Water must never be a weapon

A farmer in Pakistan’s Punjab does not need to follow international arbitration to know when his crops are at risk. A family beside the Chenab does not need to read diplomatic cables to know what an early flood warning is worth. For both, information about water can decide whether they keep their livelihood, their home or their lives.

That information now depends on the state of relations between two nuclear-armed neighbours.

On 23^rd April 2025, a day after the Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, India placed the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty “in abeyance”. The attack killed 26 tourists and demands accountability. India says the suspension will last until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably” ends its support for cross-border terrorism. Indian police named three suspects, including two Pakistani nationals. Pakistan denies involvement and has offered to join a neutral international investigation. Five UN experts later noted that India has not disclosed credible evidence that Pakistan’s government sent the attackers.

Even so, whether the allegations are true is a separate question from whether suspending the treaty is lawful. On that second question, international law has spoken.

The treaty has survived multiple wars. It gives Pakistan the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, the rivers on which most of its agriculture depends. It also created a joint commission, data-sharing and dispute resolution.

In June 2025, the Court of Arbitration found that the treaty does not provide for unilateral abeyance or suspension. On 31 August 2026, after examining India’s stated grounds, the court unanimously found that none of them justified suspension or termination. India rejected the ruling, calling the court illegally constituted and without jurisdiction.

India had a lawful route all along. Before suspending the treaty, it had sought modification under Article XII (3). Grievances over changed circumstances belong in negotiation, not in a unilateral freeze.

The human rights stakes are what make this more than a legal quarrel. In an October 2025 letter to India, UN experts warned that disrupting the treaty could affect Pakistanis’ rights to water, food, work, a healthy environment and development. They added that even if Pakistan were responsible for the attack, suspension would not be proportionate given the severe impact on Pakistanis’ human rights. They also recalled that states must respect the right to water in other countries. The farmer in Punjab has no say in what happens in Pahalgam. Making civilians bear the consequences of a political and security dispute raises serious questions of human rights and state responsibility.

This is why the Hydro Justice Fellowship is established, bringing together 22 emerging researchers to examine transboundary water disputes through international law and human rights. Following expert-led learning and international dialogue, their research is now nearing completion.

Their work raises a question that deserves greater international attention: who protects the rights of downstream communities when political disputes interrupt cooperation over shared rivers?

The risks are already visible during floods. In August 2025, Punjab evacuated about 1.15 million people from areas threatened by the Sutlej, Chenab and Ravi. Extreme monsoon rain drove that disaster, not Indian policy. But the information that normally helps downstream authorities prepare was no longer flowing through the treaty. India’s warnings came through diplomatic channels rather than the Indus Waters Commission, which an Indian source described as sent on humanitarian grounds. That was welcome, and India says it will keep sharing high-flood data this way “as and when a situation arises”. But ad hoc alerts are no substitute for routine data. The commission’s annual meetings have not been held since 2022.

Pakistan also reports abrupt swings in the Chenab. In early May 2026, flows at Marala dropped from about 21,000 to about 9,000 cusecs just as Kharif sowing began. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar has called such episodes the “weaponization of water”. Pakistan says it has written to India seeking clarification. India rejects the accusations, attributing high Chenab flows in July 2026 to heavy rainfall and denying any deliberate action. These claims need independent verification. Without shared data and a working commission, neither government can prove its case, and every fluctuation breed fear.

The remedy is not complicated. India should restore regular hydrological data-sharing and return to the Indus Commission. It should pursue its objections through the treaty’s own procedures, including renegotiation if it believes the 1960 arrangement is outdated. Pakistan must keep engaging constructively and transparently, and the World Bank, which helped broker the treaty, and other states should press both sides.

Climate change is making floods fiercer and glacier melt less predictable. In that world, the Indus basin needs more cooperation, not less.

A river crosses a border, and so should the duty to protect human life.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.