The Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani Security Agreement: A Preliminary Assessment

The Mecca Agreement, signed on 7 August, may not be the first step in a series of moves that key states in the region have begun to take, reflecting significant strategic shifts. Although the challenges facing the countries of the region are not new, they have intensified markedly in recent years. The Israeli war on Gaza, and its expansion into the US-Israeli war on Iran during the current presidency of Donald Trump, have undoubtedly provided the most significant impetus for countries in the region to reconsider their external strategic calculations, their roles, and their standing within the region. The collective security and deterrence nature of the agreement between these states carries a particular significance and represents an important development in regional security equations and deterrence strategies, in a region where the United States has long worked to establish a different set of arrangements. The agreement can be regarded as a particular message to the United States, especially as it calls on other influential states to join it, foremost among them Egypt and Qatar. These countries share a number of characteristics relating to their standing, their military and security systems, the threats surrounding them, and the regional alliances arrayed against them, which help to explain the importance of their alliance, its purpose, the reasons for their concerns, and their efforts to protect themselves. The challenge, however, remains in implementing the agreement, which depends on establishing a mechanism for activating its collective security clause namely, treating an attack on one member of the alliance as an attack on all the others. The question, then, is whether the agreement can succeed in the complex and consequential task of establishing new realities that must be taken into account in the region’s balance of power, whose relative weights have long been determined by the United States alone.

The weight and standing of the three countries involved in the Mecca Agreement may be the most important reason it has attracted attention. The agreement brings together Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia holds considerable economic and political weight in the region, while Turkey combines a significant geopolitical presence with promising and rapidly advancing military-industrial expertise; it has the second-largest military in NATO after the United States. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only nuclear power among the Arab and Muslim countries of the region and has extensive combat experience shaped by a conflict that has lasted for decades. Saudi Arabia and Turkey also share an affiliation with the Western military tradition: the former has relied for decades on the American defence establishment, while the latter is one of NATO’s key members and is firmly rooted in the Western military tradition. All three countries are allies of the United States, albeit to varying degrees. They also share an evolving approach to their domestic defence strategies, although the timing and pace of that development have differed among them. Pakistan has sought to diversify its sources of external military dependence. Having relied strongly on the United States during the Cold War, it has now become a major partner of China, which has surpassed the United States in this respect. Turkey, by contrast, remains a member of NATO while also operating elements of a Russian defence system, an approach it adopted nearly a decade ago. Today, it has developed an independent military profile over recent decades alongside its NATO commitments.

Saudi Arabia, for its part, has for years been developing a strategy based on greater self-reliance in manufacturing, including in the military sector. It has also begun diversifying the sources of its military arsenal after previously relying almost entirely on the United States.

Today, all three countries are seeking greater independence in security decision-making, arms procurement and even their alliances, a development that represents a genuine shift and a challenge for the United States.

The early signs of efforts to build this kind of collective defence arrangement in the region could already be seen last year, following Israel’s attack on Qatar. In September of last year, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a joint defence agreement during an emergency meeting of regional states convened to discuss Israeli escalation against Qatar. In April of this year, after the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran, the agreement entered into force. Just seven days before the signing of the Mecca Agreement, 14 states agreed to join a maritime defence arrangement that, in addition to the three countries, includes Egypt, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Yemen and other states. Returning to the Mecca Agreement, its parties stressed that it was not directed against any particular party, while neither the United States nor Israel issued an official position on it despite its sensitivity.

Turkish-Iranian relations have developed over many decades, and although the two countries are major regional powers and competitors, their relationship has been characterised by a degree of harmony. Turkey did not participate in the campaign of isolation imposed on Iran by the United States over several decades.

Relations between Pakistan and Iran are likewise characterised by proximity and cooperation, and the two countries have long worked together to combat terrorism along their shared border. Pakistan briefed Iran on the details of the agreement, in a gesture reflecting the nature of their relationship. Saudi Arabia welcomed its reconciliation with Iran in 2023 and refused to cooperate with the United States in the war against it; indeed, it repeatedly sought to persuade Washington not to attack Iran.

On the other hand, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia reject normalisation with Israel, while Turkish-Israeli differences and contradictions have escalated rapidly and steadily in recent years. Pakistan supports the Palestinians and has strongly condemned what it describes as the war of genocide against them in Gaza. It regards the expanding US and Israeli relations with India, its historic rival, as a direct threat.

The United States supports India in its confrontation with China in Asia and leads several regional alliances directed against Beijing. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, faces US and Israeli support for the United Arab Emirates in the region, as the latter has increasingly challenged Saudi Arabia openly in Yemen and Sudan.

Saudi Arabia also faces the risk of Israeli expansion in the Red Sea, following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, its presence at the port of Berbera and its alliance with Ethiopia, developments that constitute a strategic threat in Saudi Arabia’s immediate neighbourhood. On a third front, Israel and Turkey are confronting one another on Syrian territory. While Turkey supports the Syrian government, Israel attacks it, expands its presence on Syrian territory at the expense of Syrian sovereignty, and seeks to weaken the government. Saudi Arabia and Turkey share political support for the current government in Syria. Turkey also faces the Israeli-Greek-Cypriot alliance, which it views as an effort to contain it in the Mediterranean.

The signing of a security and defence agreement by three countries allied with the United States cannot be viewed lightly, since it may stir significant strategic shifts in the Middle East. Until recently, the United States adopted a strategy designed to sideline these states and tried to enlist their support, beside Israel, against Iran. This American strategy may be no longer hold, neither may be existing equation and international balance of powe, which are gradually moving further a way from a unipolar international system.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.