A peace that carries the scent of accepting reality

In international politics, the most important transformations do not always occur in the text of agreements. Sometimes the real transformation lies in the words that suddenly disappear; in red lines that gradually fade; and in silences that carry more meaning than any statement. The possible agreement between Tehran and Washington is precisely of this kind. No official document has yet been released, no final agreement has yet been signed, and even its details remain unclear. Yet the very language used by the American side, along with the political coordinates of the talks, suggests that the matter goes beyond a tactical understanding or a temporary ceasefire. What is now taking shape is the reflection of a gradual shift in America’s understanding of the real balance of power in the Middle East—a change that reveals itself not in press conferences, but in shifting priorities and a quiet retreat from certain maximalist objectives.

Donald Trump is speaking of a “peace memorandum” with Iran at a time when, unlike in previous years, there is almost no serious or direct reference to the total destruction of Iran’s nuclear program, the elimination of its enrichment capacity, or the dismantling of the main components of Tehran’s deterrence. This absence is not accidental.

In reality, what is happening in Washington today is not an ideological change in its view of the Islamic Republic, but rather a pragmatic reassessment of the costs of continuing the status quo.

After years of sanctions, maximum pressure, proxy wars, security operations, and attempts to wear Iran down on all fronts, the United States has now reached a point where the continuation of chronic tension in the Persian Gulf, instead of producing geopolitical advantage, is becoming a permanent drain on America itself.

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This issue has become more tangible for Washington than ever, especially after successive crises in energy markets, maritime insecurity, threats to the Strait of Hormuz, and the rising costs of indirect conflict in the region. The United States is now facing a difficult reality: amid intense competition with China, a global economic crisis, domestic divisions, and pressure from public opinion, it no longer has the capacity to enter another major, grinding war in the Middle East. In such an atmosphere, it is natural that the White House’s priority would shift from “fundamentally changing the balance” toward “making the crisis controllable.” For this reason, the central axis of the new understanding is not the complete collapse of Iran’s power infrastructure, but rather the management of tension, the stabilization of energy security, and the prevention of a regional explosion.

In fact, what is being observed today is a kind of change in the philosophy of America’s presence in the Middle East.

Washington is gradually moving away from the old model of “engineering the regional order through absolute superiority” and toward a form of balance management—a model in which the main objective is not to eliminate troublesome actors, but to prevent rivalries from turning into uncontrollable wars.

This is precisely the point that distinguishes the possible agreement with Iran from previous agreements. The United States knows very well that even if it intensifies economic and security pressures, there is still no guarantee that Iran’s deterrence structure will collapse. On the contrary, the continuation of this war of attrition could pull the entire region into a cycle of permanent instability whose costs would ultimately fall directly on Washington.

It is this new understanding that has also changed the behavior of Arab countries in the region. In previous years, many Arab actors supported the strategy of maximum pressure against Tehran. Now, however, their priority is no longer the elimination of Iran, but the prevention of widespread instability. Saudi Arabia’s massive economic projects, the United Arab Emirates’ commercial competition, the global market’s dependence on the security of Persian Gulf energy, and the fragility of the regional economy have led many Arab governments to see the continuation of gray-zone and warlike conditions as a threat to their own future. That is why, unlike in the past, this time part of the Arab world has not only refrained from obstructing the talks, but has in practice supported the formation of a kind of crisis-management understanding.

Under such conditions, the Strait of Hormuz has acquired a meaning beyond that of a mere maritime route. Hormuz has now become a symbol of the fragility of the global economic order—a chokepoint where any crisis can send shockwaves through energy chains, trade, and financial markets. The United States and its Arab allies know very well that the continuation of permanent tension with Iran means leaving a permanent threat hanging over the energy artery of the world. Therefore, the possible agreement should be understood not merely as a nuclear file, but as part of an effort to redefine regional security and prevent economic exhaustion.

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Yet it is precisely at this point that the most important rift between Washington and Tel Aviv becomes visible. Israel does not view the issue merely at the level of a technical nuclear agreement. Tel Aviv’s main concern is the gradual change in America’s view of Iran—a change that is slowly moving from the language of “pressure for elimination” toward the “management of a power that cannot be eliminated.”

For Israel, the real danger does not lie in the centrifuges themselves, but in the normalization of the idea within Western decision-making structures that Iran, despite all pressures, has remained a stable and influential actor, and that instead of dreaming of its collapse, one must come to terms with the reality of its presence.

For this reason, the danger of Israeli intervention to disrupt the path toward an agreement remains entirely serious. The experience of the past two decades has shown that whenever the atmosphere of negotiations between Tehran and Washington has moved toward de-escalation, the level of sabotage operations, media pressure, and security maneuvers has simultaneously increased. Tel Aviv knows very well that if this agreement—even at a limited level—leads to the consolidation of a new pattern of interaction between Iran and the United States, it could weaken part of the foundation of Israel’s security strategy in the long run. From this perspective, the possibility of provocative actions, intelligence operations, or even the creation of shocks on the ground to sabotage the atmosphere of agreement remains a fully plausible scenario.

Inside the United States, too, the situation is more complicated than it appears on the surface. Some currents close to Trump believe that the American president has, in effect, been forced to choose the second option between “an uncontrollable war” and “an agreement short of the initial objectives.” They see this agreement not as a strategic victory, but as a kind of acceptance of the limits of American power. By contrast, another current in Washington argues that the art of great-power politics does not necessarily lie in destroying the rival, but in preventing rivalry from turning into permanent attrition. From this perspective, the United States must now concentrate its resources on containing China, rebuilding its domestic economy, and preventing the collapse of the global order—not on sinking into the quagmire of yet another endless conflict in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Tehran has also tried to move the negotiations out of the traditional framework of “agreement from a position of weakness.” The important point is that Iran has succeeded in shifting the talks away from the issue of “complete elimination of capabilities” and toward “management of mutual threat.” This shift may be the most important hidden transformation in the current process, because it shows that the region’s strategic atmosphere is no longer being shaped on the basis of fantasies of rapid collapse or total surrender by actors. Instead, it is being redefined around a gradual acceptance of existing balances.

Perhaps the most important feature of this possible agreement is precisely that almost none of the parties is willing to call it a “victory for the other side,” while at the same time almost everyone knows that the previous path was no longer sustainable. The Middle East today has entered a stage in which even enemies are forced to choose between the dream of fully eliminating one another and the management of the region’s hard realities. And perhaps the real meaning of a possible Tehran–Washington agreement is exactly this: not the end of rivalry, not the beginning of friendship, but the quiet acceptance of the fact that some actors, despite all pressures, have become an indelible part of the regional equation of power.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.