The Gulf needs an energy non-aggression pact

The next crisis or confrontation in the Gulf may not begin with a territorial invasion or an attack on a military base. It could start with the disruption of an oil refinery, export terminal, liquefied natural gas facility, power grid or desalination plant. In a region where oil, gas, electricity, water and maritime trade are tightly interconnected, an attack on energy infrastructure is no longer a limited act. It could simultaneously affect global markets, human security and the stability of several states.

The region therefore needs an “energy non-aggression pact”: a limited but practical agreement protecting critical energy infrastructure and the essential services that depend on it. Its purpose would be to transform mutual infrastructure vulnerability into mutual restraint.

Such an initiative would only be meaningful if it moved beyond narrow blocs and included the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Iran and Iraq, according to their different roles in the region’s energy geography and maritime security. No durable arrangement can exclude a major part of the Gulf’s security equation.

When energy infrastructure becomes a global target

The 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais facilities demonstrated how damage to a small number of critical sites could temporarily disrupt a substantial share of the Kingdom’s oil production and immediately unsettle global markets. The deeper lesson was not merely the temporary loss of output, but the concentration and vulnerability of infrastructure on which part of the global economy depends.

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The security of the Gulf is also inseparable from surrounding maritime routes, from the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman to Bab Al-Mandab and the Red Sea. Disruption at one point can raise shipping, insurance and energy-trading costs across a much wider area. The spread of drones and the growing threat of destructive cyber operations have extended this vulnerability beyond physical facilities to control centres, communications systems and digital energy networks.

Qatar’s position as one of the world’s largest and most strategically important LNG exporters further demonstrates that the region’s vulnerability is not limited to oil. Disruption to gas production, liquefaction or exports could quickly place international supply and prices under pressure.

Energy security is also human security

The principal danger is not simply the loss of hydrocarbon revenue or an increase in global energy prices. In many Gulf states, energy security cannot be separated from water security. Desalination plants depend on electricity, fuel, control centres and backup systems. A prolonged disruption could affect hospitals, public health, food security and the basic conditions of urban life.

An attack on energy infrastructure is therefore not necessarily an attack on an economic asset alone. It may effectively become an attack on drinking water, healthcare, transport and the daily lives of millions of people. This connection turns infrastructure protection from an economic necessity into a humanitarian responsibility.

The infrastructure deterrence paradox

The ability to strike an adversary’s infrastructure may appear to create deterrence: each side refrains from attacking because it fears a similar response. Yet this form of destructive deterrence remains stable only when red lines are clear, communication channels are active and responsibility for an attack can be reliably established.

The region possesses none of these conditions in a complete or enduring form. The number of state and non-state actors, the difficulty of attributing drone and cyber operations and the possibility of decisions based on incomplete information all increase the risk of miscalculation. A limited incident—or the premature attribution of responsibility—could trigger a chain of retaliation that none of the parties can control.

This is mutual infrastructure vulnerability: no actor can attack another’s critical systems without accepting the risk of economic, humanitarian and security consequences for itself and its partners.

What would the pact prohibit?

Under an energy non-aggression pact, regional states would commit not to attack oil refineries, export terminals, LNG facilities, major pipelines, power stations, electricity grids, energy control centres, desalination plants and their critical backup systems.

The commitment should also prohibit support for attacks by non-state actors or proxy groups, as well as the use of drones or destructive cyber operations to disrupt essential services. Beyond refraining from attacks, states should cooperate in prevention, technical investigations and efforts to stop their territory from being used against another country’s critical infrastructure.

The pact would not replace international humanitarian law. That body of law protects civilian objects, although the legal status of dual-use energy facilities can become contested when an installation serves both civilian needs and military operations.

The pact’s added value would lie in defining protected infrastructure more precisely at the regional level, creating an additional commitment to restraint and addressing grey areas involving proxy, drone and cyber operations. Its objective would be to prevent every political confrontation or military crisis from producing a cascading failure of essential services.

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Start small rather than build a large institution

In a region marked by profound mistrust, verification should not begin with intrusive inspections or the creation of a large organisation. The first step could be an emergency energy hotline and the rapid exchange of information about attacks, cyber incidents and sudden disruptions.

A non-political technical working group could later use satellite data, maritime insurance reports, market information and independent expert assessments to reduce the danger of premature attribution. The parties could then develop shared crisis-management protocols and arrangements for the emergency supply of electricity, fuel, spare parts and alternative export routes.

The initial objective would not be complete trust. It would be to buy time for diplomacy before a chain reaction begins.

Regional ownership, international support

Oman could serve as an initial facilitator because of its record of mediation and its channels of communication with rival parties. Qatar’s strategic position in the LNG market and Saudi Arabia’s production capacity and political weight in global oil markets make their involvement essential.

Iran’s participation would be equally indispensable: no Gulf energy-security arrangement can function without one of the region’s most consequential geographical and energy actors.

External powers and major energy consumers—from the United States and China to Europe and Asia’s leading economies—would all benefit from a stable Gulf. Their role, however, should be supportive and facilitative rather than a substitute for regional ownership. A pact perceived as the project of one outside power would soon become another arena for geopolitical competition.

Difficult, but necessary

An energy non-aggression pact would face serious obstacles: deep mistrust among states, the difficulty of attributing drone and cyber attacks, the role of armed non-state actors and disagreements over dual-use facilities. These challenges are not a reason to abandon the proposal. They are a reason to begin with a limited, technical and phased arrangement. Such a pact would not end the Middle East’s conflicts. It could, however, prevent the next crisis from holding electricity, water, fuel, hospitals, ports and the vital systems serving millions of people hostage.

Energy security in the Gulf is no longer a purely national matter. No state can regard its own infrastructure as secure while that of its neighbours remains under constant threat. Transforming mutual vulnerability into mutual restraint will not be easy, but it could become the first practical step towards a more realistic—and more humane—regional security architecture.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.