Israel’s forthcoming elections on 27th October, the first since the events of 7th October three years ago and their aftermath, are taking place amid deep polarisation and fierce competition among rival political currents. Issues dividing groups of differing orientations, successive last-minute surprises and opinion poll findings all underscore the complexity of the political landscape. Although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud party have seen their standing decline, the standing of the right wing has not declined. Depending on the projected electoral outcomes, change could bring de-escalation in the occupied Palestinian territory, but it would not guarantee a fundamental shift in Israel’s occupation policies towards the Palestinians more broadly. Palestinian votes within Israel could weaken the electoral position of Netanyahu, Likud and the governing coalition. The number of seats won by Palestinian electoral lists could also improve the prospects of Netanyahu’s rivals forming a government, although those lists would still have very limited influence over its policies and plans for now.
Just one week before Israel’s elections, Israeli opinion polls remain unable to predict with certainty which party, or even which coalition, will govern, amid fluctuating and closely contested results and the pragmatism of rival parties when it comes to forming a government. This uncertainty persists despite sharp differences among the main contenders over the political leadership’s responsibility for security failures, the conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews, the rising cost of living and settler violence in the West Bank. US President Donald Trump’s endorsement of Israel’s prime minister in the final days before the elections represents an unusual and widely criticised departure from established US practice, suggesting foreign interference at the heart of domestic affairs.
Nevertheless, it may have little influence on undecided Israeli voters, as Trump does not command much trust among Israelis. The late withdrawal of Benny Gantz, leader of the Blue and White party, from the race also benefits the anti-Netanyahu camp by helping to consolidate its vote.
In a repeat of an earlier electoral contest, the political landscape appears to be taking shape around a competition between a camp led by Netanyahu and another seeking to bring his tenure to an end. Netanyahu’s standing as prime minister has declined in opinion polls, reflecting public dissatisfaction with his government’s policies, with Gadi Eisenkot emerging as the main beneficiary, enjoying an average lead of nine percentage points. Netanyahu’s Likud and Eisenkot’s Yashar party have alternated at the top of party rankings in opinion polls, with only narrow margins separating them. The change camp led by Eisenkot, which includes, alongside Yashar, the Together list headed by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu and the Democrats led by Yair Golan, is also polling very close to Netanyahu’s right-wing camp in both support and projected seats. Under the current electoral arithmetic, however, neither camp would have enough seats to form a government. Under Israel’s established procedures, the president assigns the task of forming a government to the party best placed to do so, regardless of whether it has won the largest number of seats. This could give Eisenkot’s change camp an advantage in forming a government, given the support it receives in these elections from Palestinian parties in Israel, even if those parties do not participate in the next government.
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Netanyahu and his Likud party bear direct responsibility for the decline in the electoral standing of his right-wing camp. Yet opinion polls reveal that this decline does not stem from a weakening of the right’s political standing in Israeli society, and may even point to its consolidation. Likud is projected to lose around ten seats compared with the previous election results, while the religious and far-right parties have largely maintained their electoral strength. This shows that the decline in the camp’s electoral standing is attributable to Likud’s losses, with the overall reduction in seats broadly corresponding to those lost by Netanyahu’s party.
Current opinion polls indicate that the Israeli right continues to retain its electoral strength. Although the ultra-Orthodox Shas party has lost a small number of seats over its position on the conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews, some of the younger voters it is losing are shifting their support to more extreme right-wing parties that are also its coalition partners.
The ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism party has likewise largely maintained its electoral standing. Meanwhile, Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Jewish Power party is gaining seats, while the Religious Zionism–Zehut list led by Bezalel Smotrich has broadly maintained its position.
These indicators are consistent with a recent Reuters report highlighting growing support for Ben-Gvir among young voters. A Hebrew University poll found that around a third of supporters of Ben-Gvir’s party will be voting for the first time in the forthcoming elections. Current opinion polls also suggest that the left’s electoral standing is unlikely to improve. The Zionist left, represented by the Democrats, which brings together the Labour and Meretz parties, is projected to win around nine seats, compared with the four seats held by Labour in the current Knesset. However, this increase does not necessarily reflect a broader societal shift towards the left. Rather, it can be explained by the merger of the two parties, which helps to prevent Meretz votes from once again going unrepresented in parliament, as they did in 2022, when the party failed to cross the electoral threshold of 3.25 per cent, equivalent to approximately four seats.
Although Eisenkot’s camp is expected to emerge as the leading electoral bloc, with its principal figures united in their desire to replace Netanyahu, the challenges of maintaining political cohesion remain significant, given their differing political orientations and the difficulty of reaching agreement on a unified programme. Eisenkot leans towards the centre and has a military background, while Bennett comes from the nationalist right, with roots in the religious settler movement. Lapid, Bennett’s alliance partner, represents the secular liberal centre, whereas Lieberman represents the hardline secular nationalist right. Golan belongs to the liberal Zionist left. On the Palestinian question, Eisenkot and Bennett both lean to the right. Eisenkot combines opposition to the two-state solution following the 7th October attack with criticism of the E1 settlement project and settler violence; Bennett, for his part, explicitly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state. While Lapid supports the two-state solution and Golan calls for curbing settler violence and pursuing a political solution to the Palestinian question, Lieberman advocates scrapping the Oslo Accords and dismantling the Palestinian Authority.
However, the success of this scenario would not, from a Palestinian perspective, mean a shift in Israel’s objectives regarding their cause, although it would probably curb the escalation against them that has persisted for years. Under Netanyahu’s current government, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, has witnessed a sharp escalation in killings and settlement expansion. The annual average number of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces and settlers during its tenure has risen to around five times the level recorded in preceding years. The imposition of settlement facts on the ground, settler violence and the undermining of prospects for a geographically contiguous Palestinian state have also accelerated markedly. Gaza, meanwhile, has witnessed a genocidal war unparalleled since the 1948 war. Eisenkot’s camp may therefore be inclined to reduce this escalation without fundamentally altering the dynamics of the conflict with the Palestinians.
Eisenkot opposes the collapse of the Palestinian Authority or direct Israeli rule over millions of Palestinians, while insisting on Israel retaining overall security control in the West Bank. In Gaza, he supports the US plan, but makes the complete disarmament of Hamas a precondition for any other arrangements. He has made no commitment to a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, nor has he specified a timetable for one.
On settlements and annexation, he supports settlement activity that serves Israel’s security interests and does not propose withdrawing from settlements. He has criticised the decision to place the police under Ben-Gvir’s authority and to grant Smotrich powers over the administration of civil affairs, calling instead for the military establishment to regain control. Bennett explicitly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state, proposing autonomy instead. In Gaza, his electoral list favours maintaining Israeli control up to the Yellow Line and retaining freedom of military action until Hamas is disarmed. Bennett has stated that Area C, roughly two-thirds of the West Bank, would become part of Israel, while the remaining third would be self-governing. Lieberman openly advocates preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state. In Gaza, he supports handing over its administration to a foreign authority after Hamas has been eliminated. He opposes the evacuation of settlements and insists on full Israeli control over Area C and security control over the rest of the West Bank, alongside a Jordanian role in its administration.
Nevertheless, several possible scenarios for the outcome of Israel’s elections cannot be overlooked. One involves the opposition agreeing to form a unity government bringing together Likud and Yashar, alongside additional coalition partners. Such an arrangement could offer Netanyahu a way to remain in power while allowing him to break free from his dependence on his more hardline partners. At the same time, it could give Eisenkot an opportunity to assume the premiership under a rotation agreement with Netanyahu. This would allow greater scope for de-escalation and regional understandings, without guaranteeing any fundamental shift in Israel’s approach to Palestinian rights. According to press reports, the Trump administration favours this scenario as an opportunity to advance regional understandings and normalisation with Saudi Arabia.
Under another scenario, Netanyahu’s government and its current coalition could remain in office while efforts to form a new government are stalled. Israeli law allows 28 days to form a government, with a possible extension of a further 14 days. If this period expires without a government being formed, another election becomes a serious possibility, giving Netanyahu additional time in power. This scenario could arise if neither camp emerges from the elections with a clear majority capable of forming a government, the opposition maintains its refusal to enter a coalition with Netanyahu, neither side succeeds in attracting additional partners, and Eisenkot’s camp is unable to benefit from the support of Palestinian parties.
If Netanyahu succeeds in remaining in power, he may present the outcome as a mandate to continue his policies and as encouragement to pursue more hardline measures, depending on the composition of his coalition. An opposition victory, on the other hand, would not automatically signal a shift towards recognising a Palestinian state or ending the occupation.
Nevertheless, a change of government could allow for tighter curbs on settler violence and more flexibility over arrangements for Gaza and regional understandings, opening the way for relative de-escalation compared with the current escalation.
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