Trump could lose Congress and still expand the US war on Iran

President Trump has promised that the United States will not attack Iran before the 3rd  November midterm elections. That statement sounds like restraint and at the same time also be read as a warning. By tying military restraint to election day, Trump has made the period after the vote more dangerous.

The Iran war is making the election harder for the Republican Party. As of now, prediction markets give Republicans roughly a one-in-ten chance of retaining both chambers of Congress.

An October AP-NORC poll found that 69 per cent of Americans believed the war was not worth fighting, while only 28 per cent approved of Trump’s handling of Iran. For many voters, the war is no longer a distant foreign-policy issue. They feel it through higher fuel prices, inflation, and the fear of another open-ended conflict.

A Republican defeat, however, would not remove Trump’s military power the next morning. He would remain Commander-in-Chief, and the outgoing Congress would remain in office until 3rd January 2027. This leaves a two-month gap between the election and the arrival of a new Congress. During that period, Trump would face less pressure to protect Republican candidates, but Democrats would not yet control the congressional machinery needed to challenge him.

That is the main danger. Americans may vote against the party that owns the war, but their votes would not immediately change who controls military decisions. The election could reject the war politically while leaving Trump free to expand it militarily.

Trump would not need a special executive order or advance approval from Congress to begin a limited operation. Like other presidents before him, he could rely on a broad interpretation of his Commander-in-Chief powers, claim that an attack was needed to protect American personnel or interests, and use forces and funds that Congress had already approved.

Congress would then be responding to a war that was already under way.

The War Powers Resolution offers some restraint, but not enough to prevent the opening attack. It requires the President to report the use of US forces in hostilities within 48 hours and sets a timetable for ending an operation that Congress has not authorised. In practice, this gives Congress a way to contest a campaign after it begins. It does not reliably stop the first missiles from being launched.

A further attack would also face serious questions under international law. Unless Washington could show Security Council authorisation or a genuine case of self-defence, the use of force against Iran would be difficult to justify under the UN Charter. Yet this is another example of the gap between law and action: a strike can take place before courts, international organisations or legislatures are able to respond.

READ: Axios: Netanyahu discussed joint strike on Iran with Trump before Israeli election

This does not mean that a Democratic victory would be meaningless. Democratic control of both chambers would make a prolonged war harder to sustain.

Congress could investigate the administration, subpoena officials, expose the real military and financial costs, and attach conditions to future funding. It could also demand the withdrawal of US forces and force the White House to defend its war aims in public.

But congressional power has limits. Trump could veto legislation restricting the campaign, and Democrats would need a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override him. The administration could also continue using previously approved funds while Congress debated what to do. The important distinction is simple: a Democratic Congress could make the continuation of war more difficult, but it might not prevent Trump from starting the next phase.

The Pentagon’s preparations make this risk more credible. Recent US reporting indicates that Central Command has been asked to prepare options for renewed operations against Iran. Military planning is not proof that Trump has decided to attack. It does mean that the machinery is being put in place so that he can act quickly if negotiations fail. After election day, the immediate political cost of such action will be lower.

The consequences would be felt far beyond Washington. Iran can retaliate against US forces and partners across the region and can disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. A new round of attacks could raise energy and insurance costs, expose countries around the Persian Gulf to retaliation and place even more pressure on governments trying to stay outside the conflict. American military superiority may win individual battles, but it has not produced a stable political settlement or removed Iran’s ability to impose regional costs.

The timing also matters for Palestine. Every new escalation with Iran allows Israel to present the region mainly as a security threat and draws diplomatic and media attention away from its actions in Occupied Palestine. A wider US-Iran war would therefore not only deepen regional instability. It would also give Israel more space to avoid pressure over Gaza and the continuing dispossession of Palestinians.

Regional governments should not wait for the American election to solve this crisis. An election can change the political price of war, but it cannot produce peace by itself. Pakistan and Qatar, which are facilitating indirect communication, should use the period before 3 November to press for an immediate and lasting ceasefire. Other regional states should support an agreement that protects navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, prevents further attacks and restores a credible diplomatic path on the nuclear issue.

The real question is therefore not only whether Democrats will win Congress. It is whether diplomacy can produce an agreement before the last electoral restraint on Trump disappears. If it cannot, the period after 3rd November may become more dangerous, not less.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.