The Israeli and US elections and the future of the war on Iran

The results of Israel’s parliamentary election and the US midterm elections revealed a decline in public support for the policies of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump. The escalation of the war against Iran and its repercussions in both countries, across the Middle East and around the world were among the factors shaping the election outcomes, alongside domestic issues. How, then, will these results affect Netanyahu’s prospects of remaining in power and Trump’s room for manoeuvre in dealing with Congress? And what might they mean for the continuation and course of the war?

Netanyahu made no secret of his outright hostility towards Iran, even before first becoming prime minister in 1996. He warned the Knesset in 1992 of the possibility of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, a warning he repeated in his book A Place Among the Nations the following year. In an article published in Yedioth Ahronoth that same year, entitled ‘The Great Danger’, he explicitly called on the United States and industrialised nations to prevent Iran from acquiring the technology needed to develop its nuclear capabilities. He reiterated his position on Iran in his 1995 book Fighting Terrorism. Since then, Israel has openly sought to target Iran and undermine its nuclear capabilities through Washington, either by seeking US assistance or through direct American involvement.

Under Ehud Olmert, Israel requested bunker-busting bombs from Washington in 2008, along with permission to fly through Iraqi airspace to reach the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. George W. Bush rejected both requests, authorising covert operations to disrupt Iran’s nuclear programme instead.

In 2012, Netanyahu unsuccessfully sought to persuade Obama to strike Iran if its nuclear programme crossed Netanyahu’s red lines. In 2015, Netanyahu addressed Congress during Obama’s presidency in an effort to prevent the conclusion of the Iran nuclear deal. In 2018, Trump cited intelligence documents released by Israel when announcing the US withdrawal from the deal. In 2020, towards the end of his first term, Trump considered striking an Iranian nuclear facility under Netanyahu’s influence, but ultimately decided against it. In October 2024, Joe Biden announced that he would not support an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. The following year, Western media documented Netanyahu’s efforts to persuade Trump to join an attack on Iran. A New York Times investigation concluded that Netanyahu’s presentation contributed to Trump’s decision to join the war on Iran in February.

In early March, 93 per cent of Jewish respondents in Israel supported the joint US–Israeli attack on Iran, according to a poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute. In a June poll by the Institute for National Security Studies, 66 per cent of all respondents believed that the US–Iranian memorandum of understanding was detrimental to Israel’s interests. Although the Knesset election results have been announced, the composition of the next governing coalition remains uncertain, as neither Netanyahu’s bloc nor Gadi Eisenkot’s secured the 61 seats needed for a majority. Nevertheless, the military option against Iran enjoys support among leaders in both camps. Within the camp of Netanyahu’s outgoing government, which took part in the attack, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich criticised the US–Iranian understanding.

In the opposition, Gadi Eisenkot maintains that dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme remains an unfulfilled objective, while Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid support the overthrow of the Iranian regime, and Avigdor Lieberman calls for strikes against Iran’s critical infrastructure.

Trump entered the war on Iran in February without congressional authorisation. In June, both chambers of Congress passed a war powers resolution calling for the  withdrawal of US forces from hostilities against Iran unless Congress authorised their continuation. The White House, however, disputed that the resolution was legally binding. The Pentagon financed military operations through existing defence appropriations approved by Congress before the war. When the White House requested supplementary Pentagon funding in June for operations against Iran and other activities, the request remained pending, as the Senate did not pass a broader package that included it.

In the US midterm elections on Tuesday, the Democrats wrested control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate from the Republicans, in a clear blow to Trump’s popularity in particular and a direct electoral rebuke of his policies. Half of the voters surveyed by the Associated Press cited the cost of living as a decisive factor in their vote. The rising cost of living in the United States was driven by a sharp increase in fuel prices resulting from the war on Iran. A Pew Research Center poll found that public concern over rising fuel prices because of the war was shared by 61 per cent of Republicans and 85 per cent of Democrats.

There is no doubt that the Democrats’ victory in both chambers means that control of Congress will pass to the party opposing President Trump, narrowing his political room for manoeuvre and strengthening congressional oversight of his administration. It does not, however, automatically deprive him of the ability to continue military operations. Congress has greater power to obstruct the administration’s requests than to compel the president to change his policies. Moreover, the institutional impact of this shift will not be felt immediately upon the announcement of the results. The new Congress will begin on 3^rd January, while the current Congress will retain its powers until then, delaying the transfer of legislative and oversight tools to the new majority.

Once in office, the Democratic majority will be able to hold the administration to account over the war’s objectives and legal justifications, refuse to authorise the use of force, and seek to impose legislative and financial restrictions on its continuation. However, turning political opposition into legally binding constraints on the president requires the enactment of legislation and, if he exercises his veto, overriding it by a two-thirds majority of members voting in each chamber, provided a quorum is present. Congress can also decline to approve the supplementary appropriations requested by the administration without requiring a two-thirds majority. By contrast, imposing new legal restrictions on the use of funds is subject to the same legislative process and the possibility of a presidential veto.

The experience of George W. Bush following the Democrats’ victory in both chambers in the 2006 elections illustrates the political realities at play. In early 2007, Bush announced the deployment of more than 20,000 additional troops to Iraq, relying on the authorisation for the use of military force passed in 2002. When Congress tied war funding to a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq, Bush vetoed the bill, and the House of Representatives failed to override it. Bush was thus able to continue the war and secure its funding despite an opposing legislative majority. Similarly, Barack Obama retained considerable room for manoeuvre after the Republicans took control of both chambers in early 2015. Militarily, he continued the war against Islamic State, relying on the 2001 and 2002 authorisations for the use of military force, even though Congress did not approve the new authorisation he requested in February 2015. He also proceeded with the Iran nuclear deal, and the Republican majority was unable to turn its opposition into a legal prohibition that would prevent its implementation.

Even on the question of war, although Congress has the constitutional authority to declare it, the president, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, retains room to initiate military action, the legal limits of which have long been disputed between the two branches of government. In Kosovo in 1999, military operations continued under Bill Clinton without explicit congressional authorisation for the use of force. In Libya in 2011, operations continued under Obama even though the House of Representatives rejected a resolution authorising the use of force. The administration maintained that the limited nature of US involvement did not constitute ‘hostilities’ requiring the termination of operations under the 60-day limit set by the War Powers Resolution, an interpretation challenged by members of Congress. These precedents demonstrate that the absence of authorisation, or even its rejection by one chamber, does not automatically bring military operations to a halt in practice.

Based on these precedents, it can be argued that the results of the Knesset and congressional elections do not necessarily mean an end to the war on Iran if the Israeli leadership decides to continue it and Trump wishes to do the same.

These developments in Congress may increase political pressure and legislative and financial constraints, but they do not automatically translate into a decision to end the war.  The impact of these results is therefore likely to be reflected more in the cost, scope, duration and terms of continuing the war than in preventing it outright.

This will ultimately depend on the ability of opposition forces to translate their electoral gains into effective constraints, and on the capacity of both Israel and the United States to bear the costs of pressing on.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.