E1 and the fight over Palestinian statehood

1. Few pieces of land carry as much weight as the 12 square kilometres known as E1. It is an unremarkable stretch of hillside on a map, but for critics of Israel’s settlement policy it is the place where the two-state solution could be decided without negotiation, vote, or treaty.

E1 lies between occupied East Jerusalem and the Ma’ale Adumim settlement bloc. That location is the point. Building there would create a continuous belt of Israeli construction across the central West Bank, cutting the northern part of the territory off from the south and further separating East Jerusalem from the rest of the Palestinian territory.

The plan was originally envisaged at roughly 3,400 housing units and has now reached the tendering stage. Tenders were issued for 1,234 units in August and another 2,167 in September, which means all the planned units are now on the market. Whatever one thinks of the politics, this is no longer a drawing-board proposal.

The legal framework

The legal objection rests on a principle that predates this conflict: territory cannot be acquired by force, and an occupying power may not transfer its civilian population into occupied land. UN Security Council Resolution 2334 applied this to the present case, affirming that Israeli settlements in territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, have no legal validity and constitute a flagrant violation of international law.

The UN has warned that E1 would undermine the viability of a contiguous Palestinian state because it aims to create irreversible facts on the ground. The argument is practical as much as legal. A state needs connected territory, and a patchwork of enclaves divided by settlement blocs and roads is not a viable state, whatever it is called.

Facts on the ground

Critics describe this as a strategy of faits accomplis: build first, and let the finished buildings make any future negotiation moot. Advocates of the Palestinian position argue that once thousands of homes and the infrastructure serving them exist, reversing them becomes politically and practically close to impossible.

This is why E1 cannot be treated in isolation. It sits alongside the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, displacement in the West Bank, settler violence, and the expansion of Israeli administrative control. Taken together, these developments erode the territorial basis of Palestinian self-determination.

Some critics go further and call the pattern a settler-colonial project that entrenches an apartheid-like reality, a characterisation Israel firmly rejects.

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The international response

The diplomatic climate has hardened. Dozens of delegations walked out during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address to the UN General Assembly, a moment many observers read as a rare public rebuke on the floor of the world body.

More concrete steps have followed. In September 2026, twelve countries, among them the UK, France, Canada, Spain, Portugal, Norway, and Sweden, announced their intention to introduce or support restrictions on trade in goods from Israeli settlements, explicitly tying the measures to preserving the two-state solution. Trade restrictions are a notable shift from statements of concern to economic consequence.

Voices from the Muslim World

The pressure has not come only from Europe. On 21st August 2026, eight countries, Pakistan, Egypt, Türkiye, Indonesia, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, jointly rejected the E1 plan and related settlement activity east of occupied East Jerusalem. They argued that E1 undermines the geographic contiguity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and threatens the realization of an independent, contiguous Palestinian state. They called for immediate action to halt the project, rescind related measures, and allow Palestinians to exercise self-determination.

For Pakistan, the statement was consistent with a long-held position: support for an independent, sovereign, and contiguous Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital, a stance it has repeated at the UN, the OIC, and other forums. Islamabad frames E1 as an attack on the territorial foundation of any future Palestinian state, and its argument is that international law cannot be applied selectively.

Gaza, the Peace Plan, and the Board of Peace

Pakistan also links the E1 question to the broader peace architecture. It supports the Gaza Peace Plan but ties that support to effective implementation, insisting that Gaza remain an integral part of Palestinian territory, reunified with the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In its view, implementation must offer a credible and irreversible pathway to statehood.

It has said it is ready to work with the United States, the Board of Peace, the Palestinian Authority, and other parties to advance the Comprehensive Plan and Road Map. In this vision, the Board of Peace could support the plan, protect Palestinian territorial integrity, oppose annexation and displacement, and facilitate Gaza’s reconstruction and governance. The caveat is that such mechanisms must reinforce, not replace, the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.

E1 now poses a question larger than one hillside: can international law, UN resolutions, and the right of peoples to self-determination meaningfully constrain attempts to permanently alter territory?

If settlement expansion can quietly erase the map of a future state, the principle that borders cannot be changed by force is weakened everywhere, not just in Palestine.

Supporters of the Palestinian position therefore argue for effective international action: halting E1, protecting civilians, preserving the territorial integrity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and advancing a sovereign and contiguous state on pre-1967 lines.

The other side of the argument

Israel and its supporters see it differently. They argue that the area is administered under Israeli control under existing agreements, that Ma’ale Adumim is a major population centre needing room to grow, and that a link to Jerusalem serves legitimate security and housing needs. Some contend that contiguity can be achieved through transportation corridors and that final borders are for negotiation, not for UN resolutions or outside pressure. Israeli officials also reject the labels of apartheid and colonialism, citing historical and legal claims to the land and the security threats they face. These competing claims explain why E1 remains so contested.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.