The geopolitics of energy reconstruction: Who will rebuild the Middle East’s damaged energy systems?

In the Middle East, war often survives in the electricity grid long after it recedes from the battlefield. It persists through blackouts, fuel shortages, damaged substations, disrupted water supplies and hospitals forced to rely on generators for the basic requirements of life.

From Gaza and Syria to Lebanon and Yemen, energy systems have been destroyed, degraded or deprived of investment. Restoring them will require immense financial resources, advanced technology and sustained political coordination. Yet energy reconstruction is not simply an engineering or humanitarian undertaking. Decisions about who finances a power station, supplies its equipment, controls its software and maintains its operations can shape a country’s economic orientation and political relationships for decades.

The next phase of Middle Eastern energy diplomacy may therefore be defined not only by those who produce and export energy, but also by those with the capital and technology to rebuild it.

Gaza and the politics of energy survival

Nowhere is the relationship between energy and political authority more visible than in Gaza.

Even before October 2023, Gaza’s electricity system met less than 35 per cent of demand. The 2026 Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimates that the energy sector has sustained approximately $565 million in physical damage and a further $164 million in economic losses.

More than 90 per cent of its energy infrastructure has reportedly been destroyed, including much of its distribution network and solar-generating capacity.

This destruction affects almost every component of civilian survival. Without reliable electricity, hospitals cannot operate safely, water cannot be pumped or desalinated, telecommunications remain vulnerable and businesses cannot resume normal activity. Restoring power is therefore a prerequisite for wider reconstruction rather than one sectoral project among many.

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The decisive question is whether Gaza’s former centralised and externally dependent electricity system will simply be restored or replaced with a more resilient architecture. Reconstructing the previous model would leave civilian life exposed to future restrictions on fuel, equipment and cross-border electricity supplies.

A more durable system would combine electricity imports with decentralised solar generation, battery storage and local microgrids serving hospitals, water facilities, schools and residential communities. This would not provide complete energy independence, but it could reduce the risk that a single external interruption paralyses essential services.

For Gaza, the choice between restoring centralised dependence and building distributed resilience will be a political decision as much as an engineering one.

The hidden architecture of dependence

Energy infrastructure extends far beyond the equipment installed on the ground. Every project is embedded in financing agreements, procurement rules, technical standards, proprietary software, maintenance contracts and tariff structures.

A government purchasing a foreign gas turbine may depend on the manufacturer for spare parts, software updates and specialised maintenance. A lender financing a transmission network may influence procurement standards, electricity pricing and market reform. A company installing a digitally managed grid may acquire privileged access to operational data or embed its technology so deeply that replacing it becomes prohibitively expensive.

Because power stations and transmission systems commonly remain in operation for several decades, agreements negotiated under emergency conditions can determine a country’s suppliers, technical standards and financial obligations for an entire generation.

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Syria illustrates the scale of the challenge. A 2025 United Nations Development Programme assessment found that more than 70 per cent of Syrian power plants and transmission lines had sustained significant damage, while national grid capacity had declined by more than 75 per cent.

The World Bank estimates that rebuilding Syria’s damaged infrastructure and buildings could cost approximately $216 billion—almost ten times its projected 2024 gross domestic product. In 2025, the Bank approved a $146 million grant to rehabilitate transmission lines, substations and regional interconnections.

International assistance will be indispensable, but the governance of that assistance will be as important as its volume. The selection of priority projects, contractors, technologies and financing mechanisms will determine whether reconstruction strengthens Syrian institutions or leaves them reliant on external suppliers and operators.

Competing models of reconstruction

The emerging market for energy reconstruction will attract regional and global actors offering different combinations of finance, technology and political support.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar possess substantial financial resources, sovereign investment vehicles and increasingly capable renewable-energy companies. Their involvement could connect infrastructure investment with diplomatic influence and access to emerging post-war markets.

Türkiye has geographical proximity, significant construction capacity and established commercial networks across neighbouring states. Electricity interconnections, equipment supplies and reconstruction contracts could deepen its economic position in Syria, Iraq and the Eastern Mediterranean.

China can offer competitively priced equipment, project finance and turnkey delivery. Its ability to build infrastructure rapidly may appeal to governments facing urgent shortages. However, the adoption of Chinese hardware, software and maintenance systems could anchor national grids within Chinese technological ecosystems.

European governments and multilateral development banks are more likely to emphasise renewable energy, environmental standards, institutional reform and regional integration. Their assistance may improve governance and sustainability, but conditions attached to tariff reform, market restructuring or procurement can be difficult for fragile governments to negotiate and implement.

The competition is therefore not merely over construction contracts. Each actor offers a distinct model of recovery—and, with it, a different vision of the region’s future energy order.

Rebuilding resilience rather than restoring fragility

External influence is not the only danger. Reconstruction may also restore the structural weaknesses that made national energy systems fragile before conflict.

Rebuilding an obsolete fuel-dependent power station may return electricity quickly, but it can also lock a country into imported fuel, inefficient generation and high operating costs. Replacing destroyed equipment without reforming the system around it may reproduce old vulnerabilities under new contracts.

Lebanon offers an important warning. As the national grid deteriorated, wealthier households and businesses increasingly turned to private diesel generators and solar installations, while poorer communities remained exposed to prolonged power cuts. Decentralisation provided alternatives, but without effective regulation it also reinforced inequality.

Yemen demonstrates a different limitation. Off-grid solar systems have supplied essential electricity during conflict and helped households survive the collapse of central services. Yet emergency energy solutions cannot permanently substitute for functioning national institutions and equitable public provision.

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The appropriate model is neither absolute centralisation nor uncontrolled privatisation. Conflict-affected countries require layered energy systems that combine rehabilitated national grids with municipal networks, rooftop solar, community projects, battery storage and protected supplies for hospitals and water facilities.

Resilience must also include diversified suppliers, accessible spare parts, cybersecurity protections and domestic engineering capabilities. A turbine tied to one manufacturer, a solar system that local technicians cannot repair or a digital grid vulnerable to external disruption can introduce new forms of insecurity even when generating capacity has been restored.

Who should govern the rebuilding process?

Energy reconstruction can revive industry, restore public services and provide the material foundations of stability. Without effective governance, however, it can also generate opaque contracts, unsustainable debt and infrastructure that serves foreign or commercial interests more effectively than local communities.

Three principles should guide the process.

First, national institutions, local engineers and affected communities must participate in deciding what is rebuilt, where it is located and how it will be operated. Foreign expertise may be necessary, but local participation is essential for legitimacy, maintenance and institutional learning.

Second, financing and procurement agreements must be transparent. Contracts should disclose long-term liabilities, supplier exclusivity, ownership arrangements and provisions governing access to strategic energy data.

Third, reconstruction should be evaluated by the vulnerabilities it removes rather than only by the megawatts it restores. Diversified generation, affordable access, decentralised capacity and local technical knowledge should be treated as core measures of energy security.

For much of the past century, geopolitical power in the Middle East was associated with control over oilfields, pipelines and maritime routes. Another source of influence is now emerging: the capacity to rebuild what war has destroyed.

The decisive contest will not be over reconstruction funding alone, but over the political, financial and technological arrangements embedded in every power station, transmission line, maintenance contract and solar microgrid. In the post-war Middle East, those who rebuild the grid may also shape the political order that follows.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.