Joint forces to govern Gaza: Mission and repercussions

The day after the war in Gaza poses a major dilemma for regional and international actors, who are working to shape a plan for deploying an Arab–international force in the Strip in a bid to end the war, which is nearing its second anniversary on 7 October.

The proposed plan is not new; it has been put forward repeatedly in the past and was met with strong rejection from Arab capitals, as well as a pledge from the Palestinian resistance to confront it. What is new this time, however, is Egypt’s announcement of its acceptance of deploying international forces in the Gaza Strip.

Egypt’s acceptance brings with it a mix of concerns and the need for assurances, while also raising questions over the mandate of the new force, the potential for confrontation with resistance factions, and Israel’s underlying motives.

Egyptian acceptance

A few days ago, Cairo showed a notable openness to the idea of deploying international forces in the Strip, through its Foreign Minister, Badr Abdelatty, who stated that “there is no objection to deploying international forces in the Gaza Strip.” This was the same proposal put forward by the Israeli side more than a year ago, which Egypt had previously rejected.

This new development marks a shift in Cairo’s position, as it faces US pressure to accept a plan for the displacement of Gaza’s residents into its territory. At the same time, Egypt seeks to bring an end to the war, which has created major tensions along its northern border with the Strip and disrupted international shipping in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal due to attacks by Yemen’s Houthi movement on vessels bound for Israeli ports.

Observers believe that Egypt’s sudden shift aims to block the Israeli government’s plans to reoccupy the Strip, while at the same time preventing Hamas from returning to power there, paving the way for the Palestinian Authority to resume governance in Gaza, and opening the door to reconstruction and the two-state solution.

It remains unclear for now the extent of Egypt’s participation in the proposed force, which countries will be involved, how many troops are to be deployed on the ground, the nature of their armament, whether European states will take part or if participation will be limited to Arab and Islamic countries, and under whose authority the force will operate — the United Nations or another body.

The final statement of the Arab Summit, hosted by Manama in May 2024, had called for the deployment of “international protection and peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the United Nations in the occupied Palestinian territories until the two-state solution is implemented.” 

Security responsibilities

The duties of the proposed force include protecting civilians, distributing aid, and securing the reconstruction process. However, Israel’s ambitions go further, seeking to achieve its objectives of destroying tunnels, disarming Hamas, and preventing rocket fire from Gaza.

According to Egypt’s foreign minister, Cairo has begun training 5,000 Palestinian police officers (affiliated with Fatah) in Egyptian camps, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority and Jordan, to fill the security vacuum in Gaza once Israel’s war on the Strip comes to an end.

Political analyst Mohamed Gamal believes that limiting the composition of the force to a Palestinian Arab framework (Egyptian and Jordanian) would prevent clashes with the resistance factions, which certainly do not wish to see the conflict redirected into a Palestinian–Arab confrontation.

Speaking to Middle East Monitor, he noted that the issue as a whole will ultimately depend on security arrangements and understandings with the Palestinian Authority and the resistance factions, particularly Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Major differences still remain over the goals and powers of such a force, how it would coordinate with the Israeli occupation, and where it would stand on the question of disarming the resistance.

Hamas official Osama Hamdan had earlier stated that the movement would regard any newly formed force as an occupying power aligned with Israel.

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A proposed deal

At a press conference last week with Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa on the Egyptian side of the Rafah crossing, Egypt’s Foreign Minister reaffirmed his country’s position, stating : “We are ready to contribute to any joint international force deployed in Gaza, provided it is guided by clear standards — including a UN Security Council resolution with a defined mandate — and that it takes place, naturally, within a political framework.”

Speaking at the “Two-State Solution” conference in New York last month, Abdelatty said that Egypt has a vision for Gaza’s future security and governance, including who would take charge of the territory once the war is over.

Cairo hopes that the presence of such a force would remain temporary, lasting only until a roadmap toward a two-state solution is agreed, security services are unified, and weapons are brought under the control of the Palestinian Authority. At the same time, it wants to avoid any scenario that could trigger direct clashes between the joint force and the resistance on one side, and between the joint force and Israeli forces on the other.

Egypt’s role may expand later, culminating in a behind-the-scenes deal reportedly backed by the generous offer made by Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid. According to Hebrew media, the proposal—part of a US administration plan—would grant Egypt responsibility for governing Gaza for 15 years in exchange for wiping out its foreign debt, estimated at $155 billion.

In addition to debt relief, the package for Egypt would reportedly include a set of incentives: direct US involvement in the Nile Dam dispute in Cairo’s favour, military aid to bolster stability in Sinai, and backing for El-Sisi to remain in power for a fourth presidential term lasting until 2036.

Possible confrontation

“The devil is in the details,” especially given the high likelihood of confrontation, depending on how the ongoing negotiations and arrangements define the mandate of the force that would take charge of Gaza once the war ends.

What could further fuel the risk of confrontation is Tel Aviv’s desire for the Arab–international force in Gaza to serve as a proxy arm for Israel, or for that force to be drawn into direct clashes with the resistance — effectively fighting a proxy war against Hamas and casting the movement as an enemy of the world, rather than of Israel alone.

Caution prevails, particularly since past experiences with deploying international forces in conflict zones have often worked to the benefit of occupying powers — UNIFIL in Lebanon being a prime example. Such a force could be steered to serve Tel Aviv’s interests, or even infiltrated with Israeli intelligence operatives, much like when US intelligence elements were inserted into the “Gaza Humanitarian” organisation.

The mission of the new force might resemble that of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), deployed along the Syrian Israeli border under the 1974 disengagement agreement, or that of the UN peacekeepers known as the “Blue Helmets.”

Deliberate sabotage

The day after the war in Gaza is already being set up for failure, and the prospect of Arab forces taking part in running the Strip could turn into a ticking time bomb if their role is reduced to acting as Israel’s police force — a role that serves both Israeli and American agendas.

An Egyptian expert, who asked not to be named, believes the proposal to deploy an Arab or international force in Gaza is likely to go through — provided it operates under the UN authority and serves solely as a buffer force, with no mandate to disarm the resistance.

He told Middle East Monitor that formal approval from Hamas is essential for the proposal’s success; without it, the force would be seen as an occupying power and come under fire from the resistance. He added that any invasion of the Strip, if carried out, would doom the proposal once and for all.

Ultimately, the weapons of the Palestinian resistance remain the decisive factor, and efforts to disarm them are likely to be the greatest obstacle to any political settlement or long-term truce between Israel and Hamas — a goal the Israeli army has failed to achieve over the past two years. That reality clouds the future of the proposed joint force and could even turn the force itself into a trap.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.