Beyond Makkah: Defence pacts must become economic networks

A treaty can be signed in a day. A trading bloc takes a generation.

On 7th August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, which treats an armed attack on any of them as an attack on all. Commentators have dubbed it the “Mecca Defence Alliance.” It is a defence treaty, not an economic bloc, and the difference matters. Together the three economies are worth roughly $3 trillion. Yet Pakistan’s annual trade with Turkiye stands at only $1.3–1.5 billion, and with Saudi Arabia at around $4–5 billion. The distance between their strategic ambition and their commercial reality is the real story. If the Muslim world is serious about collective influence, the next move must be economic.

Why now

The pact was signed amid the Iran war and continuing Houthi attacks, and it builds on the Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement of September 2025. Gulf governments are reassessing their options. The sensible response is not to abandon established partnerships but to add indigenous capacity and diversify strategic relationships.

The three partners complement one another. Saudi Arabia brings capital, energy weight and geography. Pakistan brings military experience and a long defence relationship with the Kingdom. Turkiye brings an advanced defence industry and diplomatic reach.

Institutionalisation has been fast. A Strategic Political and Defence Committee met in Istanbul on 31 August, and the joint statement announced a Secretariat in Saudi Arabia, headed initially by a Pakistani Secretary General for three years. The three states also committed to defence-industry cooperation and joint technology development.

Defence as industrial policy

The clearest economic logic lies in the defence sector itself. Saudi Arabia’s military spending is among the world’s highest, roughly $76–80 billion, but only 24.89 per cent of it was localised by the end of 2024, against a Vision 2030 target of over 50 per cent. Turkiye, meanwhile, has become an export power. Its defence and aviation exports reached $10.05 billion in 2025, up 48 per cent in a year and more than double the $4.4 billion of 2022. Turkish firms are already localising production with Saudi industry.

That is a template. Riyadh needs partners to build a domestic industry, Ankara has proven systems and an export model, and Islamabad has an established defence-production sector and an interest in technology and investment. Joint production, shared supply chains and third-market exports would turn a security guarantee into jobs and foreign exchange.

READ: Report: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to hold first meeting under Joint Defence Agreement

A pattern, not an exception

Makkah is not alone. On 21st October, Turkiye, Qatar, Pakistan and Indonesia signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding in Doha to cooperate on military production, training, and research and development. It is not a collective-defence treaty, but it is revealing. As one analyst told Al Jazeera, Turkiye contributes technology and systems integration, Pakistan and Indonesia offer manufacturing capacity and large markets, and Qatar provides financial depth. Indonesia’s presence matters: the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country shows that this cooperation is not confined to the Gulf or the Arab world.

Much of this web already existed in bilateral form. Turkiye supplies Qatar with drones and armoured vehicles, builds warships with Pakistan and has developed a tank with Indonesia. What is new is the move from separate bilateral deals to multilateral frameworks. Turkiye’s defence ministry itself described Badr as holding “substantial economic importance”.

The numbers that should embarrass us

Saudi-Turkish trade has exceeded $8.5 billion, with a $10 billion near-term target and $30 billion over the longer term. Pakistan’s links to both are far thinner. Its trade with Saudi Arabia is dominated by energy imports and a narrow range of exports. The Saudi deferred-oil facility that once gave Pakistan $1.2 billion in financing has also expired.

The wider Muslim world tells the same story. According to the ICIEC’s 2025 Annual Report, citing data from the Islamic Centre for the Development of Trade, intra-OIC trade reached US$1.004 trillion in 2024. That was 20.36 per cent of members’ foreign trade, still short of the OIC’s 25 per cent target.

Pakistan’s business community has seen the opening. The Pakistan Business Forum cautioned that the agreement will not by itself raise trade, and called for a structured trilateral economic roadmap with sector-wise targets. That is the right instinct.

What a roadmap should contain

• Trade and logistics: lower tariffs on a defined list of goods, faster customs cooperation and transport corridors linking the three economies.
• Energy and food: pair agricultural exporters with food-importing partners and channel Gulf capital into Pakistan’s energy and industry. Turkiye and Saudi Arabia have already signed a roughly $2 billion renewable-energy agreement, and the model could be extended to include Pakistan.
• Payments: develop local-currency settlement and a regional payment mechanism well before any talk of a common currency, which would require monetary and fiscal convergence the region is decades away from.
• Defence-industrial joint ventures: focused on third-market exports, not just domestic procurement.

The European Union took generations to build. The lesson is sequencing, not imitation: trade first, then institutions, then deeper integration.

Pakistan’s three-year window

Pakistan holds the Secretariat’s first three-year term, which gives it a rare opportunity to shape the agenda. It should use that term to propose the economic roadmap, publish an annual public report on implementation and press for ratification where it is still pending. The aim is to make the agreement a source of investment and export growth, not only a security commitment.

READ: Iran and “Mecca Pact” countries agree to continue talks amid fears of renewed regional conflict

A diplomatic voice, not a bloc

Muslim-majority states often struggle to turn shared concerns, whether Palestine, humanitarian emergencies or representation in global institutions, into coordinated action.

The Committee could become a standing channel for consultation without demanding identical foreign policies. Pakistan, which has positioned itself as a channel between Iran, the United States and the Gulf, is well placed to push a credible mediation mechanism for disputes between Muslim states. This would reduce reliance on outside brokers. It should complement the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, not compete with it.

The risks

Honest advocacy requires naming them. Analysts noted after the signing that the Turkish and Pakistani parliaments had yet to ratify it. The signatories share no borders, and their threat perceptions diverge: Riyadh focuses on the Gulf and Red Sea, Islamabad on India, Ankara on the Levant.

Reactions have been mixed. India has said it is “closely following” the agreement. Iran’s response has been split: its foreign minister welcomed the pact, while a senior parliamentarian dismissed it. A Pakistani policy brief warns that Islamabad risks overextension and a misreading of its commitments by outside parties. Turkiye is a NATO member, and Turkish and Gulf interests have not always aligned. Overlapping frameworks (Saudi-Pakistan 2025, Makkah, Badr) could also produce duplication or conflicting obligations.

Credibility therefore rests on three commitments. The partners must respect sovereignty and international law. They must expand only on clear criteria and institutional readiness (Turkiye has signalled that enlargement depends on first building the necessary mechanisms). And they must reject confrontation as the project’s purpose.

The test

Strategic autonomy does not mean isolation or hostility to established powers. It means enough collective capacity to decide independently and negotiate on more equal terms.

The Makkah Agreement will be judged by three questions. Will it be ratified and institutionalised? Will trade and investment among its members measurably grow? Will it reduce conflict, or add to it?

Defence cooperation is where this journey begins. It should not be where it ends.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.