Emirates of chaos: How the UAE fuels war and walks free

To General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s de facto head of state and commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), foreign interference has been the main force prolonging his country’s brutal war. In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly last September, he pointedly stated, “Without this support… the war in Sudan would have ended,” a thinly veiled reference to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Backed by mounting evidence, Sudan took the unprecedented step of filing a complaint against the UAE at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing it of complicity in genocide. On 5 May, the Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The decision highlighted a glaring loophole in the Genocide Convention: states can shield themselves from accountability simply by refusing to recognise the Court’s authority—thus appearing compliant with international law while avoiding its consequences.

The court failed to examine the merits of Sudan’s case because UAE never recognised Article IX of the UN Genocide Convention which effectively shields it from any accountability. At the same time Abu Dhabi remains committed to the Convection—a scandalous loophole that lets potential perpetrators of genocide off the hook despite the fact genocide is still illegal and a criminal act under international law.

Among the evidence Sudan submitted to the ICJ were flight records showing repeated journeys by military cargo planes from the UAE to Chad—Sudan’s western neighbour. These aircrafts, primarily Ilyushin Il-76TDs, were observed unloading arms and equipment later transported overland into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)-controlled areas in northwestern Sudan, particularly into the war-torn Darfur region. The latest UN Panel of Experts report, submitted to the Security Council in April and leaked to the press, described a “consistent pattern of Ilyushin Il-76TD cargo flights” from the UAE to Chad. The panel noted these trips were so frequent and systematic that they had effectively established what it called a “new regional air bridge”—a covert supply chain sustaining the RSF’s war effort.

Among the evidence Sudan presented to the ICJ were the serial numbers of mortar rounds seized from an RSF-bound convoy intercepted in 2019. These rounds were traced to a Bulgarian military factory, and when questioned, the Bulgarian authorities confirmed the shipment had been exported to the UAE earlier that year. Amnesty International’s May, 2024, report provided further evidence in reporting that Chinese-made weapons captured in both Khartoum and Darfur were “almost certainly re-exported” from the UAE to Sudan. The report said: “It is shameful that the UN Security Council is failing to implement the existing arms embargo on Darfur.”

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Flush with cash, the UAE has played a destructive regional role—widely acknowledged by UN bodies and rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Its activism escalated in 2011 when it joined the NATO-led war in Libya, which toppled Gaddafi but plunged the country into chaos. Capitalising on Libya’s fragmentation, Abu Dhabi backed General Khalifa Haftar, the eastern strongman, funnelling millions in cash and arms to his Libyan National Army (LNA) to help him consolidate power and eliminate rivals, including extremist groups like Daesh. Emboldened by this support, Haftar’s ambitions grew.

Backed by Russian Wagner Group mercenaries and bolstered by Emirati funding and logistics, Haftar’s forces surged toward Tripoli, reaching within 10 kilometres of the city centre and bringing Libya to the brink of a full-scale civil war. In January 2020, a Chinese-made Wing Loong II drone—supplied and reportedly operated by the UAE—targeted a military academy in Tripoli, killing more than 26 unarmed cadets and injuring dozens during their early morning assembly. But by June, the offensive had unravelled. Haftar’s troops were pushed back hundreds of kilometres eastward, leaving behind devastated neighbourhoods and mounting evidence of war crimes in Tripoli’s southern districts.

Abu Dhabi’s motivations for its growing regional entanglement are multifaceted. It seeks to shape outcomes by cultivating a web of local proxies, from Sudan to Libya, as levers of influence. Yet the UAE’s ambitions are not purely geopolitical—economic incentives loom large. Chief among them is Sudan’s vast, unregulated gold sector. In 2024, Sudan produced an estimated 80 tons of gold valued at roughly $6 billion, but the bulk of it was smuggled—much of it reportedly routed to the UAE for processing. Gold, in this context, has become both a funding stream and a strategic asset, helping bankroll the RSF’s war effort while tying Sudan’s conflict to broader regional power plays.

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While no independent UN panel or credible expert report has directly implicated General Khalifa Haftar in supplying the RSF, Sudan’s army (SAF) has repeatedly accused him of interfering in the conflict. In early June 2025, SAF announced the withdrawal of its forces from the strategic triangle near the Libya-Egypt-Sudan border, citing an attack by Haftar-aligned forces—an allegation the Libyan general promptly denied. The incident underscored the fragility of the border region and the perception in Khartoum that Haftar, a long-time UAE ally, may be acting as an unofficial conduit for Emirati interests in Sudan.

Sudan’s ICJ case may have faltered on technical grounds, but the UAE’s role in fuelling the conflict is no longer a secret. What adds to the frustration in Khartoum and beyond is the West’s deafening silence. Western governments, while voicing concern over Sudan’s humanitarian catastrophe and the displacement of millions, rarely—if ever—acknowledge Abu Dhabi’s destructive role. This selective outrage mirrors their stance on Gaza, where Israel, despite facing accusations of genocide, continues to receive military and political backing. The hypocrisy is not subtle,  it’s systemic.

The UAE has little incentive to end its regional meddling unless confronted with firm diplomatic pressure from key players such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the African Union. While Cairo and Riyadh have largely turned a blind eye, the AU has shown some willingness to assign blame. In February, Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commissioner, Salwa Adam Biniya, openly criticized UN Secretary-General António Guterres and outgoing AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki for attending a UAE-sponsored meeting on Sudan’s humanitarian crisis. She described the gathering as a disgraceful attempt to whitewash the UAE’s role in fuelling war crimes and prolonging the conflict in Sudan.

The so-called international community has, so far, failed Sudan—just as it previously failed Libya and continues to fail Gaza. With no credible peace process in sight, and international actors either complicit or indifferent, the prospect of lasting stability in Sudan remains grim. Unless the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) manage to decisively defeat the RSF on the battlefield—a scenario that currently appears distant—there is little hope for an end to the conflict.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.