America can still strike. The hard part is what comes next

On 4 August, Qatar said mediators had made progress towards US-Iran talks aimed at ending the war, even as Tehran continued to deny direct negotiations with Washington. The diplomatic push came days after President Donald Trump called off another round of major strikes on Iran and turned again to diplomacy. After months of war, threats, pauses and renewed attacks, the episode captured the central contradiction of American power today: the United States can still strike almost anywhere, but it is increasingly difficult for Washington to turn military force into a political outcome it can control.

That distinction matters. America can send carrier groups into the Persian Gulf, keep drones circling over conflict zones, impose sanctions, and launch cruise missiles on short notice. None of that is the same as achieving a durable result.

The problem is not a lack of weapons. It is the growing gap between the ability to use force and the ability to translate military superiority into political outcomes. In the Middle East, that gap has become impossible to ignore.

For years, “America First” was supposed to offer a different answer. Many of the voters who rallied to Trump were tired of endless wars, tired of sending American troops to fight conflicts whose connection to US security was never clearly explained, and tired of watching Washington treat foreign commitments as permanent while domestic needs remained unresolved. Trump spoke directly to that frustration. His promise was not that America would become weak or passive. It was that American power would be used more selectively and that the interests of American citizens would come before the demands of allies, lobbies and inherited commitments.

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What has emerged instead often looks like the old system under a new label. American forces remain exposed across multiple theatres.

Taxpayer money continues to sustain military commitments with no clear political end state. And the United States repeatedly finds itself using force without being able to define what success is supposed to look like once the shooting stops.

That is the opposite of strategic restraint. It is intervention without a convincing theory of victory.

The Iran war has made the problem especially visible. Washington can destroy targets, kill commanders and raise the economic cost for its adversary. Yet Iran and other regional actors still retain the ability to impose costs of their own, disrupt trade, pressure US partners and force Washington back towards bargaining.

The lesson is not that American military power has disappeared. It is that military superiority by itself does not guarantee political submission. Once adversaries understand that distinction, deterrence becomes harder to sustain.

The same tension now appears at home. On 23 July, the House voted 214-208 for a War Powers resolution directing the president to remove US forces from hostilities with Iran. Whatever one thinks of the resolution itself, the vote reflected a widening political question: what exactly is the United States trying to achieve, and how much American blood and money should be committed to achieve it? A great power weakens itself when the answer to those questions remains vague.

Alliances complicate the picture. NATO has long been attacked by America First critics as a system in which Washington carries too much of the burden while wealthy European governments rely on the American security guarantee. There is an important counterargument: European allies and Canada are now spending substantially more on defence, and NATO says they are moving towards the higher targets agreed by alliance leaders. That is real burden-sharing progress. But it does not settle the larger question. More allied spending does not automatically mean every American deployment, guarantee or intervention serves a vital US interest.

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The same is true in the Middle East. Partners want the protection of American power, but they also pursue their own interests, hedge with rival powers and press Washington to absorb risks they may be unwilling to bear themselves. That is normal behaviour for states. The mistake is assuming that every allied priority must therefore become an American obligation. An alliance should be a tool of national strategy, not a substitute for one.

This is where the original America First mandate has been diluted. Washington still speaks the language of “international commitments,” credibility and leadership, as if maintaining every inherited military posture were proof of strength. But credibility does not come from being everywhere. It comes from making commitments that matter and being able to fulfil them. A country that repeatedly enters conflicts without a realistic political objective does not strengthen deterrence; it teaches adversaries to test how far its willingness to escalate actually goes.

The power to strike without a clear willingness or ability to impose an acceptable outcome eventually becomes theatre. Adversaries begin to assume they can absorb a blow and survive the political contest that follows.

Allies begin to hedge because they are uncertain how long Washington will stay committed. American voters begin to ask why they are paying for missions that seem permanent while the promised results remain temporary. That combination drains prestige more effectively than any single battlefield setback.

Breaking the cycle does not require isolationism. It requires discrimination. The United States should maintain a powerful military, but use it when vital American interests are genuinely at stake and when political leaders can explain what victory means. It should ask allies to carry a greater share of their own defence. It should reduce a global military posture built around the assumption that every regional crisis requires an American answer. And before entering a conflict, Washington should know what outcome it is prepared to impose, what price it is willing to pay and when the mission is complete.

That is the test of whether America First is an operating principle or simply a slogan. The United States has not lost the ability to project force. What it too often lacks is the strategic clarity required to convert force into a durable political result.

Until that gap is closed, each new strike risks demonstrating the same uncomfortable truth: America can still hit hard, but hitting hard is not the same as deciding what happens after the smoke clears.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.