Elections in Israel: The names change, but colonisation continues

With every election in “Israel”, the expectation resurfaces that replacing the prime minister will pave the way for Palestinian freedom. History demands a different test: which structures of domination will be dismantled?

As long as occupation, settlements, ethnic cleansing and the denial of self-determination persist, changes of government will continue to reshuffle the leadership of the Zionist state without addressing the colonial question.

In June 2021, when Naftali Bennett replaced Benjamin Netanyahu, I wrote that the proclaimed “government of change” offered no grounds for expecting a break with colonisation. Bennett supported settlements and opposed Palestinian sovereignty. Opposition to Netanyahu brought together a heterogeneous coalition, but did not turn it into an instrument for the emancipation of an occupied people.

That precedent should inform our reading of the contest between Netanyahu and Gadi Eisenkot

There are differences over institutions, military conscription, alliances and the conduct of military operations.

Yet the issue extends beyond who holds the office of prime minister. It concerns the nature of the Zionist state, the interests it serves and the security apparatus that sets the boundaries of the alternatives its leaders will accept.

Netanyahu has entrenched this reality, but he did not create it. Labour, Likud and successive coalition governments have participated in territorial dispossession and the maintenance of the occupation. His eventual departure could end a political career without removing the historical conditions that enabled his rise. Personalising the crisis allows others who bear responsibility to present continuity as renewal.

The failed Oslo Accords, signed in 1993, raised expectations of a negotiated settlement. Yet the Palestinian experience was marked by continued settlement expansion and territorial fragmentation.

Explaining that failure solely through Israelis’ loss of faith in peace obscures this inequality: while negotiations continued, the occupying power kept changing the material conditions on which those negotiations rested.

The Second Intifada, the withdrawal of settlements from Gaza and the subsequent cycles of violence must be examined within this colonial relationship.

The removal of settlers did not deliver Palestinian sovereignty. The emphasis on deterrence and military superiority entrenched a policy of permanent conflict management, in which Israeli security takes precedence over the freedom of the people living under occupation.

Against this backdrop, Eisenkot’s rise must be assessed through the substance of his political programme. Rebuilding institutions and restoring “Israel’s” international legitimacy are not equivalent to recognising Palestinian national rights.

Curbing certain settler attacks, or distinguishing between state-authorised settlements and outposts deemed illegal by the state itself, does not resolve the fundamental issue of appropriating occupied territory.

The political agency of Palestinian citizens of “Israel” must also be recognised. Their electoral participation expresses demands for an end to discrimination, demolitions, violence and neglect.

Removing Ben-Gvir and Smotrich from power may be a concrete priority. These voters are political actors with demands of their own. Their votes do not automatically signify endorsement of the Zionist leaders seeking their parliamentary support

The paradox remains: Palestinian representatives may be essential to making an alternative government possible while still facing resistance to their participation in decision-making. Recommending a candidate to form a government does not mean joining that candidate’s coalition.

The international dimension adds another difficulty.

On 3 November, Donald Trump announced that he would end annual assistance to “Israel”, set at $3.8 billion, at the end of 2026. However, he did not explain how he would bring forward the termination of the existing commitment, which runs until 2028. His statement must therefore be treated as a political announcement whose implementation remains uncertain. Trump also said that arms sales would continue.

The announcement matters for what it reveals about the political cost of sustaining this support. Ending financial assistance while maintaining the arms trade does not amount to abandoning the alliance. The episode suggests that any Israeli government will have to confront growing disputes over US support.

The political transformation of Israeli society deserves attention, without treating that society as homogeneous. Dissenting voices and organisations opposed to the occupation do exist.

Nevertheless, parties that place “Israel’s” security and the privileges of its Jewish population above Palestinian rights have sufficient power to constrain the commitments of any governing coalition.

Palestinian liberation requires popular agency, political unity and international pressure capable of imposing consequences for the occupation.

Netanyahu’s departure may alter decisions and the balance of power, but it neither absolves other leaders nor dismantles the structure that sustains him.

The measure of genuine change will be the attainment of Palestinian freedom and self-determiniation. Without it, Eisenkot’s rise may represent merely another stage in the administration of colonial rule and the ongoing Nakba.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.