Coercive diplomacy: What does the call between Netanyahu and al-Sharaa really mean?

The phone call between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Syrian interim leader Ahmed al-Sharaa—following months of firing salvos via fighter jets, missiles, and third-party intermediaries, alongside strikes that targeted the courtyard of the Syrian Ministry of Defence and the perimeter of the presidential palace—was no ordinary diplomatic formality. Rather, it was a condensed moment signalling a tectonic shift in the geopolitics and power balance of the Middle East.

When Netanyahu and Sharaa speak directly to discuss sectarian tensions in the Druze-majority province of Sweida, we are not merely witnessing a localised security arrangement dictated by geography and overwhelming force. We are standing before a series of uncomfortable questions shaping the region’s future: Is Syria capitulating entirely to the rhythm of Israeli power, which has established itself as an unyielding arbiter in the new Syrian landscape? Or is this a pragmatic response from Damascus to pressure from an Arab bloc seeking regional normalisation—a bloc that views any effort to rebuild and reintegrate Syria as passing, one way or another, through the neutralisation of active fronts with Tel Aviv?

Furthermore, who granted Israel and Netanyahu the political and international mandate to act as the self-appointed custodian over Syria’s Druze minority?

The most realistic answer lies elsewhere: in a devastated economy, a shattered state apparatus, and a transitional authority that has come to realise that rebuilding Syria requires, above all, zeroing out external hostilities. States emerging from the crucible of war do not enjoy the luxury of managing multiple conflicts at once. Today’s Syria looks far closer to this exhaustion model than to the legacy slogans of traditional “Resistance.”

Yet, the phone call poses far larger strategic dilemmas than it answers: Is this a tactical manoeuvring aimed at preventing escalation and buying time, or the beginning of a structural shift redefining Syria’s place on the regional map? Is Sharaa treating Israel as an unalterable geopolitical reality, or is the entire region entering an era where ideological mantras surrender to the imperatives of economic survival, reconstruction, and stability?

Anticipating an answer requires reading this new Syrian stance not as absolute surrender, but as a tightrope walk driven by a “survival mindset.”

Sharaa lacks the military capacity to engage an adversary that strikes the heart of Damascus with international impunity. Conversely, he understands that total compliance with Israeli terms risks sparking domestic fragmentation and delegitimising his rule regionally.

Hence, the most plausible regional scenario is Damascus moving toward ending the “active state of war” without entering the formal fold of political normalisation—establishing a security framework for borders and minorities that satisfies regional patrons while isolating Syria from radical axes to minimise reconstruction costs.

On the Israeli side, Netanyahu is attempting to engineer an advanced “politico-security belt” reaching deep into Syria’s social fabric.

By asserting proxy guardianship over minority populations like the Druze, Tel Aviv aims not only to secure its northern border, but to institutionalise a model of a “regional patron” holding the keys to stability in broken neighbouring states.

This style of power projection forces any future government in Damascus—whether led by Sharaa or another—to operate within a security architecture drafted in Tel Aviv long before it reaches the halls of the United Nations.

Ultimately, what transpired was not the announcement of a new alliance, but a mutual acknowledgment of a new balance of power. It is an equilibrium in which Netanyahu realizes his security influence remains incomplete without ordering his immediate Syrian backyard, while Sharaa recognizes that reclaiming statehood may require, for the first time in decades, managing relations with Israel through state pragmatism rather than ideological rhetoric.

The significance of the call lies not in its brief duration, but in its role as a barometer for a Middle East where yesterday’s political impossibilities have become today’s negotiating points.

Yet, all these calculations could swiftly evaporate or invert should Netanyahu lose power in the upcoming Israeli elections.

The core dilemma rests not solely within Syria, but in the nature of the Israel that Netanyahu embodies today. Under his tenure, Israel has transformed from a state seeking security-driven compromises into an actor behaving as the region’s absolute power, backed by an unprecedented surplus of self-confidence—perceived by its adversaries as military hubris and by its leadership as earned strategic dominance. Thus, any potential Syrian opening cannot be disentangled from the persona of the man wielding power in Tel Aviv.

Is Damascus reaching out to Israel as a permanent state institution, or is it coercively adapting to an extraordinary “Netanyahu moment” and the hard facts it has established on the ground? This question is no less vital than the issue of normalisation itself. If Netanyahu departs the political stage and Israel reverts to more conventional, less aggressive security calculus, the strategic weight of these contacts may shift overnight. They may well be reinterpreted as fleeting security arrangements dictated by temporary power dynamics rather than enduring strategic realignments.

When the dust settles, we may discover that the true historical event was not the phone conversation between Sharaa and Netanyahu, but the historical epoch that produced the phenomenon of Netanyahu itself—an era that compelled the entire region to redefine power, deterrence, and sovereignty under the weight of a prolonged war that has not yet ended, but will not forever remain governed by the logic of a victor who believes history moves by his will alone.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.