Is the region paying a heavy price for Trump’s personal interests?

President Donald Trump’s administration has been accused of waging war against Iran on Israel’s behalf. Israel had made no secret of its determination to draw the United States into such a confrontation, having failed to persuade previous US administrations to do so. Since then, countries across the region have borne the consequences of the war’s repercussions and of Trump’s decisions relating to it, whether in their regional relations, the broader regional security environment, or even the internal security and stability of some states. The equation surrounding the war against Iran appears even more complex when viewed through the prism of Trump’s character. Coming from the world of business and finance, he is far more adept at striking deals and maximising economic gains than at relying on conventional approaches to politics and diplomacy. The convergence of these factors raises a fundamental question: were Trump’s decisions during the war driven solely by political considerations, or did his personal and economic interests also help shape them, at the expense of the region’s stability?

The data show that Trump’s statements and decisions concerning the war on Iran, as well as the ceasefires associated with it, affected market movements and trends. A number of defence companies benefited, and their share prices rose at the outset of the war.

Escalation, or threats of strikes against Iran, also drove up oil prices and the shares of energy companies, affecting the stock-price indices of airlines, transport companies and technology firms. Conversely, promoting ceasefires and negotiations pushed down energy shares while lifting the shares of companies operating in other sectors.

Trump holds shares in defence, technology and energy companies whose performance is affected by his decisions concerning the course of the war on Iran.

Trump maintains a formal and publicly disclosed financial relationship with the stock market, one that he did not relinquish upon taking office, unlike the practice followed by the presidents who preceded him. At the beginning of his first presidential term, the Office of Government Ethics recommended that Trump divest himself of financial interests that conflicted with his presidential responsibilities. The seven presidents who served before him, following the enactment of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which requires presidents to disclose their financial interests and transactions, either sold assets that conflicted with their official duties or placed them in a blind trust, with no knowledge whatsoever of its transactions throughout their time in office. In the United States, official political decisions and statements influence market sentiment and stock prices. Trump closely follows the stock market and regards it as an important measure of the success of his presidency.

Trump retains a publicly listed company bearing his name, as well as investment portfolios containing bonds and shares. The value of the shares held in the investment fund that he disclosed upon taking office falls within the highest reporting category in the United States, exceeding $50 million. Trump is the fund’s sole beneficiary, and it continues to retain the authority to buy and sell shares throughout his presidency. Although Trump has stated that others manage the fund’s transactions, a former official at the Office of Government Ethics has argued that Trump’s financial arrangements fall well short of what is conventionally understood as a blind trust.

Trump’s investment fund holds positions in companies operating in cryptocurrencies, banking, artificial intelligence, technology, semiconductors, energy and defence, including Apple, Tesla, Nvidia, Boeing and the defence contractor Lockheed Martin.

The interests of these major US companies are affected by decisions taken by the Trump administration, including those relating to tariffs, import restrictions, war and ceasefires, creating a clear overlap of interests. During the first quarter of this year alone, Trump’s investment fund executed more than 3,600 share purchase and sale transactions involving these companies. His official financial disclosures reveal the scale of the trading activity and the breadth of his holdings, but they do not disclose the precise profits generated from share trading.

During the war, the markets reacted to Trump’s statements, even when they were not reflected in actual policy. A recurring pattern emerged: forceful threats tended to drive oil prices higher and depress the shares of other companies, while announcing additional time or referring to negotiations reversed that pattern. Trump’s statement on 9 March that the war was progressing more favourably than expected contributed to a fall in oil prices and a rise in the share prices of other companies. Likewise, his announcement on the 23rd  of the same month postponing strikes on Iran’s energy facilities led to a fall in oil prices of around 15 per cent. What has raised further questions, however, is that unidentified parties sold large oil futures contracts only minutes before Trump announced the postponement of the strikes, which triggered an immediate drop in oil prices. On 7 April, only hours before Trump announced a two-week ceasefire, oil futures were again sold in the same manner, with the volume almost doubling. Following his announcement, oil prices fell by around 15 per cent. These are only a few examples that prompted experts to call for scrutiny into the possibility that confidential official information had been leaked.

Under US conflict-of-interest law, executive branch officials are prohibited from participating in government matters that affect their own financial interests, although the president and vice-president are exempt from that restriction. US securities laws also prohibit trading while in possession of material non-public information.

The United States lately derailed the agreement with Iran and undermined every negotiating and diplomatic effort pursued throughout the war, amid the contradictory policies it maintained during that period. The opening provision of the ceasefire framework agreement called for an end to hostilities on all active fronts, including Lebanon. Although Israel was not a party to the agreement, the inclusion of Lebanon in its very first provision, together with the strategic alliance and longstanding partnership between the United States and Israel and their joint prosecution of the war against Iran, implies that Israel accepted the terms agreed by its ally. The United States’ refusal to release Iran’s frozen assets, while making their release conditional on their use for specified purposes, also runs contrary to the agreement, which expressly provided for the immediate release of those funds without restricting how they could be spent. Likewise, the alteration of shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz at the urging of the United States constituted a further breach of the agreement by Washington. It also disrupted the balance of relations between Oman and Iran.

The United States had long failed in its efforts to drive a wedge between Oman and Iran, having consistently described Omani-Iranian relations as cordial, while Oman remained a cornerstone of mediation between Iran and the Gulf states. Under the recent ceasefire agreement, however, the United States succeeded in placing the two partners on a collision course in the Strait of Hormuz after Oman activated the southern shipping lane in line with the US position, without agreement with Iran. The agreement itself reflected the reality established by the war, under which the northern shipping lane, running close to Iran, remained in operation, and it made no provision for any alternative arrangement. It also stipulated that the Strait would be administered jointly by Oman and Iran, with no reference to any role for Washington in that context.

It is difficult to overlook the profound changes in the region’s external and even domestic relations that have resulted from Trump’s and Netanyahu’s war against Iran, contrary to the declared interests and aspirations of the countries of the region. After decades of diplomatic and political efforts to bridge the divide between the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran, efforts that had proved successful in recent years, tensions between neighbouring states have returned in a more complex form. During the war, Iran launched military strikes against neighbouring Gulf states on the grounds that they hosted US military bases involved in attacks against it. This created a fundamental imbalance in relationships that had taken many years to consolidate.

The cautious relationship between Iraq and Kuwait has not been spared the deterioration brought about by Trump’s and Netanyahu’s war against Iran. Maritime boundary disputes between the two countries had remained within a political and legal framework under the auspices of the United Nations. The war, however, gave rise to military movements from Iraq towards Kuwait, justified by Iran’s targeting of the US military presence in Kuwait. This marked an unprecedented development since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and further complicated the regional landscape to its detriment.

Lebanon and Syria have not been spared the consequences of Trump’s policies. He made the disarmament of Hezbollah a condition for Lebanon, although this was not a new proposal within the Lebanese state, and linked it to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, provoking considerable controversy and internal disagreement. Trump also suggested that Syria could fight Hezbollah instead of Israel, in proposals that would have disastrous consequences for the security and future of the region.

It is not difficult for states to recognise their own interests; one need only follow their media to discern their priorities and objectives. Gulf media have covered the war on Iran primarily through the lens of its implications for their economies and national resources. Iranian media have focused on rejecting surrender while maintaining that Iran does not seek a war. Israeli media have continued to emphasise the persistence of the Iranian threat and to reject ceasefires, agreements and negotiations. American media have concentrated on the United States’ ability to manage the regional order while securing US interests at the lowest possible cost. European media, meanwhile, have viewed the war through the prism of international stability and the evolution of a multipolar international order.

It is not in the interests of the Arab states to remain captive to the agendas and interests of other powers, including those of the United States.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.