The Mecca Pact must meet the test of war

The Mecca Pact is already facing the test that matters: whether its promise of collective defence can shape the response to an actual war. With fighting escalating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia under attack, regional leaders no longer have the luxury of discussing security institutions as a future project. They must show what those institutions can do now.

America does not have to leave the Middle East for the region to face a serious security gap. It only has to become more selective. The 2026 National Defense Strategy, published on January 23, assigns regional partners primary responsibility for deterrence and defence. A January 28 US government explanation specifies continued support for Israel and Gulf cooperation. The distinction is between continued American involvement and an American obligation to fight every partner’s war.

The distinction matters. Claims that Washington now cares exclusively about itself and Israel oversimplify its priorities. Yet Gulf states should take seriously the possibility that their assessment of an emergency will differ from America’s. Partnership remains valuable; dependence becomes dangerous when there is no credible alternative. Regional security cooperation is therefore a practical necessity, whatever the next American administration promises.

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The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye on August 7, 2026, offers a foundation for greater regional responsibility.

Its collective defence commitment must now become a workable system for protection and crisis management. The measure of its value is whether members can agree on assistance, objectives and diplomatic action when their security is being tested.

Axios reported Saudi-Israeli discussions, assisted by CENTCOM, about possible support against the Houthis. Such contacts do not establish that the Mecca framework has been abandoned or replaced. They do raise an urgent question: what distinct assistance and diplomatic leadership can the pact provide? Pakistan said on September 10 that no military response under the agreement had been discussed. The gap between a collective promise and an operational response deserves scrutiny.

A defence agreement can acquire the political weight to become a peacemaker. That evolution is possible, never automatic. An alliance may reassure its members while frightening its neighbours. It may discourage an aggressor or encourage a member to take risks, expecting others to bear the consequences. The difference lies in its rules, its restraint and the settlement it is trying to achieve.

The pact should begin with tasks whose public value is clear: protecting civilians, coordinating air defence, sharing intelligence and securing commercial navigation. Its members should agree how an attack is assessed, how assistance is requested and how collective decisions are made. A promise to stand together becomes credible when governments know what they have promised and citizens understand the limits of the commitment.

Yemen has already moved beyond the danger of hypothetical escalation. Reuters reported renewed Houthi attacks on southern Saudi cities, following strikes that wounded 73 people, and a fresh offensive by Saudi-backed Yemeni forces to reclaim territory. The urgent task is to contain an expanding conflict and define an achievable political outcome.

Calls to finish the job still leave unanswered who governs afterwards and how another cycle of violence is prevented.

The pact’s members and Gulf partners should pursue time-bound negotiations to halt the current escalation, with the Houthis and relevant Yemeni parties, alongside talks with Iran. Priorities should include stopping cross-border attacks, protecting all commercial vessels and establishing credible monitoring. Deadlines should measure compliance and guide decisions. They must also leave room for a negotiated ceasefire while defensive protection continues.

Oman’s May 2025 ceasefire announcement established a mutual no-targeting arrangement between Washington and the authorities in Sanaa, including protection for American vessels. That remains a useful precedent for mediation, but a narrow agreement cannot deliver security for every country exposed to the same conflict.

Reuters reported on September 16 that the Houthis had seized Mocha and Perim Island and met US officials in Oman. Sources said they reaffirmed protection for American vessels; one said Saudi ships were excluded. This suggests a dangerous separation between Washington’s immediate priorities and Riyadh’s exposure, although the meeting and its reported assurances were not publicly confirmed by the State Department.

Yemenis must be central to that wider settlement. Negotiations conducted over their heads would risk treating their country as a bargaining space for more powerful neighbours. The internationally recognised government, other significant Yemeni constituencies and civil society need a meaningful role.

Talks with Tehran should seek restraint and accountability without assuming that Iran can simply deliver every decision made by the Houthis.

Continued attacks require a response with clear limits and political purpose. Stronger defensive cooperation and coordinated pressure on those sustaining attacks should accompany ceasefire efforts. Military operations already under way need defined objectives, safeguards for civilians and a realistic route to termination. Regaining territory cannot, by itself, answer how Yemen will be governed or how agreements will be enforced.

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For Pakistan and Turkiye, credibility should include the ability to counsel restraint as well as provide assistance. Partners who can only endorse escalation add little to an alliance’s judgment. Partners who help distinguish an urgent defensive need from an open-ended political ambition can strengthen it. Collective defence works best when consultation is substantive and commitments are understood throughout the crisis.

The wider region also needs room outside the alliance. A pact among three states cannot by itself represent every Gulf country or resolve every regional dispute. Cooperation with other governments should grow around shared interests, while diplomatic channels with Iran remain open. Security rules will gain legitimacy if they protect civilians and commerce consistently, regardless of who violates them. A sectarian definition of security would make lasting agreement harder.

None of this requires severing relations with Washington. The United States can remain an important partner while regional governments develop greater capacity to act together. Nor does a stronger military arrangement remove the need for functioning institutions in Yemen and elsewhere.

If people remain without reliable public services, livelihoods or political representation, armed groups will continue to find opportunities that outside force cannot permanently close.

The Mecca Pact’s opportunity is to give the region more control over its future. Its members should use their combined influence to make attacks harder, negotiations more credible and agreements more durable. They should measure success in protected communities, open sea lanes and fewer recurring emergencies. The region needs a peace it can defend—and a defence policy that knows the peace it wants to build.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.