UK advised Iranian exiles to use Kurdish question to gain support for overthrowing Khomeini, British documents reveal

The UK advised Iranian opposition groups in exile to promise the Kurds a federal state in Iran in order to secure their support for any plans to overthrow Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary government, newly declassified British documents reveal.

In 1981, a year after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, the British government was approached by several exiled Iranian opposition groups and figures from the ousted regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. These groups were seeking political and military support to remove the revolutionary regime in Tehran.

Documents from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) show that although Britain refused to take part in any attempts to destabilise Khomeini’s government, officials believed that exiled opposition groups had little chance of gaining influence inside Iran unless they secured the support of minorities—particularly the Kurds.

Lord Carrington on intervenence in Iran for Kurds

Lord George Brown on Kurds

John Graham on Kurds

In November 1981, John Graham, Deputy Undersecretary of State at the FCO, met with Mehdi Samii, former Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, at Samii’s request. They discussed potential alternative leaders who could unite the opposition against the regime.

Graham advised that any opposition group in exile seeking to organise resistance inside Iran would “look for an ally who had a local power base, access to armed supporters, and links throughout the country.” He suggested that the Kurds would be the most likely such group and added that the best way to “buy” Kurdish support “would have to promise a Federal State”. Samii agreed, stating that federalism in Iran after the change of the regime would certainly be necessary.

At the time, Lord George Brown—who served as UK Foreign Secretary from 1966 to 1968—was lobbying for a strategy to restore Britain’s influence in the Arab world and protect British economic and geostrategic interests in the Middle East.

During a meeting with Graham, the viability of exiled opposition groups returning to Iran and establishing influence was discussed. The British diplomatic official argued that such groups would have to “cultivate relations with the Kurds by offering a federal state” in Iran. Similar offers would also need to be extended to other ethnic minorities, Graham added. Lord Brown, recently returned from a tour of the Middle East, warned that involving the Kurds could create problems for both Iraq and possibly Turkey.

Graham also noted that it was difficult to identify a viable foreign base from which an opposition group could operate. Brown responded that Turkey “was a possible route into Iran”.

In a report to the Foreign Secretary and the Middle East Department, Graham stated that the meeting with Lord Brown made him believe Iraq was still seeking an Iranian opposition group it could use to destabilise Khomeini’s regime. He speculated that Lord Brown might be assisting Iraq in this effort, writing that Brown “may have a finger in the pie.”

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A few months earlier, General Gholam-Ali Oveissi, former Chief of Staff under the Shah, informed the UK that he maintained personal relationships with leaders of various tribes across Kurdistan and still held considerable influence. However, he warned that the Iranian Kurds “might eventually settle for any (external) presence which offered them autonomy including that of the Soviet Union”. 

Other documents reveal that the British government rejected calls from Kurdish supporters in the UK urging British intervention in the armed conflict between the Kurds and the Iranian government, which had broken out a few months after the 1979 revolution.

Following the collapse of the Pahlavi regime in early February 1979, Kurdish rebels in Iran’s Western Azerbaijan Province established de facto control of key towns. However, by August, Iranian armed forces had regained control, prompting the Kurds to retreat into the mountains and announce the start of a guerrilla war against the central government.

After the rebellion was suppressed, the FCO did not rule out the possibility of foreign- but not British- intervention in the Kurdish conflict. In a report on the conflict, it suggested that potential backers included Iraq and Israel, who might support the Kurds against Iran’s new revolutionary regime.

In early September, a Kurdish lobbying group wrote to the FCO inquiring about Britain’s “opinions and intentions toward the Kurds’ efforts to achieve independence.” The letter, which referred to the Kurds as traditional friends of Britain, claimed there were indications that the FCO was considering sending a military mission to Kurdistan Province—the main Kurdish stronghold bordering Western Azerbaijan—to explore ways of assisting the Kurdish struggle.

In response, the FCO reiterated that the UK could not support an independent Kurdistan, having recognized the borders of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey since the end of World War I. The reply also noted that the British government was closely monitoring provisions in the new Iranian draft constitution relating to ethnic minorities. It concluded by stating that the UK was not considering dispatching a military mission or providing military assistance to the Kurds in Iran.

Lord Peter Carrington, the then-Foreign Secretary, received another petition urging the UK to do whatever it could to help the Kurds—whether in Iran, Iraq, or Turkey. The petition described it as “dreadful that civilized people such as the British must stand by and watch what we regard here as mediaeval behavior,” and claimed that “inhuman methods” were being used to suppress the Kurds’ natural desire to preserve their language and educational rights.

In a reply sent on his behalf by the FCO’s Middle East Department, Lord Carrington stated that Iranian leaders, including Khomeini, had emphasized the equality of all ethnic groups in Iran. They had also clarified that government actions were directed not at Kurds generally, but at the insurgents in the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), who were allegedly receiving support from various foreign sources. Carrington warned that British intervention on Kurds behalf “Kurds “could be construed as evidence” that Kurds as well as the KDP were connected with foreign powers and “could possibly inflame the situation”.   

The new Iranian constitution, adopted in early December 1979, affirmed the rights of all ethnic groups in Iran. It states that the people of Ira, regardless of their ethnicity or tribe, have equal rights, and that distinctions based on color, race, language, and similar characteristics do not grant any special privileges.

The constitution also declares that the Islamic Republic of Iran supports the struggles of the oppressed against oppressors around the world in their pursuit of justice and rights.

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