Türkiye: From energy corridor to regional network power

When Azerbaijani gas crosses Türkiye to reach Syrian power plants, Iraqi oil flows through Turkish territory towards the Mediterranean, and Iraq’s electricity grid connects to Turkish transmission lines, Ankara is no longer merely hosting a collection of transit routes. Türkiye is increasingly positioning itself at the centre of an energy network linking producers and consumers across the Caucasus, the Middle East and Europe.

The distinction matters. A transit state benefits from energy passing through its territory; a trading hub facilitates exchange, resale and market services. Network power, however, emerges when several forms of infrastructure — gas, oil and electricity — simultaneously connect other countries to a pivotal state. Türkiye’s energy strategy should therefore be understood as a three-stage transition: from transit corridor to trading hub, and from trading hub to network power.

Gas: From geography to market

The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, or TANAP, remains the clearest expression of Türkiye’s geographical advantage. According to official TANAP information, the pipeline was designed with an initial annual capacity of 16 billion cubic metres (bcm), of which 10 bcm was allocated for Europe, with scope for further expansion through additional investment.

But moving gas is not the same as becoming a gas hub. A genuine hub requires diversified suppliers, storage capacity, access to LNG, opportunities for resale and, ultimately, credible mechanisms for trading and price discovery.

The agreement between BOTAŞ and Shell illustrates Ankara’s movement in this direction. Türkiye’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources announced that, beginning in 2027, Shell will supply BOTAŞ with around 4 bcm of LNG annually through 40 cargoes over a ten-year period. The agreement also allows deliveries from loading ports and unloading at European terminals, giving BOTAŞ greater flexibility beyond Türkiye’s domestic market.

Iran represents another dimension of this diversification. The Iran–Türkiye pipeline was developed around a long-term agreement for roughly 10 bcm of gas annually. However, Reuters reported in April 2026 that the long-standing contract was approaching expiry and that Türkiye had imported around 7.6 bcm of Iranian gas in 2025.

Iran’s significance, therefore, extends beyond the volume supplied. The relationship illustrates how Ankara seeks to balance supplies from Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran with growing LNG access in order to increase its strategic options.

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Oil: Iraq and the importance of Ceyhan

If gas connects Türkiye to the Caucasus and Europe, Iraqi oil reveals the southern dimension of Ankara’s energy network. The Iraq–Türkiye pipeline has historically carried crude from Kirkuk towards the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, creating one of the most important infrastructure links between Baghdad and Ankara.

With the previous pipeline framework reaching its endpoint in July 2026, the two countries have sought to broaden rather than abandon their energy relationship. Türkiye’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources has described the objective as establishing a more comprehensive energy agreement with Iraq. Discussions have extended beyond oil, including the potential future transportation of Iraqi gas — and possibly gas from other Gulf producers — through Türkiye towards European markets.

This is where transit can evolve into network power. For Ankara, Ceyhan is potentially more than an oil terminal: it can become an intersection connecting Iraqi energy resources with Mediterranean and European markets.

Yet the history of interruptions and disputes surrounding the pipeline also demonstrates a central limitation of geographical leverage. Geography produces durable influence only when legal rules, tariffs and the distribution of benefits remain sufficiently predictable for all parties.

Electricity: Türkiye’s overlooked source of leverage

Perhaps the least discussed element of Türkiye’s regional energy strategy is electricity.

Unlike oil and gas, which can be stored and redirected, electricity networks require continuous system management, transmission capacity and operational coordination. Cross-border electricity connections can therefore create relationships deeper than a conventional buyer-seller transaction.

Iraq provides a clear example. In June 2025, the Iraqi News Agency reported that the capacity of the Türkiye–Iraq electricity interconnection would be increased from 300 to 600 megawatts. Data from Türkiye’s transmission system operator, TEİAŞ, also show transmission capacity towards Iraq through the Cizre–Kasek connection reaching up to 600 MW in 2026.

Iran is also part of this architecture. TEİAŞ lists a separate Türkiye–Iran interconnection through Van and Khoy within Türkiye’s cross-border electricity infrastructure.

Ankara is thus connected westwards to Europe’s electricity system, eastwards to Iran and southwards to Iraq. This emerging electrical geography complements Türkiye’s oil and gas infrastructure and expands the meaning of an “energy hub” beyond natural gas alone.

Syria: When connectivity becomes influence

Syria demonstrates more directly how energy connectivity can generate political consequences. Reuters reported in August 2025 that Azerbaijan was beginning gas exports to Syria through Türkiye, with annual supplies expected to reach 1.2 bcm. The gas was intended to support Syrian power plants with combined generation capacity of around 1,200 MW.

Türkiye is neither the principal producer of this gas nor its final consumer. Its strategic value lies in connectivity: linking Azerbaijani supply with Syrian electricity demand.

That intermediary role can translate economic access into political influence, particularly in a country where reconstruction and the restoration of basic services depend heavily on reliable energy supplies.

Yet energy dependence does not guarantee political alignment. If connectivity becomes an instrument of repeated pressure, governments will have stronger incentives to search for alternatives. Türkiye’s advantage is therefore greatest when its infrastructure expands rather than restricts the options available to its partners.

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Europe: The ultimate test of Türkiye’s hub ambitions

The greatest constraint on Türkiye’s ambitions may ultimately emerge in Europe. Türkiye receives Azerbaijani gas and LNG while remaining connected to Russian supplies through TurkStream.

In January 2026, the Council of the European Union approved the gradual prohibition of Russian gas imports, with new requirements designed to verify the country of production before gas enters the EU.

The strategic message for Ankara is clear: gas does not acquire a new origin simply by passing through Türkiye.

If Türkiye wants to move beyond being a transit corridor and become a credible hub for European markets, traceability, transparency and competitive access to infrastructure will matter as much as pipeline capacity.

Power comes from connection, not transit alone

Türkiye’s future energy power should not be measured by a single pipeline or even by the total volume of gas crossing its territory. Its deeper advantage lies in the overlap of three networks: Gas from Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan and global LNG markets; Iraqi oil moving towards Ceyhan; and electricity interconnections linking Türkiye with Europe and its eastern and southern neighbours.

But being at the centre of a network is not the same as controlling it. Partners will accept deeper dependence on Turkish infrastructure only when that dependence gives them more options rather than becoming an instrument of coercion.

The decisive question, therefore, is not how much energy can cross Turkish territory. It is whether Ankara can build an architecture in which Europe, the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq and Syria all see continued connectivity through Türkiye as serving their own economic and energy-security interests.

If it can, Türkiye’s geography will evolve from a transit advantage into genuine network power — influence derived not from owning the energy itself, but from becoming increasingly difficult to bypass in the architecture through which it moves.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.