From rust to rockets: The battle to modernise Iran’s legacy air force

The recent 12-day war between Israel and Iran dramatically exposed the gaping vulnerabilities in Iran’s air defence capabilities. Israeli F-35, F-15, and F-16 jets operated with near impunity, bombarding critical Iranian sites, including airbases, nuclear facilities like Fordo, Isfahan, and Natanz, and vital industrial and energy infrastructure. The Israeli Air Force destroyed approximately 120 Iranian air defence launchers, about a third of its pre-war inventory. This stark reality has undoubtedly accelerated Tehran’s pursuit of modern aerial protection.

A system under siege                                                                                    

Iran’s reliance on antiquated, US-made aircraft from the Shah’s era, combined with an aging, largely indigenous air defence network, proved woefully inadequate. Decades of international sanctions have severely hampered Iran’s ability to maintain and modernise these platforms. The Iranian Air Force, described by experts as a “flying museum,” is primarily composed of US-made aircraft acquired before the 1979 revolution, including F-4 Phantom IIs, F-14A Tomcats, and F-5E/F Tiger IIs. As of early 2025, the Iranian Air Force formally maintained about 150 fighters in service, predominantly these outdated American-made models. Iran has resorted to cannibalising aircraft for parts and illicit procurement, leaving the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) technologically stagnant and unable to compete with modern air forces. The confirmed destruction of F-14s by Israeli drones in June 2025 underscored this obsolescence.

The “12-Day War” with Israel and the US’s “Operation Midnight Hammer” revealed a critical failure in Iran’s air defence network. During “Operation Midnight Hammer” on June 22, 2025, US Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, carrying 30,000-pound “bunker buster” bombs and Tomahawk missiles, targeted the Fordo Uranium Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. Iran’s air defense systems, including Russian-made S-300s and indigenous Bavar-373s and Khordad-15s, completely failed to repel these strikes. Russian-made air defence systems used by Tehran proved inadequate and failed. Russia’s S-300 systems now appear helpless against modern Western technology.

The critical flaw identified was not just outdated hardware, but a systemic inability of different platforms to work together. Systems appeared to “lack proper data integration and operate in a disjointed and non-networked manner,” rendering them ineffective as a cohesive defence network. This disjointedness allowed Israeli F-35, F-15, and F-16 jets to operate with near impunity, demonstrating complete air superiority and operational freedom to hit any target, anywhere inside Iran, without interference.

The pivot to the East                                                                                     

After the war, Iran began replacing its outdated Western weapons by actively seeking advanced arms from Eastern suppliers. Although Russia still plays a significant role, reports indicate that Russia has significantly delayed Su-35 deliveries to Iran. The deal for two dozen Russian Su-35s, announced in 2023, has yet to see a single aircraft delivered, with some reportedly diverted to Algeria. This highlights Russia’s declining reliability as a supplier, partly due to its ongoing war in Ukraine and its reluctance to upset other regional partners. Iranian officials, speaking anonymously to Reuters, expressed “frustration with Moscow’s perceived inaction,” feeling “let down by both Russia and China, despite repeated calls for support.” This has prompted Iran to shift its focus more strongly towards Beijing.

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The recent conflict between India and Pakistan, where Chinese-made fighter jets, primarily the J-10CE, and ground-to-air missiles demonstrated significant effectiveness against French-made Rafale jets, serves as a powerful testament to China’s growing military-industrial prowess. Douglas Barrie, an air combat expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, noted “the likely first combat use of the Chinese Chengdu J-10CE in service with the Pakistan Air Force, equipped with the PL-15 (CH-AA-10 Abaddon) medium-to-long range air-to-air missile.” In this conflict, Pakistan’s J-10CEs, armed with Chinese PL-15 missiles, reportedly downed four Indian Rafale fighters without any losses, a victory that significantly boosted the Chinese defence industry’s reputation.

Iran is actively negotiating with China for the acquisition of advanced J-10C fighter jets, a 4.5th-generation aircraft that would represent a significant upgrade to their air force. These jets, equipped with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars and long-range PL-15E missiles, could genuinely challenge regional air superiority. “The J-10C could prove a more practical, fast, and cost-effective solution for Iran, given its proven performance, lower cost, and China’s reliable supply chain,” according to the EurAsian Times. Furthermore, China has already delivered HQ-16 and HQ-17AE anti-aircraft missile systems, along with ammunition, to Iran, indicating a broader push for integrated air defence solutions. While the Shenyang J-35 “Gyrfalcon,” a 5th-generation stealth fighter often dubbed “China’s answer to the F-35,” remains an aspirational long-term objective for Iran, the immediate focus is on the J-10C to rapidly bridge critical capability gaps.

The “Tactical Alliance” and its limitations                                               

Iran’s military modernisation is part of a complex geopolitical alignment with Russia and China, aimed at countering Western influence. This Russia-China-Iran axis is best described as a fragile tactical coalition driven by converging interests rather than shared values. Dr Stefan Meister and David Jalivand write in the German Council on Foreign Relations, “Russia is both unwilling and unable to offer Iran any meaningful support that could shift the balance in Tehran’s favour. Tehran and its partners converge around a shared objective: weakening US global influence and positioning themselves as key actors.” Both Moscow and Beijing utilize Iran as a strategic lever to challenge US dominance, but their support is conditional and self-serving. They balance their ties with Iran against relationships with other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. They are wary of being drawn into a confrontation with the West on Iran’s behalf. China is the largest importer of Iranian oil, helping Tehran bypass sanctions and generate state revenue while increasing Beijing’s role in Gulf maritime security.

This “fair-weather friend” dynamic means Iran cannot rely on them as absolute guarantors of its security, creating inherent limitations on its modernisation efforts and strategic maneuverability. The relatively muted responses by China and Russia to the 12-day war, despite their rhetorical support, underscored this transactional nature. While China provides an economic lifeline by purchasing over 90 per cent of Iran’s oil exports, often at a discount, and offers military hardware, it has shown no concrete sign of joint military engagement on Iran’s behalf during the recent conflict.

This strategic pivot towards Chinese military hardware highlights Iran’s desperate need to modernise its defences and redefine its aerial capabilities in a volatile region. However, the path forward remains fraught with challenges, including the persistent impact of sanctions on its economy and the inherent limitations of a strategic partnership based on convenience rather than a deep alliance. Iran’s quest to transform its rust-belt air force into a credible deterrent will be a defining factor in the evolving security landscape of the Middle East.

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