Has Hamas ended?

It is easy today to say that Hamas has ended. Gaza is destroyed. The movement’s leaders have been targeted. Its military structure has been badly hit. Its ability to govern has declined. Its popular base inside Gaza is more exhausted and angry than ever before. These are facts that cannot be denied.

But turning these facts into one conclusion that Hamas has ended; is a big analytical leap. A partial military defeat does not mean the end of a political movement. A reduced ability to govern does not mean the disappearance of influence. And losing part of its popular support does not mean Hamas has left Palestinian political history.

This is why I disagree with the view that Hamas has ended. It is more accurate to say that Hamas has come out of this war as a different movement: weaker militarily, heavier politically, and more dependent on its ability to survive than on its ability to govern. But it has not disappeared. It has not been replaced. And so far, no Palestinian force has appeared that can fill the vacuum it may leave behind.

The real question is not: is Hamas as strong as it was before 7th October? The answer is clear: no. The real question is: has Hamas lost its ability to influence the future of Gaza and the Palestinian cause? Here, the answer is very different. Hamas is still present in the prisoners file, in any ceasefire arrangements, in the question of security inside Gaza, and in the debate over the “day after”. Even those who want to remove it from power are still forced to negotiate around its role, weapons, or influence. That alone means it has not ended.

There is a major confusion between the end of daily administrative power and the end of a political movement. Hamas may no longer be able to govern Gaza as it once did. But it still has something important in the logic of conflict: the ability to prevent others from governing Gaza easily without it.

This is not a small form of power. In politics, a movement does not always need to govern in order to remain influential. Sometimes it is enough that its absence is impossible or costly.

Those who declare the end of Hamas also ignore the fact that Israel itself does not act as if the movement has ended. If Hamas had truly ended, Israel’s justification for continuing the war, pressure, siege, and destruction would also have ended. But Israel still talks about disarmament, preventing Hamas from returning, security control, and the day after. This means that Israel, despite all its rhetoric, knows that Hamas is still part of the equation.

In fact, Israel’s insistence that Hamas remains a danger serves two purposes at once. On one hand, it justifies the continuation of war and the effective occupation of large parts of Gaza. On the other hand, it avoids the bigger political question: what comes after the war? Who governs Gaza? What is the future of the Palestinian cause? Will there be a path toward a Palestinian state, or only permanent security management? Keeping the “Hamas threat” alive in Israeli discourse allows Tel Aviv to escape these questions.

Inside Gaza, the picture is more complicated. Yes, there is wide public anger. Yes, some people hold Hamas partly responsible for the catastrophe. And yes, people want water, electricity, food, medicine, and safety before any slogan. But this anger does not automatically mean acceptance of the Israeli alternative. It does not mean a desire for occupation. And it does not mean that Palestinians have given up their right to resistance or liberation.

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A Gazan who rejects war does not become a supporter of surrender. A Gazan who criticizes Hamas does not become a supporter of Israel. This is a basic point that must not be ignored. There is a difference between holding a Palestinian leadership accountable for its choices and declaring the end of the national project in which that leadership emerged.

The claim that Hamas has lost its popular base also requires caution. Societies coming out of genocidal war do not produce stable political positions easily. People speak from tents, from under rubble, and from the heart of loss. Their anger is legitimate and understandable. But turning that anger into a final judgment on the future of a political movement that has existed for decades may be too hasty.

Hamas is not just a government in Gaza. It is a social, religious, political, military, and security network. It is part of a Palestinian memory that began before it and will continue after it. This is why targeting its leaders is not enough to end it. Organizations born under occupation do not die simply because their leaders are killed or their structures are hit. They may shrink. They may change. They may reorganize. They may return under new names and with new tools.

This is where we must distinguish between Hamas as it was and Hamas as it may become. Perhaps the old phase of Hamas as the governing authority in Gaza has ended. Perhaps the illusion of combining governance and resistance in a besieged and destroyed territory has ended. Perhaps the movement will be forced to accept a different role, less visible and less controlling. But none of this means the end of Hamas. It means the end of one version of Hamas.

This is the core disagreement with many political analysts. Some read the blows Hamas has suffered as proof of its end. I read them as proof that it is entering a new phase. The difference is important. An end means leaving history. Transformation means the movement will reshape itself under the pressure of defeat, loss, and a new reality.

More importantly, the reasons that produced Hamas have not ended. The occupation has not ended. The siege has not ended. Settlement expansion has not stopped. A Palestinian state has not been established. Refugees have not returned. And Gaza has not become a free and safe place. As long as these reasons remain, the environment that produced Hamas will remain capable of producing another Hamas, a new version of it, or another form of resistance.

This is why the question “Has Hamas ended?” may be the wrong question if asked in a final way. The more accurate question is: what form will Hamas take after this war? Will it remain a governing movement? Will it become only a political force? Will it rebuild its military wing? Will it step back in favor of a broader national structure? Will it merge into a new Palestinian arrangement? These are the real questions.

Declaring the end of Hamas is closer to a political wish than a cold analysis. Israel wants to say Hamas has ended when it needs to speak about victory. But it also wants to say Hamas has not ended when it needs a justification to continue the war. Some of Hamas’s opponents also want to declare its end because they see it as the end of a political phase. But reality is more complex than everyone’s wishes.

Hamas has not ended. But it is no longer what it was. This may be the hardest truth for everyone: for Hamas itself, for Israel, for Palestinians, and for anyone looking for a simple answer in a conflict that does not offer simple answers.

A movement can be defeated in a battle. A large part of its structure can be destroyed. Its public can be exhausted. But its end cannot be declared while it remains present in every calculation, while its absence remains impossible, and while the reasons that created it remain in place.

So, the question is not whether Hamas has ended. The question is: what kind of Hamas will emerge from under the rubble?

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.