Crossing red lines: What happens if Israel strikes again?

Since the beginning of the Gaza war in October 2023, Israel has crossed lines that were never meant to be crossed. The direct confrontation between Israel and Iran in 2025 had been hanging in the air for more than 35 years, but it never happened until now. And the bold Israeli decision to eliminate Hezbollah’s leadership once and for all was also born during this war as well, a move that until then was never really on the table. Well, the total elimination of Hezbollah has not yet been successfully executed, but Tel Aviv and Washington are clearly investing heavily in it.

Israel’s unprecedented military operation against Qatar to assassinate Hamas’s top political leadership was the most recent of these red lines crossed — and the most dangerous so far. Not only because it was a direct hit on a high-value target like Hamas’s entire political leadership, but more importantly because it was an open act of aggression against a sovereign Arab state. A country that doesn’t border Israel, never had a direct military confrontation with the Zionist state, and is a main ally and close friend to the USA in the region.

Throughout its short history, Israel has carried out numerous military and secret operations to eliminate Palestinian and Lebanese leaders on local and foreign soils alike — from Tunisia, where the Israeli army assassinated PLO top official Khalil al Wazir (Abu Jihad) in April 1988, to Lebanon, including Operation Verdun in Beirut in 1973, when Israel assassinated three leading figures of the Palestinian Liberation Organization: Kamal Nasser, Abou Yousef el Najjar, and Kamal Odwan. The list even extends to operations in European cities. Targeting key leaders of the Palestinian revolution has long been a frequent objective for Israel, but the technique, the location, and the timing of the Doha operation stand out and set a precedent — a dangerous one indeed.

After the failure of the recent Israeli aggression in Doha, where none of the top leaders of Hamas were killed in the airstrikes, Israel has vowed to continue targeting and eliminating Hamas leaders and other high-value targets worldwide — a threat that has raised questions and concerns. Doha may not be the last; it could actually be the first, in a new – old trend amid extended war engulfing the entire region. Speculations have soared.

Egypt has reportedly delivered a clear and strong message to Washington, that any attempt to target or assassinate Palestinian officials in Egypt — similar to what Israel has done in Qatar — would have devastating consequences and would be treated as a declaration of war. According to the Middle East Eye, Egyptian intelligence reports suggested that Israel has been plotting to assassinate Hamas leaders in the Egyptian capital, and that Egypt had already foiled an attempt during ceasefire talks in Cairo over the past two years. In a short interview, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy told me: “There is no doubt that Israel’s aggressive behaviour has reached an extremely dangerous level recently, especially with the political cover and exemption from accountability granted to it by the current American administration.”

It is worth noting that Egypt has also granted the secretary-general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, Ziad Nakhaleh, permanent residency in Egypt as part of its role in Palestinian reconciliation efforts and ceasefire talks amid concerns for his safety after the recent developments. Egypt’s sensitive ties with Israel have been deteriorating ever since the beginning of the war in Gaza, despite Cairo being a main mediator for the yet-to-be-finalised ceasefire deal.

Turkey is another main player in the region and a potential target for Israel’s possible future adventures. Since the beginning of the Gaza war in 2023, Ankara has drawn a clear and bold red line to Israel: never attempt to run operations or target Palestinian officials on its territory, where Hamas and other Palestinian factions’ officials frequently visit. According to a recent Wall Street Journal report, Turkey and Egypt had warned Hamas prior to the Doha attacks to tighten security measures and watch for possible Israeli targeting of the movement’s leadership.

Unlike Iran and Qatar, both Egypt and Turkey are not officially enemies of Israel like Iran, nor are they small nations without the military capabilities to respond decisively to any Israeli offensive on their lands. Introducing a more cautious regional perspective, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy told me: “Between Egypt and Israel, there is no doubt that the current situation is the most dangerous in the past ten years — and even beyond that. The growing risks stem from Israeli actions.” he said. “Egypt never exceeds its own borders with nether the Palestinian occupied territories nor with Israel but Egypt will never be hesitated at the mean time to defend its own land and borders,” former Egyptian minister Fahmy added.

Any Israeli adventure with either of them can bring about an escalation the region hasn’t seen before. Egypt and Israel had fought each other in several wars from 1948 until they agreed on a peace treaty — the first between Israel and an Arab country — in the late 1970s. Israel and Turkey have never gone to war with each other, but Turkey is a major military power on any regional or international scale, and any Israeli manoeuvre on that front may bring about consequences that are unpredictable.

Israel’s aggressive posture in the region was weakened by the failure of its Doha strikes, which did not succeed in eliminating any members of Hamas’s political leadership, and this setback now poses a challenge to Israel’s war government. The failed raid on Qatar may serve as a pretext for another attempt to salvage the government’s reputation, both domestically and regionally, while keeping the situation open to surprises that could turn rising regional tensions into actual conflict. As long as peace remains absent and a genuine pursuit of justice and solutions is missing in the Middle East, the worst can always be expected—and if not in this phase of the confrontation, then most likely in the next.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.