Indonesia and Iraq: Quiet contacts, modest openings

Indonesia and Iraq rarely feature together in discussions of foreign policy. Their relationship has long been cordial but limited, defined more by polite exchanges than by active cooperation. In 2025, that pattern continued, though with a few modest steps suggesting a shared interest in keeping diplomatic and economic channels open.

The most visible development came in July 2025, when Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs received Indonesia’s new ambassador, Didik Eko Pujianto, in Baghdad. The meeting reaffirmed both countries’ commitment to strengthening bilateral ties. This month, the ambassador met with the Kurdistan Regional Government to discuss cooperation in trade, education, and investment. While largely procedural, these meetings underscored an intention to maintain engagement at a time when both governments are reassessing their external partnerships.

Trade between the two countries remains modest. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) data, exports to Iraq totaled about $293 million in 2023, while imports stood at roughly $33 million, dominated by oil-related products. There is little sign of major new investment, and both sides acknowledge that regulatory, logistical, and security challenges remain significant obstacles.

Still, Jakarta and Baghdad have taken incremental steps to make official interaction easier. In September 2024, they signed a visa-exemption agreement for holders of diplomatic and service passports — a limited but symbolic move to facilitate government-to-government contact. In May 2025, Iraq’s National Investment Commission invited foreign investors, including Indonesian firms, to participate in reconstruction and industrial projects. The statement reflected Iraq’s ongoing effort to diversify its partners and attract Asian participation in key sectors such as energy, petrochemicals, and agriculture.

Indonesia’s diplomatic approach fits this cautious tempo. Its foreign policy emphasises stability, economic cooperation, and nonalignment. Iraq, for its part, is rebuilding its international relationships after decades of conflict and political volatility. The intersection of those approaches — pragmatic, gradual, and non-confrontational — explains the character of their engagement.

Concrete cooperation remains limited but not nonexistent. In February 2025, an Iraqi animal-health delegation visited Indonesia to explore potential collaboration in livestock disease control with an Indonesian firm, Vaksindo Satwa Nusantara. The visit was minor but reflected growing contact at the technical level. Similar exchanges could provide a foundation for more sustained cooperation in agriculture, public health, and vocational training — areas where Indonesia has relevant experience and Iraq has clear needs.

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At the multilateral level, Iraq’s 2025 accession to the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions — an organization in which Indonesia plays an active role — added a small but notable layer of institutional connection. The move signaled Iraq’s willingness to engage with Asian governance networks and Indonesia’s quiet support for its inclusion.

Yet the limitations of the relationship are clear. There are no major investment agreements, no new trade corridors, and no active high-level strategic dialogues. Business confidence in Iraq remains weak due to bureaucratic complexity and security concerns. Indonesian firms, meanwhile, are generally focused on established markets in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and East Asia. Without targeted government facilitation or specific joint projects, expansion of economic ties is likely to remain slow.

A realistic way forward would be to institutionalise the modest cooperation already underway. Establishing a joint economic commission or a bilateral working group could help sustain dialogue on trade, investment, and technical collaboration. Jakarta has used similar formats effectively with other partners in Asia and the Middle East. For Iraq, such a structure could provide continuity across government changes and make it easier to translate broad investment appeals into concrete project proposals.

Education and professional training also offer practical entry points. Iraqi students and civil servants could benefit from Indonesian training programs in agriculture, administration, and industrial management — areas where Indonesia has built domestic capacity. These exchanges would cost little and create human connections that help stabilize diplomatic relations over time.

The overall tone of Indonesia–Iraq relations in 2025 is one of careful exploration. Neither side expects rapid progress. Both understand that cooperation will depend on maintaining steady contact rather than announcing major initiatives. For Indonesia, Iraq represents a potential partner in West Asia that aligns with its nonaligned, South-South diplomacy. For Iraq, Indonesia is an example of gradual modernization under democratic governance, offering lessons and potential cooperation without political conditions.

In global terms, the relationship remains peripheral. But modest, steady engagement has value of its own. It allows both sides to preserve options, share expertise, and slowly expand cooperation in areas of mutual interest. In that sense, the quiet steps of 2024–25 — diplomatic visits, limited agreements, and technical exchanges — represent not breakthroughs, but groundwork.

If these efforts continue, Indonesia and Iraq could develop a functional partnership based on shared pragmatism rather than rhetoric. For now, that measured progress may be enough.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.