Has the gulf’s non-aligned moment arrived with the mecca pact?

The most consequential feature of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement is not its alleged resemblance to NATO. It is not a Sunni pact either, and neither it being the first effort by Middle Eastern states to build a regional security framework.

This new security triangle represents a broader and more consequential development. As dependence on Washington loosens, the Gulf states are not simply drifting; rather, it shifted towards collective, non-aligned security mechanisms, one that potentially could inspire other heavily aligned nations that are struggling to exit the US orbit.

For nearly 80 years, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia functioned as cornerstone allies of the United States. Turkey is a NATO member, Pakistan was a founding member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and Saudi Arabia served as the anchor for American defense agreements in the Gulf. 

But the illegal war on Iran launched by Israel and the U.S. since February this year has resulted in a total loss of confidence in the United States’ ability to guarantee their security, and these countries have now begun seeking alternative geopolitical realignments. 

The Mecca Agreement emerged out of this need,  representing a new “defensive alignment” designed to reflect a regional desire to handle security independently of outside hegemonic influence. 

This non-aligned defensive mechanism might set an inspiring model for heavily aligned nations such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, or Vietnam; all are currently filled with US bases, to transition from block alignment and instead pursue direct, regional security dialogues with their immediate neighbors.

What is the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement?

Media sensationalism, especially in the Western Hemisphere, was quick to spew panic and conjectures with unhelpful labels, i.e., Islamic NATO or Sunni bloc. A closer reading of the text shows that it is neither. 

The agreement that was signed on the 7th of August between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan in Mecca was primarily built upon the 2025 defense arrangement already established between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, with Turkiye joining to extend the formation. 

Unlike NATO’s Article 5, which features an automatic trigger calling all members to defense if one is attacked, the Mecca Agreement only calls members to assist when an affected country explicitly invites them to do so. In other words, it operates on mutual invitation and coordination.

Moreover,  there is little evidence to suggest that the agreement is designed to be hostile toward Iran. The official Iranian media reported that Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Mohsin Naqvi briefed Iranian leaders during a visit to Tehran (August 12) on Islamabad’s new defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkiye and reassured them of the agreement’s peaceful, regional nature. 

READ: Saudi Arabia says Mecca Agreement with Turkiye, Pakistan ‘long-term’ deal to boost cooperation

Tehran too has downplayed early media hyperbole labeling the partnership an “Islamic NATO” and explicitly clarified that the accord is not directed at Iran. All parties involved, including Iran, recognized that the core driver of the agreement is a shared, profound loss of confidence by these historic US allies since the 1940s in the ability of the United States to guarantee their security. 

What will be the alternatives? Instead of turning to another hegemon, these countries turned to each other for mutual defense. This step towards non-alignment is a positive development to enhance stability and peace in the region. 

Decline of US influence in the Gulf Region

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are not the only three countries in the West Asia region that try to transition away from reliance on US strategic dominance. 

Recent news and statements show that Qatar too is trying to reduce the physical footprint of the U.S. military on its territory. Qatar hosts Al Udeid Air Base, which is the largest US military base in the Middle East and a forward headquarters for US Central Command (CENTCOM). 

But since the war started in February, Qatar has bypassed U.S.-led frameworks to engage in active, direct security dialogues with civilian and military leaders in Islamabad, and is now actively developing mutual defense arrangements with Pakistan. When the Mecca Agreement was signed, Qatar welcomed it as a positive step toward greater regional cooperation and stability.

Pakistan too has bypassed the U.S. to drive its own regional defense strategy, establishing a defense pact with Saudi Arabia, expanding agreements with Kuwait and Somalia, and allegedly working with China to supply advanced military technology to Iran (of which it has “categorically” denied).

Oman, a traditional  U.S. ally, has ignored Trump’s order and resumed negotiations with Iran over the reopening of the critical Strait of Hormuz. Trump responded with a threat (not his first time) to bomb Oman if it “gets in the way” of a peace deal between the US and Iran. 

Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE confront a rather trickier conundrum. Egypt and Jordan remain critical pillars of the U.S. regional security architecture, while the UAE has long been among Israel’s staunchest regional partners.

The geopolitical ground beneath these alliances now might be shifting. Turkiye actively championed Egypt as a “natural partner” for the proposed Mecca Pact, which presumably deepen anxieties in Washington. Jordan, meanwhile, maintains deep and longstanding military and training ties with Pakistan.

Should Egypt and Jordan formally integrate into the pact (perhaps as observers), the regional balance of power could be dramatically altered, leaving Israel considerably more exposed. In that context, it would hardly be surprising if Qatar and Iran, too, were eventually invited to participate in some observer capacity.

Since the outbreak of the war, Abu Dhabi has come under mounting pressure and appears to have begun recalibrating its engagement with Tehran, perhaps in an effort to hedge against the consequences of a rapidly changing regional order. The decision to dispatch three aircraft carrying 2 tons of gold and $3 billion in cash, which were previously seized Iranian assets, is a striking illustration of this shift.

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A Regional Security Alliance is Effective Only if it’s Non-Aligned 

The Gulf region has never lacked security arrangements; what it has lacked, particularly in recent decades, is the long-term development of a regional security architecture capable of uniting key players around a shared interest in stability. 

Today, that shared interest takes the form of an urgent imperative: ending the conflict with Iran and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. But if this emerging regional defence alignment is to endure and remain relevant beyond the immediate crisis, it must rest on something more substantial than short-term expediency. Three main ingredients must gradually be incorporated:

1. The arrangement must eventually accommodate Iran, whether initially as an observer or, ultimately, as a full member. A regional security architecture that excludes one of the region’s principal powers would merely reproduce the very logic of bloc politics it seeks to escape.
2. It must progressively reduce the region’s dependence on the American security apparatus, including the network of foreign military bases that has long allowed Washington to exercise disproportionate influence over the region’s strategic chokepoints.
3. It must be grounded in a clear commitment to Non-Alignment, one that places the sovereignty, security, and autonomous development of Gulf states above the strategic or ideological demands of competing global hegemons.

In this sense, the Mecca Pact could represent a return to the principle of collective regional management: regional states jointly assuming responsibility for critical trade and maritime corridors, including the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, rather than allowing their security to be defined by a single external power.

The broader implications may extend well beyond the Middle East. As confidence in the U.S. security umbrella declines, leaders in other regions may eventually begin asking similar questions. Japan and South Korea, whose territories host extensive U.S. military infrastructure, may find greater incentives to move away from rigid bloc alignment and towards direct regional security dialogues with their immediate neighbours.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.