born after.

My father and the members of his generation were always oriented toward left-wing parties. They truly believed they could create a society that was socially just—both internally and toward Palestinians. One might say they were naive or even lying to themselves, because that isn’t exactly what they created, but they had ideals they were trying to implement.

The kind of state and the version of Judaism that evolved before he died in 2016 were completely anathema to him. It became racist and militaristic. Judaism in Israel became a religion that justifies brutalizing others and Jewish supremacy. This is a total contradiction for Jews living outside of Israel; half the world’s Jews live elsewhere and are minorities there. You cannot be a Jewish supremacist if you are a minority.

For him, this was a tragedy. He particularly detested Netanyahu, whom he viewed as the wrecker of Zionism—at least the Zionism he believed in. However, I have to say that I don’t think Zionism is redeemable. I don’t think my father’s Zionism is coming back. As an ideology, it is dead; it has to go.

Mohammad Farhan:  Could you elaborate on the relationship between Israeli politics and the idea of Zionism in current times?

Omer Bartov: It is a very good question. In Israel, when politicians in both the coalition and the opposition talk about politics, they consistently say they will only join coalitions with “Zionist parties.” That is a code word. When you say that, you are saying you will not go into a coalition with Arab parties. Since 20% of the population are Palestinians, you are essentially saying we will have a politics only for Jews.

Zionism is now used as a code for ethno-nationalism, exclusion, and the exclusive right of Jews to the country. This was legally instituted in 2018 when Israel passed the Basic Law stating that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people. But what happens to everyone else?

While Israel proper has two million Palestinian citizens, Israel is effectively the state between the Jordan River and the sea. “The occupation” has become a fig leaf to describe a single state that controls an entire area where another five million Palestinians have no rights at all. The Zionism currently in power thinks the land belongs to the Jews and that Palestinians must be removed. We see this being implemented in Gaza, the West Bank, and now southern Lebanon.

Conversely, many Jews outside of Israel view Zionism as an identity, though they aren’t very good at articulating what that means. If you are a “Zionist Jew” in New York, does that just mean you support the state? I’ve always said to my Jewish friends: “If you are a Zionist, go live there and serve in the army.”

Instead, it has become a fragile, superficial identity. This became clear during the 2024 protests against the war in Gaza. Many young Jews felt their identity was threatened by Palestinian flags because they had internalized an idealized view of Israel. It was a “cheap” identity; instead of learning Jewish history, tradition, or languages, they took on a superficial affinity with Zionism that required no real effort. Because that identity is so fragile, any opposition to Israel’s actions feels like an attack on their very self.

Mohammad Farhan: Another word you discuss extensively in the book is “anti-Semitism.” What kind of role does the media play in the representation or misrepresentation of ideas like anti-Semitism or Zionism?

Omer Bartov: The media, especially after October 7th, has generally played a lamentable role. First, in reporting what was happening on the ground in Gaza—partly because they are not allowed entry—but it has also failed in explaining the protests against Israeli actions. In the United States, young people were protesting because they were disgusted by what they saw and because this was being done with the help of American taxpayer money.

The media quickly latched onto the argument made by politicians, the Jewish lobby, and Israeli propaganda that protests against Israel are anti-Zionist and therefore anti-Semitic. In the vast majority of cases, this was simply false. Obviously, you can find occasional anti-Semitic utterances, but the main thrust of the protest was entirely different: it was about the fact that Israel was causing terrible harm to the civilian population in Gaza.

The use of the term “anti-Semitism” by both the Biden and Trump administrations, recycled by mainstream media, has had only negative repercussions. It shut down much of the protest and created a concerted policy of intimidation against students, faculty, and anyone critical of Israel. I have been shut out of various venues, and many of my colleagues won’t speak because they are afraid. They congratulate me privately for being courageous, but they remain silent.

Mainstream media is not dealing with this well, and on social media, the discourse has gone completely wild. There is no one speaking reasonably to explain the distinction between anti-Semitism and protest. It is a dangerous moment for free speech, academic freedom, and all minorities, including Jews.

Mohammad Farhan: You said you were born in Israel, and in the book, you discuss how you feel estranged from it. Even though you call it your homeland, you claim you now feel alienated. What is that feeling like?

Omer Bartov: You can only be estranged from something you once had an intimate relationship with. I am not estranged from countries I don’t know; I can only be estranged from a place that is part of me but has become alien.

Two elements primarily made me feel estranged. One was the encounter with far-right students. They feel fully justified in destroying Gaza, yet they simultaneously feel victimized by a world that describes them as murderers. They believe they are very humane while being entirely justified in carrying out genocide—a very troubling ambivalence.

The other part involves people I have known for a long time who are in a state of denial. They refuse to admit what was done in their name, often by their own children. They just want to move on. By not wanting to know, they are affirming it and becoming complicit. That will warp Israeli society for a long time to come.

Mohammad Farhan: You mentioned there is a widespread view in Israel that justifies the destruction and displacement in Gaza. Is there a way to dismantle this view, which is so prevalent in society, politics, and the media?

Omer Bartov: There are people in Israel who disagree—both Palestinians and Jewish Israelis who want a different reality—but they are too few, and their voices are currently drowned out. As I’ve said elsewhere, the only way to change this is through “shock therapy.” Right now, Israel and the Palestinians lack the internal dynamic to bring about change; they remain in denial, which only produces more violence. If you have a state where 50% of the population is oppressed by the other 50%, you are guaranteed ongoing brutalisation unless you entirely murder or ethnically cleanse one side.

This change must come from the outside. The limits of Israeli power are set in Washington. Right now, Israel can essentially get away with murder because it is supported by the U.S. with arms, money, and Security Council vetoes. If the United States changes its policy, other states—certainly European states like Germany—will follow. That would force Israel to choose diplomacy over bombs. Israeli society is filled with bravado but is actually quite fragile. Once they realize they no longer have an infinite license for violence, the political leadership will be forced to adjust. This would open space for moderate voices. Most Jews and Palestinians in the region want a better life; they just lack the leadership to change things and end up supporting militants out of fear.

Mohammad Farhan: Do you believe if this conflict is the extension of Isarel’s internal politics?

Omer Bartov: Yes. By now, the current leadership—Benjamin Netanyahu and those around him—cannot politically afford not to have a war. Since October 7th, Netanyahu has realized that as long as the war continues, he doesn’t have to face the consequences of his failures. He is like a cartoon character running off a cliff who doesn’t fall as long as he doesn’t look down. He knows that if the fighting ends, everyone will focus on him and say, “You are the guy who got us into this.” So, he must keep the state in a permanent state of emergency.

Mohammad Farhan: The current regime seems to capitalize on the history of the Holocaust. How do you view the relationship between the history of the Holocaust and the currently unfolding events?

Omer Bartov: I write about this in the book. For several decades after it happened, the Holocaust was not seen as a major event in world history or the history of WWII. It only became a more central event in public consciousness during the 1980s and 90s, with the creation of museums and commemorations.

In the early years of Israel, the Holocaust was actually seen as an embarrassment. The common Zionist refrain was, “Why did Jews go like sheep to the slaughter?” It was viewed as a negative model; the “new Israeli man” was supposed to be someone who fights back. However, from the 1980s onward, the Holocaust became a kind of glue for Israeli society. It allowed hostile parts of society to find common ground, but it also increasingly framed the Holocaust as an imminent threat.

It stopped being just a historical event and became an existential, future threat. If you believe you are constantly threatened with another Holocaust, the conclusion you draw is that you must destroy those who might destroy you. This gives you a license to use infinite violence against anyone you perceive as a threat. Israel has used this in international politics to say, “We believe in international law, except when we are threatened—then we will do whatever it takes and won’t listen to anyone.”

I think that after October 7th and the genocide Israel carried out in Gaza, that credit has run out. Israel will no longer be able to say, “We were created after the Holocaust, therefore we have license to carry out violence against others.” You cannot justify genocide with genocide. In the long run, Israel will have to reinvent this narrative. It should continue to commemorate the Holocaust, but it can no longer use it as a political tool to justify the unjustifiable.