The stalemate behind the smiles: Why Saudi-Israeli normalisation remains a mirage

Despite years of quiet overtures, symbolic gestures, and high-level diplomacy, the prospect of formal normalisation between Saudi Arabia and Israel remains stalled. At the heart of the impasse lies an immovable but straightforward truth: Riyadh’s price for peace is Palestinian statehood. Jerusalem won’t pay it, and Washington keeps moving the goalposts.

In July, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reaffirmed that normalisation “can only come with a credible, irreversible path to a Palestinian state.”  His remarks coincided with Riyadh’s co-sponsorship of a Paris-led UN initiative aimed at reviving two-state negotiations, a signal that the kingdom’s position is not rhetorical, but strategic.

This stance has hardened in the wake of the Gaza war and Israel’s continued expansion of West Bank settlements. The August approval of the E1 settlement plan, a move condemned by the EU, UK, and Australia, further undermined Palestinian territorial contiguity and reinforced Saudi scepticism.

Riyadh’s calculus: Statehood, not symbolism

Saudi Arabia’s demands are clear: a time-bound, irreversible path to Palestinian sovereignty; a US–Saudi defence pact; access to advanced arms; and a civilian nuclear program with domestic enrichment or US-controlled facilities on Saudi soil.

Although economic projects such as the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) have potential, they are hindered by regional instability and Israeli domestic politics.

Crucially, Saudi public opinion is ice-cold. An August 2025 Washington Institute poll found that 81 per cent of Saudis oppose normalisation with Israel; only 1 per cent support it. Even business-only ties have cooled since the Gaza war.

Within this context, actions such as granting overflight access, hosting UNESCO events, and organising ministerial visits may be perceived as lacking substantive impact.

Jerusalem’s constraints: Coalition red lines and strategic doctrine

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly insisted that Israel must retain “security control over the entire territory west of the Jordan River,” a position he himself acknowledged is “irreconcilable with a Palestinian state.” His governing coalition, dominated by far-right factions, opposes any steps that resemble statehood. The E1 greenlight was not an aberration; it was a signal.

While Israel values tactical gains, airspace access, quiet ties, and symbolic diplomacy, these do not meet Riyadh’s final-status demands.

Washington’s shifting leverage

The US has adjusted its Middle East peace strategy, with President Biden combining normalisation, a US–Saudi defence pact, and a civilian nuclear deal into one “grand bargain.”  But the Trump administration, returning to power in 2025, has delinked key elements of that package from Israeli normalisation, effectively allowing Riyadh to pocket strategic gains without delivering diplomatic recognition to Jerusalem. This decoupling weakens Washington’s leverage over Israeli policy, giving Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman room to say “not yet” without jeopardising US deliverables.

Gaza as the litmus test

Saudi officials increasingly tie normalisation to Gaza’s end-state: reconstruction, governance, and a political horizon. Bin Farhan’s July remarks and the Saudi-French UN initiative suggest that Riyadh views Gaza not as a humanitarian crisis alone, but as a geopolitical hinge.

The road ahead

The path forward hinges on several watch items. Whether Israel shifts its position on West Bank settlements, particularly the E1 corridor, will prove crucial to any potential breakthrough. Equally significant are the terms of a US–Saudi nuclear deal—will it restrict enrichment or allow a US-controlled facility on Saudi soil? Meanwhile, signals from Riyadh remain critical: another Paris-style conference, direct language from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or calibrated confidence-building measures around Jerusalem’s holy sites. Finally, the fate of IMEC remains stalled amid regional instability.

Conclusion: A deal deferred

For now, the normalisation track remains frozen, not for lack of interest, but because the price of peace has gone up. Riyadh demands substance, not symbolism. Jerusalem offers gestures, not guarantees. And Washington, caught between strategic ambition and political reality, keeps moving the goalposts. Unless these gaps narrow, the handshake that once seemed within reach may remain a mirage.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.