Beyond unipolarity and the end of strategic certainty: Lessons imposed by the war on Iran

The war on Iran stands as a revealing reflection of a profound structural shift in an international order that has been taking shape for years. The Iran conflict cannot be viewed merely as a passing regional crisis or a confrontation between rival powers confined to a specific geography. It represents a pivotal moment in the evolution of international relations. The war reflects the ongoing transition from a unipolar world order to a new and still undefined order, shaped by emerging forms of power born of the current era. The contours of this new order are unfolding amid mounting global challenges that may evolve into a cascading and imminent danger, a development that is far from unusual in periods of major conflicts and transformation within the international system.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, and with the emergence of Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis proclaiming the triumph of the United States over the Soviet Union, Washington came to dominate the international system as the world’s sole superpower, uniquely capable of shaping rules and imposing new global norms throughout the three decades that followed. This dominance was reinforced by Europe’s integration under the American security umbrella through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which gave the old continent a broad space to advance economically through deeper integration, while granting Washington an unprecedented monopoly over global power, backed by a cohesive Western alliance. These transformations faced little meaningful resistance from other major powers. Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union, engaged with the Western economic system, while maintaining an awareness of its distinct national identity. China, meanwhile, cooperated with that same order, developing itself cautiously and deliberately, avoiding the confrontational posture that had long defined its image. Its rise, as a result, appeared gradual and largely peaceful. Within this integrated international order, regional conflicts remained confined mainly to their geographic boundaries, a defining characteristic of the unipolar era.

Relations between Europe and the United States are increasingly moving toward divergence, or at least greater strategic autonomy. In the wake of the tariff disputes with the US, Europe accelerated efforts to finalize trade agreements with India, Brazil, and other countries, in an attempt to diversify its economic partnerships. Trade between the European Union and China now accounts for nearly 30 percent of global trade flows, despite the volatility that continues to define relations between Brussels and Beijing. The United States launched its military operation against Iran without any meaningful consultation with its European allies, amid renewed tensions over NATO funding, a dispute Trump ignited during his first term and revived again in his current one, further straining a historic alliance. Trump also threatened to impose sweeping trade restrictions on Spain after Madrid refused to allow American forces to launch strikes from bases on its territory. He later announced the withdrawal of 5,000 US troops stationed in Germany, following remarks by the German chancellor criticizing the course of the war against Iran. Last March, French President Emmanuel Macron, delivered a speech from the Île Longue nuclear naval base in which he announced the expansion of France’s nuclear arsenal for the first time in decades. He also introduced the concept of “forward deterrence” and ordered the deployment of French nuclear assets on the territory of allied European states, a direction later echoed by other European governments. Taken together, these developments point to a growing European desire to build a security architecture less dependent on the United States. They reflect a cumulative structural shift toward greater self-reliance and increasing distance from Washington, Europe’s traditional strategic anchor.

On the other side, a non-Western economic and political network has been gradually taking shape since 2009, led by China, Russia, and a number of Global South countries. Its rise was driven in a large part by growing competition with the United States and by Western sanctions imposed on Russia, as well as earlier sanctions targeting other states, including Iran. The process accelerated sharply after the outbreak of the Ukraine war. Western sanctions pushed Russia to redirect its economy eastward, while China moved from integrating into the Western-led global order toward building a broader institutional and financial space outside the American umbrella. Beijing pursued this through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the expanded use of the yuan in international trade and finance. Iran, meanwhile, found an economic and strategic outlet through these emerging networks under the pressure of western long-standing sanctions, particularly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS+.

The era of strategic certainty that defined the post–Cold War order for decades now appears to be coming to an end.

One of the clearest signs of this shift lies in the response of Western powers to the consequences of the American war on Iran. Despite rising costs, instability in energy markets, disruptions to global supply chains, and declining confidence in the rules governing global trade and freedom of navigation, these countries did not align behind Washington’s strategic vision as they traditionally would have.

At the same time, the broader Western strategy toward Russia, aimed at deterring and weakening it after the war in Ukraine, appears to have fallen short. Russia has remained a cohesive global power despite sustained pressure. The International Monetary Fund expects the Russian economy to grow by 1.1 percent this year, while projected growth for Germany, France, and Italy stands at just 0.8 percent, 0.9 percent, and 0.5 percent respectively.

Trump’s current visit to China, and the nature of the issues on its agenda, reflect the evolving balance between the world’s two leading powers. Between the possibility of Chinese purchases of Boeing aircraft, the increasingly complex artificial intelligence rivalry between the two countries, and the interconnected files of Hormuz and Taiwan, Beijing appears to hold a growing advantage over Washington within an ongoing contest of strategic bargaining. The visit carries exceptional significance and reflects broader shifts in the international order when viewed through several overlapping dimensions. The first lies in the timing itself, where it follows a visit by the Iranian foreign minister and precedes a visit by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, underscoring China’s expanding global role as a power increasingly positioned at the center of unresolved international crises. The second relates to Trump’s domestic standing. He arrives in Beijing while facing declining popularity at home, driven by rising fuel prices linked to the war with Iran, the US Supreme Court’s decision to strike down the tariffs he imposed last February on constitutional grounds, and growing strains within America’s traditional alliances with its Western partners. The third dimension points to a deeper structural reality. In 2000, US exports to developing countries exceeded Chinese exports by more than sixfold. By 2024, more than half of those countries’ imports were coming from China.

Today, China stands as the leading trading partner for more than 150 countries worldwide.

Despite the heavy dependence of many major powers on Gulf energy supplies, and the extent to which their economies are tied to secure energy corridors and freedom of navigation through strategic waterways, they proved unable to fully protect their interests. Stability in the region, and the security of global energy flows, are no longer governed by traditional calculations, making it increasingly necessary to rethink long-standing assumptions. Many of the countries most affected by these developments, including China, which imported roughly 42 percent of its oil from the Gulf before the war, approached the crisis through a pragmatic economic lens. Beijing avoided direct security involvement, relying instead on the stability provided by existing security arrangements while refraining from aligning itself fully with either side. This, in itself, reflects a deeper crisis, one rooted not only in the absence of clear global leadership, but also in the erosion of confidence in the leadership that currently exists.

The threat to the Strait of Hormuz, and the disruption of maritime navigation through critical waterways, can no longer be treated as a regional issue confined to its geographic boundaries.

It has become a direct test of the international order itself, revealing a new and still unsettled pattern of global polarization that, despite its hesitation, has not decisively tilted the balance in Washington’s favour. Even the United Nations Security Council proved unable to intervene effectively or build consensus around the crisis, as international alliances increasingly reflect a different geopolitical landscape and a new balance of power.

Within these new equations of power, states that lack deeply entrenched military superiority, but possess strong and promising economic and technological foundations, have become, in many cases, more secure than countries with established conventional military power but weak modern technological infrastructure. The ability to protect digital networks from cyber intrusions, secure supply chains against disruption or coercion, and maintain technological independence in critical sectors has become a central pillar of national security. As a result, militarily mid-sized states can now exert influence far beyond their traditional weight, particularly when they hold an advantage in one of the rapidly expanding domains of modern power. This dramatic shift is redefining the very foundations of deterrence within the international system. Armies are no longer the sole guarantors of strategic security. Strategic industries, advanced research laboratories, major technology firms, and digital infrastructure have all become essential instruments within the modern security equation. This transformation is undoubtedly expanding the number of influential poles in the world, making global power less concentrated in the hands of the United States alone, as was the case in the past, and as this war itself now demonstrates.

For years now, a competitive multipolar order has been gradually taking shape and gaining momentum. It is not being shaped by major powers alone; middle powers, too, have assumed a central role in defining its structure and securing their place within it, a feature that distinguishes this emerging order from previous international systems.

The system now taking form is no longer governed solely by military power. Technological, economic, and scientific capabilities have become equally central components of influence, distributed across multiple states rather than monopolised by a handful of great powers.

Within this evolving order, alliances are becoming more flexible, less stable, and increasingly driven by pragmatic calculations. Deterrence itself is becoming more costly and far more difficult to calculate, given the growing number of interconnected sources of threat. Equally important, economic and technological power are advancing more rapidly than conventional military force as the primary instruments of international influence and strategic leverage, a transformation whose trajectory and ultimate consequences remain difficult to predict.

The American-Israeli war on Iran has become a clear indicator of the profound transformation in the dynamics of international interaction since the era of unipolarity, when regional conflicts were, to a large extent, contained within their geographic boundaries. Today, however, such conflicts increasingly spill beyond their immediate theatres, generating consequences and interactions with global reach. The war has also revealed a deeper shift in the very meaning, and limits, of power. For decades, international influence was largely measured through conventional military strength, nuclear capability, and traditional economic power. Competition today extends far beyond those foundations, encompassing broader arenas shaped by supply chains and financial networks, advanced semiconductors and communications technologies, strategic transport corridors and energy routes, as well as data, digital sovereignty, and artificial intelligence, all of which are emerging as decisive factors in the future balance of power.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.